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Abstract 
This qualitative research set out to explore how far understanding is shared between 
systemic psychotherapists who write expert reports for family courts and the judges who 
receive them, with particular reference to various concepts involved in the process such as 
truth, objectivity and expertise itself. Data obtained from semi-structured interviews with 
systemic “experts” and family judges was analysed using Grounded Theory. In response to 
ideas emerging from initial interviews, the focus broadened to consider how, despite the 
potential advantages of a relational approach to this working context, the possibility of these 
benefits being delivered by the involvement of systemic psychotherapists remained 
“invisible” to judges. Different beliefs were identified around the idea of being able to assess 
openness to change without actually introducing change. The complexity of cases and the 
responsibility of making hugely significant  decisions about children and families were seen 
to require family judges to be more “interventive” than judges in other areas of law, and 
systemic experts to be more “certain” than in other contexts. The values, beliefs and sources 
of knowledge which inform the ways in which experts and judges reconcile those challenges 
and tensions within the context of a rapidly changing family justice system were compared.  
Some ideas were generated both about ways of supporting and enhancing these 
professional roles, and about implications for practice. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The focus of my research and of this thesis is the interface between systemic family 
psychotherapists who act as expert witnesses in conducting assessments for the family 
courts and the judges who receive their testimony. This testimony is always given in the form 
of a written report and sometimes, in addition, by the giving of evidence in person during the 
hearing. This process involves complex areas of interaction and information exchange (for 
example, the way the expert conducts the assessment, the way the conclusions and 
observations are communicated in writing, the meaning that is given to that writing , or to 
verbal testimony about it,  by the judge and the decisions that are reached as a result). 
There may be different ways of understanding or explaining those complexities and the 
research question: 
“Judges in the family courts and the family psychotherapists who make reports to them: how 
far is understanding shared about the nature of this process?”  
is intended to explore not only those potential differences, but any similarities. 
My interest in this question is informed by personal experience at two levels.  The first is that 
of working in the public sector as a systemic and family psychotherapist over many years in 
both child and adolescent and working age mental health services.  The prospect of being 
required to make a report to a court of law or to appear before one was generally regarded 
both by myself and the majority of colleagues with great reluctance, and the possibility of 
becoming involved in legal process, or a request for an expert report being the only reason 
for a referral, would affect the likelihood of a referral’s being accepted.  There have been 
occasions when family court judges have requested or even ordered that specific therapeutic 
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interventions should be made and I have wondered what knowledge of clinical practice and 
theory is informing that request.  
Alongside this experience I live with a family court judge.  I do not believe he is unique in his 
profession in the openness he has shown to the usefulness of systemic ideas in thinking (in 
general, rather than in specific cases) about children and families and their relationships.  
Family court judges have to make decisions about incredibly complex issues which have a 
far-reaching significance for the welfare of children. Lord Justice Thorpe (2001 p xi) 
commented “Perhaps the profoundest advance in the family judicial system over the past 
decade has been the recognition that good results depend upon interdisciplinary 
collaboration.  The bond between the judge and any expert concerned with child health and 
development is particularly close since in some degree they share the daunting task of 
deciding the future of the child”.  Joanna North, a psychotherapist who works as an expert 
witness, commented (2009, p13) “I have grown to have a deep respect for the way that 
judges draw on as much information as possible in order to make fair-minded and 
appropriate decisions – about the most difficult matters such as removing children from the 
care of their parents..” 
I am aware that nothing in my clinical training has prepared me for the possibility of working 
within a legal context.   I began this project with a hypothesis that some of the concepts 
which in my clinical training were regarded as fundamental to clinical work, such as 
“objectivity- in- parenthesis” (Maturana 1988 p41) or the “not-knowing” approach (Anderson 
and Goolishian 1992), might find short shrift in a world which demands objectivity and 
expertise of the clinicians who appear before it (Re R, 1991).  Raitt and Zeedyk (2000, p4) 
define the function of an expert witness as “to provide to the “trier of fact” (i.e. the jury or the 
judge) knowledge that is considered to be so specialist, abstract or complex that it requires 
an expert to explain it”.   Similarly one might contrast Andersen’s (1992) espousal of the 
“both-and” position with the comments of Lord Hoffman in Re B (2008): “If a legal rule 
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requires a fact to be proved (a "fact in issue"), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it 
happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. ...The fact either 
happened or it did not”.  
Some fairly cynical comments have been made about the relationship between 
psychological therapies and the judiciary.  Richards (1988) argued that some judges appear 
reluctant to pay attention to findings emerging from psychological research: “the general 
ethos of judgments is that what is good or bad for children and what constitutes an 
appropriate environment for development is something that can be derived from common 
sense and the experience of everyday life” (p172).   King and Piper (1995, p 54) comment 
that “...experts may be selected and their opinions heeded according to whether their 
perspective on child care coincides with that of the judge deciding the case”.  Despite the 
advances in this area that Lord Justice Thorpe identified in 2001, he was still of the opinion 
in 2007 that “lawyers are generally cautious of dialogues with other learnings”.  Yet units 
have evolved (for example, the Centre for Mediation and Conflict Resolution at the Institute 
for Family Therapy and the Marlborough Family Centre) which, unlike the agencies in which 
I have practised, have developed a specialism in making systemic assessments for the 
courts.  There are also systemic psychotherapists working in specialist court assessment 
services (Millard 2008).  I was interested in how they have managed to do this and whether 
there is useful learning for both systemic thinking and the judiciary in trying to understand 
more about the process. I was also convinced of the efficacy of a systemic approach in other 
contexts and wondered how far this was transferable. My own curiosity on this matter 
coincided with the following factors which created some external rationale for undertaking 
this research. 
In recent years there have been some very high profile court cases that called into question 
the quality of medical expert witnesses in certain types of case.  In the context of this 
proposed research it is interesting that there was particular concern that claims of “certainty” 
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were being made where it did not appear that these claims were well founded. As a result, in 
2004 a report was commissioned from the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Liam Donaldson.  The 
result, “Bearing Good Witness: proposals for reforming the delivery of medical expert 
evidence in family law cases” was published in 2006.  The key proposal was that the 
National Health Service (NHS) should establish teams of specialist doctors and other 
professionals within local NHS organisations to improve the quality of the medical expert 
witness service by introducing mentoring, supervision and peer review. There was no formal 
input from the systemic psychotherapy discipline as a whole on this important development.  
Lord Justice Wall commented (2007, p20) “the problems the family justice system now faces 
in relation to expert witnesses has (sic) much more to do with supply and demand, and the 
reluctance of the expert witness to give evidence, than with any anxiety that the experts 
themselves will prove unreliable”. Research which might inform systemic practitioners’ 
connection with this issue therefore seemed timely.  
There appeared to be a lack of professional training in this area at least on the judicial side, 
and there has been little previous research.  Findings might potentially have some use for 
the future training either of systemic psychotherapists in writing reports for court or becoming 
an “expert”, or for the training of the judiciary in the particular expertise of systemic 
psychotherapists.   
The Family Justice Council (FJC) was established in 2004 with the aim (FJC website 2009) 
of “stimulating better and quicker outcomes for families and in the family court service.  The 
Council sits between government and the courts of the family justice system.”  Part of the 
FJC’s business plan for 2008/9 in connection with this objective was to examine the use and 
role of experts in the family justice system and I hoped my research might contribute in some 
way to this objective.  I obtained the support of the Chair of the Experts’ Committee of the 
FJC, Lord Justice Thorpe, in undertaking this research, presumably on the basis that it might 
contribute to the improvement in quality of expert reports. 
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Παντα χωρει, οὐδεν μενει. Δις ἐς τον αὐτον ποταμον οὐκ ᾀν ἐμβαιης 
(“All things are in flux.  You cannot step into the same river twice” Heracleitus quoted in Plato 
Cratylus 402a) 
 
This quotation encapsulates my experience of conducting a research project over an 
extended period of time (the proposal was approved in July 2009).   Not only have new ideas 
constantly emerged, both through encountering previously untapped resources (new 
participants, new articles, journals and books) and through revisiting “old” resources, but the 
wider world moves on, the goal posts change, and what was  taken for granted at the 
beginning becomes a distant memory.  The pilot projects set up in response to “Bearing 
Good Witness” have been evaluated and the FJC has commissioned its own research into 
the quality of expert reports (both of these are discussed in more detail subsequently). In 
addition there have been major shifts of policy which have challenged my original 
assumptions on the relevance of my research. The most significant changes have been the 
Family Justice Review in 2011 which encouraged less reliance on expert witnesses and 
stronger judicial case management, and changes in Government policy since the election in 
2010 with regard to the allocation of legal aid for expert reports in private law cases.  
 
Law, policy and expert witnesses 
In order to set the context for this research I will summarise here developments and shifts in 
direction in law and public policy which have had a significant impact on the subject matter.  I 
have chosen to take as my starting point the Children Act 1989, as the comments of all the 
participants in the research are located in practice since then. The research is limited to 
family courts in England. 
I would consider the following initiatives or legislation to be the most significant in relation to 
the role of the expert witness in the family courts: 
 The Children Act 1989 in opening up the field for more “psychological” experts 
6 
 
 The Woolf report 1996 in encouraging joint instruction of experts 
 The Children Act 2004 in emphasising the role of the NHS in offering expertise to the 
courts 
 Bearing Good Witness (2006) in setting out to improve the quality of expert reports, 
to recruit more experts and encourage the development of multi-disciplinary teams 
 The Public Law Outline (2008) in highlighting the connection between the 
commissioning of expert reports and delay in resolving cases  
 The Family Justice Review (2011) in identifying a trend towards unjustified use of 
expert reports and in recommending a reduction in their use in order to reduce delay 
 The Legal Services Commission’s (LSC’s) changes since the 2010 election in 
payment rates for experts and in restricting the availability of legal aid in most private 
law cases. (The LSC was replaced by the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) in April 2013 as a 
result of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012.  
Throughout this thesis I have tried to use the title which fits the period under 
discussion rather than repeat this explanation). 
It is almost as if a wheel has come full circle in the last 20 years: from a huge expansion in the role to 
ever-narrowing parameters. These shifts in policy will be explored in more detail in the literature 
review which follows, but the assumptions upon which the initial rationale for this research was based 
have become increasingly unreliable, and the conclusions to be drawn less straightforward than I 
imagined at the outset.  The impact of these changes will be explored further in the discussion and 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This is a topic on which there is very little directly relevant literature but a huge amount which 
is contingently relevant.  I have decided to manage this by beginning with a thorough review 
of what is directly relevant and then attempting to give an overview of other areas which 
have some bearing on the subject. As I explained in the introduction, there will be a focus on 
the period since the Children Act 1989 as this coincides not only with changes in legislation 
which had  enormous implications for expert witness reports,  but also with the period on 
which all the participants in the research have based their comments. The review will 
concentrate on the question: “how far is understanding shared about the nature of the 
process?” rather than on descriptions or factual accounts of practice, and will (again in line 
with the limits of the research) privilege material which relates to the English family courts. 
What have systemic practitioners written about writing reports for court? 
Tuffnell (1993) analysed reports written for the family courts by child psychiatrists, looking for 
reports which showed evidence of a systemic approach (defined as containing information 
about legal and family systems, interpersonal rather than individual description and more 
emphasis on feedback loops), a family therapy approach (containing enactment, reframing, 
positive connotation, circular questions and a neutral stance) or neither.  Her hypothesis was 
that, given that (p414) “the role of the expert is … to provide an opinion or story which both 
encompasses and reinterprets the facts”, a systemic or family therapy approach might be 
distinguished by containing information relevant to the unit rather than the individual family 
members.  Of the 28 reports analysed, 10 showed evidence of a systemic approach and six 
evidence of a family therapy approach. One of the participants commented (p418): “I find 
little opportunity to use a systemic approach in this kind of work – I also doubt that lawyers 
would appreciate it”. The advantages of a systemic/family therapy approach were seen to be 
the opportunity to offer advice on avoiding conflict and also on what therapeutic work might 
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be possible and how to create the context for it; disadvantages included the lack of an 
empirical base, the possibility that circular descriptions might imply avoidance of personal 
responsibility, and the difficulty of maintaining a circular description of interactions when 
faced by a lawyer seeking to represent a client’s “truth” and a judge seeking to fix 
responsibility. 
Tuffnell et al also identified (1996 p 365) that “feedback to experts by ‘user’ groups such as 
judges is often lacking”, and conducted a survey of judges as to what elements they would 
like to see included in reports. These included: a statement about factors which might bias 
the expert’s opinion, (such as previous contact), a summary of the hypotheses guiding the 
assessment, and an opinion about the nature, causes and consequences of actions and 
occurrences: all preferably within about 20 pages! 
The experience of being a family therapist and an expert witness in a case where the father 
in a family had killed the mother was explored by Kaplan (1998); the case was to determine 
which set of grandparents should care for the children.  Kaplan felt that his role as expert 
was (p480)” not to simplify matters for the court, but to add complexity” and to (p481) 
“describe the issues and connote the motives and intentions of the adversaries in ways that 
counteract competitiveness and enhance co-operation”.  He identified the difference that 
such an approach could make as understanding and communicating the child’s point of 
view, exploring and influencing the family’s view regarding the child’s best interest, positively 
connoting the motivations of the competing families, and challenging the two options 
assumption.  Kaplan describes negotiating with a barrister (p491) about her cross-
examination:  “it would be against the interests of achieving a satisfactory resolution for her 
to attack Sheila in the witness box with the same rigour that her client had been attacked”.  
Sharing this anecdote with judges and asking for their opinions about Kaplan’s intervention 
became an addendum to the judicial interviews. 
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The increasing trend for courts to request professionals to act as expert witnesses alongside 
a reluctance among the professionals to comply created a difficulty for Sluckin (2000)  in that 
his “ability to believe in and sympathise with all the viewpoints put forward”  would not fit with 
the court’s need to decide between opposing views. He also initially shared the consensus of 
opinion in his multi-disciplinary team that reporting to the court “contaminated” the process of 
developing a confidential relationship with families as well as compromising a non-
judgmental position.  However, he subsequently described his exploration of the relationship 
between the therapeutic and legal contexts (“two seemingly irreconcilable worlds” p37) 
which resulted in a conclusion that systemic ideas could reconcile these different contexts by 
seeing the expert witness as working within the hermeneutic or interpretive  tradition, for 
example by  offering an overview of interpretations of meaning in a way that assists the 
judge to know how to go on, working towards reconciliation and promoting dialogue.  
Systemic ideas such as double description, objectivity in parentheses, the not-knowing 
position and social constructionism  (these ideas will be referenced in more detail later in the 
literature review) might conflict with the courts’ requirement for a definitive view, but S luckin 
suggested that this dilemma could be resolved by representing himself as (p39) a “different 
sort of expert from the one who believes his expertise comes from the resource of a more 
valid set of knowledge”: an expert who can use “systemic eloquence” (Oliver 1996) to co-
ordinate with and join the grammar of multiple contexts.  
A special edition of Context featured a number of articles describing systemic practice in 
various contexts where there is a statutory element.  In their editorial (p1) Gorell Barnes and 
Cooklin (2003) highlighted the responsibilities of therapists to use their systemic abilities to 
promote reparative thinking and ameliorate the damage which can be done, particularly to 
children, within the court process. 
It is also argued (Cooklin 2003) that an expert has an opportunity to comment, often to 
useful effect, on deficiencies in services being offered to children and families.  However, he 
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was also concerned that the adversarial nature of court proceedings can be damaging to 
relationships, and that the increasing “medicalisation” of the law (which connects to the 
increasing use of experts) has not only encouraged (p4) “the origination and then overuse of 
‘syndromes’” such as “parental alienation syndrome”, but also, by its focus on the 
deficiencies and pathology of the individual, deflected attention from wider systemic 
problems and possible solutions.  The requirement that “findings of fact” remain the province 
of the judge alone can also lead to situations where an assessing therapist may be so 
anxious to avoid taking a position on an allegation as to imply disbelief.  However, Cooklin 
also suggested that the formality of the court context could not only enable families to feel 
that justice had been done, but also to hear things in a new way.  Finally he defined several 
elements of “systemic wisdom” in the legal context: recognition of the multiple impacts on 
children and families; awareness of the multiplicity of connections (including culture and 
ethnicity) in the child’s wider system and the professional network; knowing how to promote 
the possibility of change; recognising the circularity of relationships and understanding 
recursive loops. 
“Anyone who has been at the  receiving end of ‘smart’ cross-examinations...will know that 
seeming even-handedness, self-reflexivity and self-disclosure can all be reframed as 
muddled thinking, prejudice, political correctness or plain waffle” (Asen 2003, p8).  Despite 
this experience, Asen argues that having a regard for the welfare of children offers a 
rationale for taking up this challenge.  Like Cooklin, Asen expresses wariness of a trend in 
private law cases towards “mother blaming”; in this connection he identifies (p9) a cohort of 
“so-called ‘independent’ experts” with these “strong views” and has for the time being 
decided that for this reason (“so distant from the systemic framework that I still espouse”) he 
has no wish to be involved in private law cases: “but then, does one collude with this trend if 
one withdraws from the field....what then about the children’s plight?” His suggestion that a 
team approach can be one solution to such dilemmas is also advocated by Fyvel and 
Mandin (2003). 
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Writing for a multi-disciplinary audience within the family justice system rather than a 
systemic audience, Asen (2007) describes many systemic features of the way his team 
assesses families for court (although he does not explicitly name them as such).  He asserts 
that a family assessment is not merely a static snapshot of a situation, but an interactive 
process.  He advocates transparency within the process (for example, by not reading the 
“bundle” of court papers or having meetings with professionals which exclude the family) in 
order to create a new therapeutic alliance with the family. The setting of tasks and giving of 
positive and negative feedback over time allows the potential for change to be tested, and 
work is carried out in different contexts and live interactions encouraged. His team also work 
with several families together which enables families to see patterns and interactions similar 
to their own but from an observer position.  
 
The preference of adversarial contexts for dichotomies, clarity and certainty, wanting experts 
to be experts, caused Smith (2003) to find her  work with the legal system a struggle.  She 
stresses the importance of being aware of context, and gives a case example to illustrate 
how the process of formal assessment for court and the privileges it confers of bringing 
combinations of people together can of itself bring about change (in this case, a father 
recognising that his pursuit of contact was not in his daughter’s best interest because he had 
heard that she did not desire it from her directly rather than from her mother and maternal 
grandmother).  She describes using the systemic concept of the multiverse to inform the 
provision to the court of a best and worst case scenario.  She also stresses the importance 
of identifying the research evidence for recommendations, as well as the strengths and 
resources of families.  She describes seeing evidence-giving in public law cases as a 
therapeutic intervention at many levels, but primarily a message of compassion to parents. 
Smith also comments with surprise on the lack of cross-fertilisation between public and 
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private law, and also on how little training she had to take on the work, most of her learning 
being done “on the job”. 
A systemic model of assessment for court was developed by Blow (2003) which aspires to 
(p22) “perturb all the players” (that is, professional networks and agencies as well as the 
families involved), by using a circular rather than a linear concept of causation and moving 
the focus away from finding one truth to reflecting on how things have come to be the way 
they are and the possibilities for change.  She believes that such an approach is only 
possible within the context of joint instruction (that is, instruction by all the parties to an 
action). A case example is given which illustrates how the aim is achieved of going beyond 
individual narratives to an account that (p23) “speculates about the gains and losses 
involved for everyone in order to come to a new narrative that can encapsulate all the 
different stories”.  Blow describes seeking feedback from the professionals involved and was 
told that systemic assessments had been particularly valued where there were entrenched 
difficulties and different opinions among the professionals; the involvement of children was 
especially appreciated.  
There may be contradictions between an “orderly and standardised” legal structure and 
“messy, complex and unpredictable” psychotherapy.  (Charles 2005 p51). Charles argues 
(p52) that legal conversations are seeking truth and therefore incompatible with a systemic 
perspective where “multiple explanations...are seen as valid” and describes how his 
courtroom account of his view of the diagnostic manual DSMIV  as “a way to describe  a 
situation and symptoms ...that is not the whole person” was presented as discounting the 
validity of DSMIV, so that he was required to pay particular and unfamiliar attention to his 
use of language, assumptions and metaphor.  He gives (p64) a list of questions that 
therapists should be prepared to face under cross-examination on the subject of what he 
calls “clinical epistemology”.  
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A systemic psychotherapist who works with families involved in care proceedings, (Davis 
2009) argues that psychotherapy has the potential to make an enormous contribution to the 
mental health and well-being of families in these situations. He considers that the systemic 
perspective is particularly helpful in making sense of the involvement of professional 
networks in families’ lives.  He identifies (p27) a particular skill required as being 
communicating essential complex matters “in a more straightforward but nevertheless 
coherent fashion”.  
Chimera and Marsden-Allen (both experienced systemic practitioners who act as expert 
witnesses) presented a workshop at a systemic conference in 2009 entitled “The Court as a 
Reflecting Team”.  Their stated aim was to “debunk the myth that doing court work is not 
compatible with systemic thinking” and to think how the potential for the court process to be 
therapeutic could be enhanced.  Among the arguments put forward by systemic workshop 
participants (personal communication 2009) for court work being incompatible with their 
thinking were the adversarial, “right/wrong” nature of the proceedings, the delay (too late for 
an intervention), the need for certainty and truth, the vested interest (the therapist is being 
paid) and the need to take an “expert” position.  The presenters argued for seeing systemic 
court work as a different sort of expertise where the assessment is an intervention in itself, 
with an emphasis on change, on addressing issues of disempowerment and on highlighting 
patterns. They asserted that the process enables reflection at multiple levels: with individuals 
and their families, with other involved professionals, with lawyers and guardians, and with 
the judges and the court system. Chimera (2010) responds to a suggestion from family law 
solicitor Gregorian (2010) that family therapists should become involved in private law 
disputes as a more effective alternative to mediation. Although uncertain as to how this 
might happen, she agrees that systemic approaches can help to reconcile previously 
conflicting marital narratives, and advocates that systemic practitioners own their expertise 
on the needs of children when parents separate, and use it to “educate” parents. Her 
experience as an expert witness has informed an opinion that (p54) “under the auspices of a 
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judge who is sensitive and empathetic to the needs of children” the court arena can offer the 
possibility of change and positive intervention.  Her view is that a systemic “expert” brings to 
the process a relational rather than an individual perspective, an appreciation of context, a 
tendency to avoid blame and above all the promotion of the voice of the child.  
Gorell Barnes (2010, personal communication), described the way she uses attachment 
theory in her work with families before the family courts in conflicted private law proceedings.  
Her perception is that “family courts make all sorts of attempts not to operate in an 
adversarial way”, and that the court process can act as affect regulator, the ritual being 
soothing and containing of difficult emotions.  It also creates the possibility of saying what 
needs to happen in a family, an intervention which is “essential but not in the therapeutic 
canon”, as well as centralising the voice of the child. She argued that there is a 
“problematised division” between therapy and what the court requires and also that the 
outcome and the therapeutic effect of the assessment depends entirely on “the sympathy 
and understanding of the judge”. 
A number of the articles referenced above refer to the reluctance of systemic/family 
therapists to become involved in the court process.  Woody (2007) (an American lawyer: I 
have been unable to trace anything similar in English professional journals) gives advice to 
family therapists on how to avoid getting drawn into the role of expert witness even if they 
are subpoena’d as a “fact” witness . Woody argues that there are strong ethical and practical 
reasons for avoiding the dual role. 
There is some literature by systemic practitioners who are working alongside the family 
courts although not directly as expert witnesses. Blincow et al (2007) are part of a multi-
disciplinary mental health team including a systemic psychotherapist who argue for the 
introduction of “resilient therapy” (which aims to develop personal characteristics such as 
hope, bravery and self-efficacy) in the context of what they call a “therapeutic assessment” 
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for court. Gee (2007), a family therapist and mediator, identifies the importance of talking to 
children about the impact on them of matrimonial disputes. 
There is also a body of literature on reconciling systemic approaches with working in 
statutory contexts.  For example, Crowther et al (1990) describe the dilemmas of a multi-
disciplinary family therapy team in managing the expectations of referrers that they would 
offer expert opinions, against their own wish not to be involved in helping families and 
simultaneously making decisions about them.  They resolved this by acknowledging the 
statutory context but maintaining a position of neutrality by the use of such questions as 
(p113) “how are you going to persuade Social Services to get off your backs?”.  They also 
separated the roles of therapist and “reporter”. 
Lang et al (1990) suggest that Maturana’s (1985) concept of domains of professional 
practice can be useful in managing such tensions.  Court work would fall into the domain of 
“production”, where certain norms (such as legislation) are taken for granted and there is 
consensus about ways of doing things.  Therapy would fall into the domain of explanation 
where the focus is the elaboration of multiple accounts and perspectives.  Decisions about 
which domain has the higher context at any point in time are taken in the domain of 
aesthetics where the professional is (p 44) “playing out a particular moral commitment” as 
well as paying attention to maintaining a neutral position.  
The tendency for professionals working with families to act as if there is a normal ideal of 
“family” to which they must live up is challenged by McCarthy (1994).  She advocates a “fifth 
province” approach (the term refers to the ancient Celtic myth of a fifth province in Ireland) 
which represents a disposition towards tolerance and empathy and (p233) “highlights an 
ambivalent social domain which is constituted in the holding together of contradictory and 
often non-equal positions..and reincludes a focus on marginal versions of reality and 
lifestyle”.  This does not preclude having a preference for a particular way of seeing a 
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situation, but requires a focus on the effects of dominant discourses.  This is particularly 
relevant where the opinions of professionals are accorded significant influence. 
This review of systemic literature on the process of reporting to family courts shows some 
sense of potential tension between ideas. On the one hand writers express doubts about the 
compatibility of systemic ideas such as circularity, objectivity in parentheses, the not-
knowing position and self-reflexivity with the court’s need for truth and certainty.  On the 
other hand they reveal a strong sense not only that they have a duty to use their skills to 
promote the welfare of children and families wherever they can, but also that a systemic 
approach has much to offer the process. Frequently cited advantages in using such an 
approach include the promotion of co-operation, reconciliation and dialogue, the possibility of 
wider system analysis as well as the opportunity for using the court process in itself to 
promote change. These practitioners have obviously devoted much time and energy to 
making sense of the apparent contradictions and providing a rationale for their decision to 
undertake the work.  This raises the question whether there are any features or 
characteristics of their thinking, training or ethical position which set systemic “experts” apart 
from their colleagues who do not undertake the work, or whether their careers have simply 
evolved differently. 
What has been written about reports for court for or by clinicians from other 
therapeutic disciplines?  
There is more literature in relation to forensic work for other disciplines, particularly child 
psychotherapy, psychology and psychiatry.  These include dedicated journals (the Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology) and text books (for example Welldon and van Velsen 
(eds) (1996), Black et al (1998), and Bond and Sandhu (2005).  Much of the practice 
described is work with offenders rather than acting as an expert witness.  Youell (2002) and 
Tydeman (2007) have written about their work in a multi-disciplinary service assessing 
families for court, but the focus is on the particular contribution of  child psychotherapy in that 
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context.  Where the role of the expert is discussed, for example in Welldon and van Velsen 
(1996) p251, the advice tends to the practical (content and headings) rather than to “fit” 
although the possibility of “feelings of anxiety induced by what may be perceived as a 
strange, threatening or even hostile atmosphere” are conceded. All draw a clear distinction 
between putting oneself forward as an expert witness (which requires therapists’ reflection 
on “whether they have the relevant qualifications and practical experience in the field in 
question”  (Bond and Sandhu 2005 p61)) and becoming involved as the treating therapist.  
One of the principle challenges of the work is seen as being the different ways of thinking 
and understanding between the world of therapy and the legal world; see for example Bond 
and Sandhu (2005 p4): “the therapist’s trained intuition is a valid source of 
information...intuition is of much lower standing in law and is often treated with suspicion.  
Lawyers tend to approach human experience in a very different way”. Similarly Kennedy 
(2005) comments on the difficulty for an expert witness of finding a language that the court 
can understand but that does not dilute the expert’s opinion.  The court is defined as a place 
where words are given (p216) “almost magical status”; and where words can (p217) “give 
the impression that we all know what we are doing, when quite often we are struggling with 
uncertainty”. 
Strasburger et al (1997) argued that there is an irreconcilable role conflict in serving as both 
a psychotherapist and an expert witness: (p449) “treatment in psychotherapy is brought 
about through an empathic relationship that has no place in, and is unlikely to survive, the 
questioning and reporting of a forensic evaluation.  To assume either role ..is to compromise 
one’s ability to fulfil the other”.  Other legal requirements which are identified as 
irreconcilable with therapy are the search for truth, the reasonable degree of certainty, the 
emphasis on pathology, the outer, “real” world, time limits and constraints on confidentiality.  
A multi-disciplinary team set up to carry out assessments for court in response to the 
proposals made by the Chief Medical Officer Sir Liam Donaldson in his report “Bearing Good 
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Witness” was described by Millard (2008).  It is interesting that the original team included a 
systemic/family psychotherapist in additional to other disciplines, but the rationale for the skill 
mix is not explained.  If one analyses the number of disciplines and professions which 
constitute all the pilot teams set up in response to “Bearing Good Witness”, systemic 
psychotherapists represent 5%.  
The Psychotherapist (the journal of the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP)) 
produced a special edition on expert witnesses in Spring 2009.  North in the editorial 
comments on her discovery in acting as an expert witness that (p13) the British justice 
system has a “human face” and on her deep respect for the effort that judges put into 
making well-informed decisions about children.  Braier (2009) identifies the difficulties of 
working therapeutically with “findings of fact” for example in relation to abuse which is denied 
by the parent.  Westmacott (2011) suggests that the courts are not good at identifying the 
most appropriate expert to instruct or in understanding significant issues (such as the 
distinction between psychiatry and psychology) and argues therefore for increased dialogue 
between lawyers and psychological experts. 
It is interesting that where textbooks are discussing this issue in relation to the talking 
therapies generally rather than to specific professions (for example Kennedy 2005), there is 
often a notable and surprising omission (“when it comes to interviewing and assessing 
children and families, a number of different professionals have a role to play, including the 
child psychiatrist..the child psychotherapist,.. the clinical psychologist..and social workers.”)  
One wonders how far the “visibility” of systemic and family therapy in this context is 
connected to the way in which expert witnesses are recognised and recruited (given that, as 
Bond and Sandhu (2005) point out, there is no fixed test to qualify as an expert witness), and 
to the part which personal and geographical connections play in developing inter-
professional knowledge.  Mitchels (2009) who is both a solicitor and an expert witness, 
describes always choosing experts whose work she knows, or who are strongly 
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recommended by trusted colleagues.  The Dartington Conferences (a series of 
interdisciplinary conferences on the theme of family justice) appear to have evolved from the 
existence of a course on forensic psychotherapy at the Portman Clinic and to have thus 
developed the reputation of privileging a psychodynamic approach.  Research (Brophy, 
Wale and Bates, 1999) shows that psychiatrists and psychologists are the major providers of 
expert evidence. 
In comparing the position of  other “expert” disciplines to the process of preparing reports for 
court with that of the systemic “experts”, there seems to be a much greater emphasis on 
distinguishing – indeed keeping clearly apart – the functions of assessment and offering 
therapy.  This is in direct contrast to the systemic writers who see the possibility of change 
occurring in the assessment process as a positive advantage and even something at which 
to aim. Within the psychodynamic model there is a clear belief that the reporting process 
would have a negative impact on the relationship with the “client” which would preclude the 
possibility of any useful therapy.  In contrast the emphasis within the disciplines of psychiatry 
and psychology tends towards diagnosis and the application of tests and screenings which 
can produce results which appear more “scientific”.  It will be important in analysing the data, 
particularly the judicial interviews,  to see whether and how far these distinctions and beliefs 
emerge.  It will also be important to pay attention to the process by which mental health 
practitioners become “recruited” as experts in order to have a better understanding of 
whether the preponderance of psychological and psychiatric “experts” is the result of 
systemic practitioners failing to make themselves available for the role for whatever reason 
or not being given the opportunity.  
What has been written about reports for court from a legal perspective? 
In considering the legal literature on expert witnesses I include references to expert 
witnesses in general but exclude material which relates to any kind of expert evidence other 
than psychological. Mackay et al (1999) in explaining the admissibility of psychiatric and 
20 
 
psychological evidence (which was first allowed in 1896), refer (p322) to the “sceptical and 
cautious attitude” towards it of the judiciary, and draw attention to the “Turner Rule” of 1975 
which states that the qualifications of an expert do not necessarily make his (sic) opinion on 
matters of human nature within the limits of normality any more helpful than that of the jurors 
(this being in a criminal context).   
In this part of the review I have chosen to summarise only those aspects of the literature 
which relate to the more complex philosophical and ethical elements of the interface 
between systemic therapy and the family courts: there is a great deal of practical advice (for 
example, about the layout of the report, the arrangement for payment of fees, the timetable 
for various stages of the proceedings) which are not significant to the research question. 
Brophy  et al (2001) describe (p10 -11) the Children Act 1989 as creating “a new and very 
different landscape for the work of expert witnesses in child proceedings” in that courts in 
public law cases now required more help in establishing whether a child was suffering, or 
likely to suffer, “significant harm” (the “threshold” question). The 1989 Act required experts to 
advise on what might happen to children as well as what had happened: it also broadened 
the field of harm to include emotional and psychological damage as well as physical, thus 
opening up more possibilities for experts other than the purely medical to become involved. 
Brophy (2001) also describes a number of research projects on experts undertaken during 
the 1990s (Bates and Brophy 1996, Brophy et al 1999) which identified how demand began 
to exceed supply and raised concerns about the quality of reports.   
 Lord Woolf (1996) in his review of the wider civil justice system identified the cost to the 
system of appointing many experts as interfering with access to justice.  Different parties to 
proceedings were each instructing their own expert (the “hired gun” or as Woolf more 
diplomatically says the “partisan advocate”).  This led in 1998 to Part 35 of the Civil 
Procedure Rules which emphasised (para 35.3) the expert’s overriding duty to the court 
rather than to an individual party,  and also encouraged (para 35.1 and 35.7)the appointment 
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of one expert jointly instructed by all parties to give evidence only on “that which is 
reasonably required to resolve the proceedings”.  
In 2003, the Every Child Matters Green Paper was published to consult on the proposals made in the 
report of the same year of the formal enquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié. These proposals were 
broadly supported and subsequently enacted by the Children Act 2004.  Its main purpose  was “to 
create clear accountability for children’s services, to enable better joint working and to secure a better 
focus on safeguarding children” (Explanatory notes summary para 4 2004).  The relevance of this Act 
to the area of expert witnesses is in section 11, which clarifies that the National Health Service is 
expected to play a greater part than previously in procedures to safeguard children.  This may have 
created expectations that more professionals working in the health service would be prepared to take 
on the role of expert witness in private as well as public law cases in the interests of joint working 
around children.  
The Review of Child Care Proceedings System in England and Wales (2006) identified a number of 
issues as being significant for outcomes for families and children and for efficient use of resources, 
which include (p3) : “unnecessary delay, which is caused by a complex set of drivers, including .. 
expert evidence that takes a long time to commission and / or is requested late in proceedings and / 
or does not provide suitable guidance for the court”.  The concern about delay and its negative 
impact on children (the average time taken for public law cases was identified as being 51 weeks in 
care centres and 42 weeks in magistrates’ courts) led in 2008 to a new Public Law Outline with its 
emphasis on agreeing timetables for all aspects of the proceedings and on strong judicial case 
management.  A new Practice Direction for Experts was associated with this initiative. The pressure 
to produce reports within a certain time frame (family judges in the Midlands Region at the time of 
writing are only commissioning reports from experts who can deliver reports within three months) 
inevitably affects both the nature of the reports and the ability and willingness of practitioners to 
undertake them. 
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Alongside these changes, the Legal Services Commission, the body responsible for 
administering the annual £2 billion legal aid budget, and thus the payment of the majority of 
expert witnesses, were concerned at the ever–increasing cost of experts. It identified (p3 of 
the 2008 Alternative Commissioning of Experts Pilot) an increase in cost of 50% over the 2 
years to April 2007, as well as  problems of a shortage of suitable experts.  It therefore 
commissioned a pilot project to recruit the multidisciplinary teams envisaged by Donaldson.  
Further pressure was put on the LSC’s budget following the election of the coalition 
government in May 2010 and legal aid became unavailable to most private law cases in the 
family courts.  The Consortium of Expert Witnesses (2010) report to a parliamentary select 
committee identified that funding issues were a major factor in deterring experts from acting 
for the courts. The rates payable to experts have reduced and an informal survey 
undertaken by the Thames Valley Child Care Group in 2012 shows that many are 
withdrawing their services as a result. 
The report of the Family Justice Review (Norgrove, 2011)  comments (p117) on a trend 
towards “increasing and unjustified use of experts”.  A recent file study by the Ministry of 
Justice apparently showed that experts were used in 92% of care proceedings, with an 
average of 3.9 reports per case.  Concern focuses not only around the delay involved for the 
child, but also on the effect of repeated multiple assessments.  Norgrove’s recommendations 
include greater judicial involvement in establishing a clear reason why an expert report is 
needed and setting out the questions the expert is to be asked to address.  He also suggests 
another (wider) pilot on the use of multi-disciplinary teams for expert assessments with more 
involvement from the NHS.  This is significant for potential systemic experts as so many 
systemic therapists work in the NHS rather than privately.  Other ideas include “in-house” 
experts working permanently as part of the court team, and “hot-tubbing” or the giving of 
concurrent evidence to develop an in-court dialogue where several experts are involved. The 
judicial proposals for implementation of the review (Ryder 2012) include the comment (p8) 
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that reports are often “long on records and short on analysis” and that experts are “misused 
and overused”.  Additional training is planned for the judiciary on the use of expert evidence.  
Lord Justice Wall on becoming President of the Family Division in 2010 emphasised the 
need for judges to become more active or “interventionist” in case management (for 
example, in a discussion in October 2010 on the radio programme “Law in Action” ).  It 
remains a question of current debate as to exactly how far this intervention should extend in 
the matter of commissioning and instructing expert witnesses. Pearce et al (2011) identified 
(p59-60) an “increasingly heavy emphasis on experts’ views in terms of parenting capacity 
and children’s needs. These views have replaced both social work and legal judgments on 
welfare issues. Lawyers rely on experts for the content and direction of their advice, and 
therefore seek assessments to provide them with a foundation for their representation. 
Where experts’ opinions are adverse to the parent, representation can involve strong 
encouragement to settle. Judges rely on expert evidence in coming to their decisions. In this 
way judges share the burden of these difficult decisions with knowledgeable, independent 
professionals. Cases come to decide themselves through the accumulation of expert 
evidence.” Experts are usually suggested and identified by the parties’ legal representatives 
rather than by the judges, so there is an element of networking which will be further 
discussed in relation to my research findings.   
Practice Direction 35 (2012) outlines the requirements for “experts and assessors”: “Expert 
evidence should be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced by the pressures of 
litigation...   experts  should assist the court by providing objective, unbiased opinions on 
matters within their expertise, and should not assume the role of an advocate...Experts 
should consider all material facts, including those which might detract from their opinions. 
Experts should make it clear when a question or issue falls outside their expertise; and when 
they are not able to reach a definite opinion, for example because they have insufficient 
information”.   
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There is also some relevant case law: for example Re R (1991) emphasised that expert 
witnesses should be objective by including relevant facts even if those facts do not support 
their opinion.  Re M (1994) stressed the importance of experts being fully instructed, making 
sure that all the evidence on which the report is based is available to the court, and being  
kept up to date on developments in the case.   Wall, a high court family judge, in his 
handbook for expert witnesses (2000), emphasises as the highest context in the role of the 
expert that of helping judges to make the “right” (p1) decision about a child’s welfare; he also 
comments on the non-adversarial nature of the process (the expert should not be supporting 
one side against the other) and distinguishes the confidentiality of the court (that is, only 
certain parties are allowed access to information) from the idea that anything can be kept 
confidential from the court. Where a judge is attempting to establish a “fact” (for example, 
whether or not an injury occurred), he advises (p11) that the “safest way of expressing your 
opinion about a... particular condition is that it is ‘consistent’ or ‘inconsistent’ with a given set 
of facts”.  Experts are free to express opinions providing the opinion relates to a matter on 
which they are “qualified” to give expert evidence.    This point is amplified in the (2008) 
practice direction for experts in family proceedings relating to children, which refers to the 
duty (p6) to confine their opinion to questions “that are within the expert’s expertise (skill and 
experience)”; reports are expected to “make clear which of the facts stated ..are within the 
expert’s own knowledge” and to highlight whether a proposition is a hypothesis (especially if 
controversial) or (p8) “an opinion deduced in accordance with peer-reviewed and –tested 
technique, research and experience accepted as a consensus in the scientific community”. 
Malek (2010), writing on the rules of evidence,  illustrates this distinction by comparing an 
expert’s ability to (p1075) “identify facts which may be obscure or invisible to a lay witness”, 
such as a microbiologist identifying a microbe, from the inferences which are drawn from 
those “facts” (“the question of subjective assessment and interpretation which is the essence 
of opinion evidence”).  
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Cantwell and Mantle have both written extensively about the ethical and practical issues 
connected with assessing families and writing reports for court from the perspective of the 
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) practitioner. I have 
chosen to reference those articles which connect significantly either to systemic ideas or to 
issues which emerged during the research. Cantwell (2004) suggests that the kind of 
assessment which might assist the court would include thoughts as to how courts could 
assist families rather than become part of the problem, creative hypotheses about the 
function of entrenched conflict, and a broad understanding of how the parents’ life 
experience connects to their current behaviour.  He also identifies the scarcity of any 
resources such as family therapy to which families may be referred subsequently.  In 2007 
he talked (p747) about the relevance to private law cases of the systemic idea of “stuckness” 
and the way in which the professional system can become part of the problem.  Cantwell 
(2010) highlights that whilst CAFCASS officers are very well-versed in responding 
appropriately to some aspects of safeguarding, it is much more difficult to identify the 
emotional abuse connected with conflicted private law cases. Mantle (2003) writes about the 
difficulties of representing the child’s voice in report writing and (2008) presents research 
findings which illustrate ways in which “assessment” for the court can merge into 
“intervention”. 
The major theme that emerges for me from this review is the number of drivers that have 
been apparent over recent years within the overarching framework of safeguarding children.  
These include: 
 the desire to improve the quality of expert evidence 
 recognition of the need to increase the pool of available experts 
 the need to reduce reliance on experts and the associated cost 
 the helpfulness of good expert input in making complex and life-changing decisions 
about families 
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 the need to keep proceedings (and therefore the time taken for assessment) as short 
as possible 
 the need for impartiality 
 the need for advocacy of the marginalised 
 the relative benefits of assessment by a single expert or a multi-disciplinary team. 
It is obvious that these drivers often conflict with each other and that the relative weight 
given to each changes according to Government and legal policy. It will be interesting to 
reflect how experts and judges compare in the way they make sense of and work within this 
confusion. 
What research has been done about writing reports for court? 
King (1991) interviewed seven mental health professionals who acted as experts for the 
courts and concluded (p277) that “the impression gained from several of the interviews was 
that the legal rules and procedures, far from assisting in the search for truth, actually 
obstructed that search”.  Information about relationships was considered too complex and 
inaccessible to be translated into legal language  and one psychiatrist commented (p278) 
that she was disturbed by the way the law “required her to turn something which is not 
objective into objectivity for the sake of the kind of dialogue that we must have in court.” 
Other participants were unhappy about the adversarial nature of the process in which judges 
became “aloof arbiters” and the inappropriateness of making once and for all decisions 
about children. 
Tuffnell, Cottrell and Giorgiades (1996) compared the views of child psychiatrists, judges 
and other parties to family cases such as guardians ad litem as to what constitutes good 
practice for expert witnesses.  They identified (p365) that “feedback to experts by ‘user’ 
groups, such as judges, is often lacking” and (p366) that “little is known about how expert 
reports influence judicial decision making, and we know of no evaluative studies”.  To date I 
have not found any research in the field of family law that has filled this vacuum since. Genn 
27 
 
(2008),  in her Hamlyn lectures reviewing civil justice,  commented with surprise on the lack 
of research in this country into how judges make decisions, compared with other 
jurisdictions. Herlihy et al (2010) analysed the assumptions about human behaviour made by 
judges in making judgments about asylum claims.  Some doubts were raised as to how far 
the assumptions were in line with current empirical evidence. A similar question is raised by 
Kaganas (2011), who analysed judgments in contested contact disputes. 
Brophy and Bates (1998) researched the commissioning of experts by guardians ad litem in 
complex cases following the Children Act 1989, using a case vignette. They identified that 
the majority of experts appointed were child psychiatrists (some on the basis of a “national” 
reputation).  Factors influencing choice of expert in addition to reputation included 
experience in a particular field (e.g. child sexual abuse), status, location and personal 
knowledge.  One respondent (p52) stated: “I’d want a child and family psychiatrist for this, 
probably a ‘systems’ person”.  Most guardians favoured assessments over time with a 
particular emphasis on capacity to change.  There was agreement about the limited 
availability of trusted experts, and it appeared that local availability and familiarity with the 
quality of assessment likely to be produced were possibly as influential in the choice of 
expert as perceptions of boundaries between different disciplines.   The authors commented 
on the lack of any formal system of mandatory training and accreditation for experts, as well 
as the lack of peer support.  Brophy Wale and Bates (1999) conducted a national survey of 
the use of experts in child care proceedings.  They found that the great majority of expert 
reports were sought from psychiatrists and psychologists (this does not of course preclude 
their being systemic in orientation, but it does suggest that systemic psychotherapy is of 
itself not necessarily as highly valued). 
Brophy et al (2001) researched  the views of medical consultants who were involved as 
experts in public law cases.  A number of tensions were identified between the discourses of 
law and “child welfare knowledge” which included: 
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 the ethics of making recommendations about future treatment: should these be 
based on the child’s needs or what was actually available? Is it appropriate to  make 
a recommendation for another clinician to follow up? 
 is one working for the court or the child? Is one “doctor to the family” or “an adviser to 
the court” (p26) 
 The needs of the court for “hard” (physical forensic) evidence against the “soft” 
evidence of psychiatric and psychological experts.  Whilst it was felt that in America 
this had resulted  in “medicalised” language (e.g. sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome), there was evidence that in this country there was an ongoing negotiation 
to resist pressure to oversimplify: one participant commented (quoted p 84) “I never 
cease to be amazed at how competent good child care lawyers are in grasping the 
important basic issues” 
Other significant findings were that consultants felt that the possibility of cross-examination 
ensured a “well-disciplined framework” (p87) to their reports and saw it as part of the job, 
and also that some pitched their reports to parents (“I try to explore in my report ways in 
which the family could be helped by reading [it]” quoted p64). 
Brophy et al (2005) interviewed ethnic minority parents who had been involved in care 
proceedings and their solicitors about the experience.  In relation to expert reports, they 
found that there was considerable variation in the extent to which attention was paid to the 
family’s cultural and religious background.  This led sometimes  (more likely in the case of 
psychological assessments) to a sense of having been treated unfairly.  Brophy’s (2006) 
review of research findings in relation to care proceedings confirmed the view that the 
majority of expert reports (other than paediatric) are provided by psychiatrists and 
psychologists, and also highlighted once again the shortage of experienced and trusted 
people to undertake the role. 
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Concerns about the quality of experts’ reports had been raised by the quashing in 2003 of Sally 
Clark’s conviction in 1999 for the murder of her baby sons, a conviction which had been largely 
based on the evidence of paediatrician Dr Roy Meadow.  In his introduction to Bearing Good Witness 
(2006), the Chief Medical Officer Sir Liam Donaldson cites the Clark case, along with others, as being 
the context for “growing public unease about miscarriages of justice arising from the quality and 
validity of evidence given by medical expert witnesses in the courts”. He therefore sought to review  
“the use of medical expert witnesses within the family courts, and specifically in public law Children 
Act cases. It aims to identify the main problems with the current system and make proposals both to 
resolve them and to secure a sustainable supply of competent, quality-assured medical expert 
witnesses for care and supervision cases in the future.”  A quantitative survey of clinicians was 
undertaken to assess their experience or otherwise of acting as an expert witness, and their attitudes 
towards undertaking this kind of work. The survey concluded that, although it had been set up in 
response to concerns about the quality of expert evidence, the problem was actually more of supply.  
Clinicians were deterred by lack of training, fear of finding the court process stressful and time 
consuming, and the possibility of referral to the General Medical Council (the report only looked in 
detail at medically qualified expert witnesses and although other disciplines were consulted, these do 
not appear to have included a solely systemic body such as the Association of Family Therapy and 
Systemic Practice(AFT)). Donaldson’s recommendations (p27) that “NHS Trusts ....with substantial 
paediatric, child psychology and psychiatry and/or adult psychology and psychiatry services, should 
provide medical expertise to the Family Courts through the formation of groups or teams of clinicians 
within the same specialty or on a multi-disciplinary basis. Teams may include other specialists from 
within the trust..” opened up the possibility for a wider range of professionals to be involved in this 
work.  Subsequently (2008) the Legal Services Commission initiated a pilot project whereby six multi-
disciplinary assessment teams were set up on the model suggested by Donaldson across the 
country; only two of those teams included systemic psychotherapists.  The pilot was evaluated by 
qualitative research undertaken by Tucker et al (2011); their conclusion was that use of the pilot 
teams had been too limited to evidence definitively the value of multi-disciplinary teams.  However, it 
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was argued that these teams had potential for increasing the supply of quality-assured experts 
although lawyers (both judges and solicitors)  would need to be persuaded to give up some of their 
current control over the choice of expert.     An interesting finding (p31) was dissatisfaction among the 
key stakeholders (guardians, solicitors and judges) with the mix of experts within the teams: the ideal 
model was felt to be (p87)  “ a multi-disciplinary team capable of providing a ‘one-stop’ approach in 
the majority of cases. This suggests that expertise in paediatrics, adult psychiatry and psychology, 
and child psychiatry and psychology are all required within the team” (note that systemic therapy is 
omitted again). The recommendation was for further trials, with the suggestion that in order to 
maximise the possibility of a successful outcome the NHS would need to become more involved. 
A study was recently (Ireland 2012) undertaken on behalf of the FJC into the quality of expert reports 
in the family courts.  The experts evaluated were all psychologists and the criteria used to evaluate 
quality were: 
 ability to show appropriate qualifications and expertise for the instruction given  
 the correct use of evidence based, current and valid assessment tools in any 
psychometric assessment  
 avoidance of irrelevant comment or observations about subjects of assessments  
 transparency of methods used for assessment, including whether any other 
individuals have undertaken any part of the assessment  
 the importance of drawing report conclusions that are clearly grounded in the facts 
adduced, and relevant to the instruction provided. 
The conclusions were that further research was needed, and that it would be helpful to 
extend this to other disciplines.  Particular concern was raised about the fact that some of 
the “experts” were not appropriately qualified, and that nearly all of them were full-time 
“professional experts” rather than having an ongoing connection with practice: that is, 
expertise was seen to be enhanced by continuing clinical practice.  Such findings contribute 
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both to an increasing scepticism about the usefulness of expert evidence and to more 
recognition of the need for well-informed legal participants in the process of commissioning 
expert reports : for example Cooper (2012) reports on a debate hosted by the Family Justice 
Council in October 2011: “Experts in the Family Courts: are they worth it?” The conclusion 
was (p 197)  that “generally... they are and when they are not, the problem sometimes lies 
with an erroneous judicial decision or a less than ideal letter of instruction”. (The “letter of 
instruction” is the document which encapsulates the questions that the court requires the 
expert to answer.  The content is agreed in principle by all parties at previous hearings but is 
usually prepared not by the judge but by one of the solicitors.) 
A multi-disciplinary assessment  team at the Maudsley (Redfern et al 2012) reviewed cases 
assessed over a period of a year for public law care proceedings. The team’s composition is 
psychiatrist, psychologist  and social worker. The team identified the usefulness of the team 
approach in identifying previously unrecognised developmental disorders, educational and 
mental health needs and in creating opportunities for disclosures.  They also found that 
parents were sometimes better able after the process to prioritise their child’s needs,  thus 
reducing the court  time spent on contested cases. 
It is hardly surprising that the research highlights many of the same issues in relation to 
mental health professionals acting as  experts as have already emerged from other 
literature.  I would highlight particularly misgivings about the compatibility of different 
discourses, discomfort with the forensic setting, and the lack of feedback for experts on how 
their work is received.  What provokes further thought is the overwhelming emphasis on 
public law.  I am left wondering how the situation compares in private law cases and how 
one should understand the comparative lack of research in this area.  I am also curious that 
the lack of any requirement for formal training or accreditation for experts has previously 
received  so little attention until the recent (2012) FJC report. Should we be concerned if an 
expert is “full-time” rather than having a foothold in other types of practice? What is the 
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relevance of this issue for systemic experts? Finally Cooper’s (2012) research raises a new 
question about the quality of the letter of instruction, and in turn about  relevance of shared 
(or otherwise) understanding not only between experts and judges but between experts and 
other lawyers involved in the process. 
How far is understanding shared? What are the areas or issues with potential 
for a difference of understanding? 
“Interference of the law and other social discourses does not mean that they merge into a 
multi-dimensional super-discourse, nor does it imply that information is ‘exchanged’ among 
them. Rather, information is constituted anew in each discourse and interference adds 
nothing but the simultaneity of two communicative events” (Teubner 1989). 
“One clear example of a psychological version which will not fit easily into law is that of 
Family Systems Theory” (King and Piper 1995).  
 “I find little opportunity to use a systemic approach in this type of work – I also doubt that 
lawyers would appreciate it” (child psychiatrist who acts as expert witness reported by 
Tufnell 1993). 
“I have long thought that we are the only institution left that believes in Objective Truth.  
Good luck to Sue from me - I can see that she is actually onto something..." (anonymous 
comment from a senior family judge in 2009). 
(Doctor member of the FJC’s experts working group referring to a recent public law case) 
“the expert  ...reports...demonstrated both conflict of ‘observed fact’ as well as conflict of 
interpretation.  This is partly due to the very different natures, professional cultures and 
epistemologies between law and medicine…” (Payne 2012 p 1386) 
These quotations encapsulate a general sense from the literature review to date that while it 
may be possible for systemic ideas and approaches to be useful in a legal context, there is 
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some potential underlying incompatibility (possibly in terms of epistemology – how we know 
what we know- or ontology – what our beliefs are about the nature of reality and truth) to 
which attention will need to be paid in order to achieve this. In this section I will try to locate 
this more firmly by looking at similarities and differences in the underlying beliefs and theory 
of both contexts.  My own experience in training as a systemic therapist is that there has 
always been a strong emphasis on connecting the daily practice of the discipline to its 
theoretical and epistemological underpinnings, and this interest was certainly shown by the 
systemic participants, as will be evidenced in the analysis of their contributions.  When I 
wrote the proposal for this research I wondered whether there would be the same interest 
from the judiciary.  I asked a family court judge to suggest some relevant up to date reading 
on the philosophy and theory of law and was told “I can’t help: I haven’t studied any 
jurisprudence for forty years”. To an “outsider” who has been trying to review the relevant 
legal literature there seems to be some distinction between case law/practice issues and 
academic analyses on the nature of law and the two spheres do not appear often to cross-
reference each other: for example Hart’s Concept of Law (1961) does not reference any 
case law. Galanter (2006) argues that legal academics, judges and lawyers are more 
attracted by “text” than by “context” and more interested in the deconstruction of arguments 
than the collaborative process of exploring the legal world.  
An exhaustive review of the theoretical underpinnings of the practice of either systemic 
psychotherapy or the law is beyond the scope of this project and I have therefore tried to use 
some examples to give a flavour of different viewpoints from the two discourses: this will 
include differences within each discourse as well as between them.   
For the last thirty years there has been a trend towards post-modernism in family therapy: for 
example in the introduction to their collection of papers on therapy as social construction, 
McNamee and Gergen (1992, p2) refer to therapeutic discontent with the  traditional or 
“modernist” view of “therapist as scientist” as a “gathering storm”, and also identify (p4) “ a 
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generalised falling-out within the academic world with the traditional conception of scientific 
knowledge”, whilst Held (1995) critiques “antirealist therapies”, which illustrates the tradition 
of debate within the discipline about the usefulness of post-modern ideas.  Rivett and Street 
(2009) say that it is not surprising that family therapists became excited by post-modern 
ideas as within the discipline there was a tradition of seeking exotic and challenging 
philosophical ideas. 
I have chosen to take as a starting point for looking at attitudes to this “post-modern” thread 
within systemic therapy the Leeds Family Therapy Manual (Pote et al 2003) which has been 
accepted as the definitional standard for research purposes and lists eleven “organising 
principles” for systemic practice. (I am, however, aware that there many different strands of 
systemic thinking and that there might be considerable argument about the interpretation 
and application of these principles.  This might be affected by the date of the therapist’s 
training or even by the theoretical orientation of his or her training establishment).  Below I 
have selected and summarised those principles which have particular relevance for the 
process of reporting to courts and will concentrate on connecting them with some key 
theorists within the systemic literature, and in considering them in relation to the legal 
literature.  
The central focus is on the system and relationships rather than the individual; in 
understanding relationships and difficulties within systems it will be important for the 
therapist to consider the connections between circular patterns of behaviour, and the 
connections between the beliefs and behaviours within systems.  It is easy to forget 
that systemic/family therapy is a relatively new discipline but from its beginnings in the 1950s 
(Bateson et al 1956) through subsequent theorists (for example, Satir 1967, Walrond 
Skinner 1976, Burnham 1988, Jones 1993, Dallos and Draper 2005) this principle has 
remained unchallenged.  The reason I have chosen to highlight it here is because most of 
the experts instructed by the courts are, by training and practice, experts in either adults or 
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children and reports may therefore be more likely to be about individuals.  Personal 
communication (2012) with a number of experienced “experts”  attending a workshop on 
using attachment ideas in making assessments revealed a great deal of discomfort and lack 
of confidence in the idea of moving away from individual towards relational assessment. 
People cannot make assumptions about what meaning will be attributed to the 
information they offer/contribute to others. The importance is stressed of giving 
precedence over the concept of a single external reality, the idea that meaning is 
created in the social interactions that take place between people and is thus context 
dependent and constantly changing. It will be necessary for the therapist to be alert to 
their own constructions, functioning and prejudices so that they can use their self 
effectively with the family. 
Maturana (1988) has been particularly influential on the theory and practice of systemic 
therapy in advocating the position that “facts” and “reality” are constructed in interactions 
between people, and that therefore we cannot claim to have any “objective” knowledge of 
the world or to be able to pass that knowledge on either because there is nothing “out there”, 
or because we cannot be sure of “knowing” it accurately.  There may therefore be multiple 
truths about any situation depending on the position from which it is seen and who is seeing 
it. There can be no guarantee that a communication will have the same meaning for the 
communicant as was intended by the communicator. Equally influential have been the ideas 
of social constructionism (Shotter 1993 and 2004, Pearce 1994, Hoffman 2007) that 
meaning and the “realities” of daily living are created and maintained within communication 
and social interaction. 
This position would appear to be inconsistent with the idea that it is possible to give an 
entirely “objective” report as required by the practice directions for experts, or even that law 
is open to the influences of other disciplines. The “closed” nature of law has been argued by 
other theorists than Teubner: for example the positivists Kelsen and Hart. Kelsen’s (1970) 
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theory of law was that it should be “objectivist and universalistic. It aims at the totality of law 
in its objective validity ...in this way legal theory becomes an exact structural analysis of 
positive law, free of all ethical-political value judgments” (p191-2). Similarly Hart (1958 p 
601-2) argued that a legal system is a “closed logical system in which correct legal decisions 
can be deduced by logical means  ...without reference to social aims, policies or moral 
standards”. 
However, there is also a strong strand of thinking within legal theory and practice which 
challenges this positivist position. Wendell Holmes said (1918) that “A word is not a crystal, 
transparent and unchanging, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour 
and content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used.” American Realist 
Llewellyn (1930 p 34) questioned the relationship of the “facts” on which the court makes a 
decision to “the brute raw events which happened long before”. (Sheppard (2008 p xii) said 
of Llewellyn that he “saw law as much more the result of events than of logic...[Llewellyn] 
would say that rules alone are worthless and that the law is best seen as what officials do in 
fact”). 
From a critical legal perspective Goodrich (1987) discussed the connection between the 
“sciences” of linguistics and jurisprudence, and criticised the idea of law as a closed 
autonomous system, arguing (p80) that a “positivistic conception of the unity of law and of 
the determinate language of the normative order” consciously or unconsciously leads to 
elitism and exclusion from participation in the legal process. He further identified the 
rhetorical or persuasive aspects of legal discourse, which confers on itself the possibility of 
“relexicalisation” (p180) or of appropriation of other languages or vocabularies. Goodrich 
called for the development of an interdisciplinary study of law which might “critically articulate 
the internal relationships it constructs with other discourses” (p 212). Smart (1989) saw the 
use of the term “law” as a claim to power which “disqualifies women’s experience and 
knowledge” and allows judges to exercise “legal imperialism” (p13) and to encroach into the 
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domains of other discourses (such as the emerging “psy” professions) by retaining the 
authority drawn from legal scholarship.  Valverde (2003) suggested that the “epistemological 
workings of law” (p3) could not be reduced to any one general thesis and that different fields 
and situations exhibit different logics.  She argued (p225) for the “continuing importance of 
intermediate and hybrid knowledges” (my emphasis).  
Cotterrell (2001), a socio-legal theorist, challenged the logic of Teubner’s theory on the basis 
that  conflict between law and other subsystems of society must surely be in a strict sense 
impossible, because they do not recognise each other: “Each sees nothing to oppose” (p92). 
Cotterrell suggested that what can actually be experienced are “stable patterns of action and 
understandings, associated with particular groups or social environments” (p99) and that 
these should be the focus of enquiry.  Elsewhere (2006) Cotterrell proposed (p3) that “...law 
has no unified way of looking at the world, no “truth” of its own... Legal ideas are the varied 
understandings of lawyers, judges and other participants in legal processes.” Even a classic 
textbook on the rules of evidence (Malek in Phipson on Evidence (2010 p1070) contains the 
surprisingly post-modern comment that “the distinction between fact and opinion is ultimately 
one of convenience rather than an objective reality; all sensory data is mediated by our 
powers of perception, assimilation and expression”. So it appears that my original 
assumption of a clear dichotomy between systemic postmodernism and legal modernism 
was far too simplistic. In particular it will be interesting to consider how far the interactions 
between experts and the judiciary are contributing to the development of “hybrid 
knowledges”. 
Also challenging in this context may be the “second order cybernetics” idea that any 
“observation” cannot be seen as objective because the presence of the observer will affect 
the observed system. The theory that the prejudices and assumptions of the observer will 
affect both what s/he observes, how s/he observes it and the conclusions that s/he draws 
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from the observation has also been hugely influential on systemic practice (Hoffman 1985, 
Atkinson and Heath 1990, Cecchin et al 1994). 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988) argued that in the field of therapy individuals and families 
should be seen as the “experts” on their lives and a “not-knowing” or non-expert stance 
should be advocated for systemic therapists. This idea has provoked much continuing 
discussion within the field; Cade for example (1992) took issue (p30) with the “current pre-
occupation in our field (dare I say, sometimes a somewhat sanctimonious one) with denying 
completely the validity of the role of expert, or even of expertise itself” and argued that the 
role of expert can be taken in an empowering way. The debate continues (Larner 2000, 
Anderson 2005); with Rober arguing (2005) that the “not-knowing” stance pays too little 
attention to the practitioner’s inner dialogue and Anderson saying in 2007 (p49) that the 
therapist uses knowledge as “food for thought and dialogue” rather than being “authoritative, 
objective or instructive”, offering knowledge in a “tentative and provisional manner”, and in 
2012 (p10) that “creating theories..truths...realities or how-tos is an interactive interpretative 
process of social discourse” resulting in the elimination of the “dichotomy between knower 
and not-knower” through taking a stance (following Shotter 2004) of “withness” not 
“aboutness”.  Ireland’s (2012) research has shown that in the instruction of expert witnesses 
there are difficulties even about the practical definition of what qualifies someone to be seen 
as an expert, and I can find no evidence of any epistemological or philosophical attention 
being paid to the question. 
On the question of “prejudice”, Genn (2008) highlights the lack of any research in this 
country (at the time of writing) on judicial decision making.  Research from America suggests 
that alongside the “legal model” (interpreting the law as well as possible) sit the “strategic” 
model (considering the effect of the decision on broader outcomes) and the “attitudinal” 
model (decisions based on personal preferences, preconceptions and values). Whilst the 
American Realist Frank ‘s (1931) view that “the stimuli affecting the judge x the Personality 
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of the judge = Decisions” was described by Leiter (1997 p 269) as an “extreme”, Lord 
Carnwath’s (2013) claim (p19) that his approach has been to consider whether something 
had gone wrong which required the intervention of the court, and “if the answer appears to 
be yes, then one looks for a legal hook to hang it on”, appears to fit Frank’s equation.  
However, I have been unable to identify much legal literature which evidences any  interest 
in reflecting on the effect of personal “prejudices” in judicial decision making; presumably if 
individual judges were to make such reflections  publicly (as many therapists do) they might 
offer grounds for appeal from any future decision: see for example the appeal in Timmins v 
Gormley (1999). On the other hand Thorpe (1997) reflecting on what judges stand to gain 
from a greater understanding of the theories of Winnicott, Bowlby and Anna Freud, 
commented (p 6) that one gain was the possibility of better understanding of oneself: “there 
is an obvious risk that the decision may be dictated or distorted by a pre-disposition...the 
danger is the prejudice of which he is unaware”.  (This article also gives further food for 
thought on the significance of personal relationships in promoting cross-disciplinary thinking, 
of which this thesis is one example.  Lord Justice Thorpe was married to a child 
psychotherapist). 
The therapist should consider the importance of context, in relation to the cultural 
meanings and narratives within which people live their lives, including issues of race, 
gender, disability and class etc.; the therapist should pay attention to the power 
differentials that exist within the therapeutic relationship, and within the family 
relationships. The therapist should take a non-pathologising, positive view of the 
family system, and the current difficulties they are struggling with. 
This principle, following for example among many McCarthy (1994), whose “fifth province” 
approach has been described earlier in the review and Burnham (2012), invites practitioners 
to take an ethical and reflexive position in relation to social difference and to inequality.  
Many of the families who come before the courts (particularly in public law cases) are 
marginalised in various ways.  Equally individual family members may be marginalised or 
40 
 
disadvantaged within families, for example by virtue of gender, disability or age.  The 
“expert” and the court process have enormous power over the lives of such families and 
individuals: power to remove children permanently, to return them to abuse.  Judges often 
refer to the sense of responsibility and stress that they feel in making such decisions (for 
example Thorpe 2007 and Wall 2010) and an awareness of suggestions of prejudice; for 
example against fathers. The following is quoted on behalf of Fathers for Justice by Langford 
(2012): “Family law in this country is a perversion of the course of natural justice. It trashes 
lives, destroys childhoods, tears families apart, strips them of their savings; it even pitches 
parent against parent. It criminalises and crushes you before suffocating you with a blanket 
of secrecy and censorship. It is like being buried alive”.  Experts are not immune to such 
criticism either: John Hemming MP (P v Nottingham City Council & the Official Solicitor 
2008) compared them to witch finders and implied that the primary motivation for 
undertaking the role is financial (para 95): “that essentially is much like the witching courts ... 
The similarity goes as far as the amounts of money made by various expert witch finders.... 
.... The outcome for the expert is more money in the bank. The outcome for the other parties 
to the case is often massive damage to their quality of life (prison, removal of children etc)”. 
Experts have also been the butt of Private Eye’s satire (2012):                      
22  
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Other literature also raises questions about the disempowering or marginalising of certain groups or 
voices in situations where “experts” are giving evidence (for example Mantle 2003 in relation to 
children, Raitt and Zeedyk 2000 in relation to women, King and Piper 1995 in relation to “non-
experts” in general, and Brophy and Bates 1998 in relation to parents) and will be important to 
consider how systemic experts think about their relationship with power and with the marginalised 
and what impact this has. 
Systemic therapists have, following Bateson (1979 p15) considered that “without context, 
words and actions have no meaning at all” and have advocated the skill of speaking into a 
particular context For example, Cronen and Lang argue (1994 p29), following Wittgenstein’s 
(1953 para 90, para 304) concept of “grammatical abilities” that “one of the tasks of therapy, 
consultation or management involves entering into the grammar of the groups which we are 
working with or relating to at any point”.  Shotter (1993) talks about “rhetorical-
responsiveness” in focussing on the “formative uses to which words in their speaking are 
put” and Oliver (1996) develops the idea of “systemic eloquence” or “contexted speaking 
abilities”.  Such ideas, which invite us to consider how we can present our own beliefs, 
assumptions and practices in a way which will facilitate a “fit” with the contexts into which we 
are communicating, appear very relevant to the process of writing expert reports. It is worth 
commenting that there is a power differential for any systemic therapists entering the court 
process in that they have to “play by the law’s rules” However, Genn (2008) draws an 
interesting parallel when she argues (p 7) that “effective communication and enabling 
depends on judges being able to ‘fit’ their approach to the situation and the parties before 
them”. 
I began this project with a hypothesis of potential incompatibility and difference. It seems 
appropriate to end this literature review with the conclusion that its overall message is to 
embrace the complexity of the interface between systemic psychotherapy and the law rather 
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than to try to reduce it to polarities and inconsistencies, and to recognise the enormous 
variety of beliefs and experience which exists within different disciplines as well as between 
them. The development of my awareness of this complexity will be explored further both in 
the following chapter on methodology and in the chapters analysing and discussing findings.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
“Judges in the family courts and the family psychotherapists who make reports to them: how 
far is understanding shared about the nature of this process?”  
Rationale for the research 
In the introduction I explained the original rationale for undertaking this research. That 
rationale (of exploring the potential for more systemic psychotherapists to be useful to the 
family courts by acting as expert witnesses) no longer applies in the same way given the 
recent changes in the family justice system which have significantly reduced the demand for 
expert witnesses. Yet some expert witnesses will still be required, and complex family 
situations will still be the subject of proceedings in the family courts. The question of the 
compatibility of a systemic approach to this area of practice therefore remains relevant, but 
the rationale may now include highlighting the implications of the changes for judges, for all 
expert witnesses but most particularly for the children and families in the system.  
What method is implied by this question? 
I needed in some way to obtain data both from systemic/family psychotherapists who write 
reports for courts, and from judges who either commission or receive them. The data should 
be obtained in a format and analysed in a way which is compatible both with my own 
epistemological position and respectful of the paradigms of the disciplines who are the 
“object” of my interest. The questions I wanted to ask were likely to receive complex 
answers. My curiosity was not informed by an existing body of coherent literature or theory, 
but by trying to make sense of and compare a variety of “knowledges”, acquired in different 
ways and contexts. My interest was more than academic: I would like my research to make 
some contribution, however small, to the disciplines involved which have both enriched my 
life in different ways. 
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What kind of data? 
It would perhaps have been possible to conduct a detailed analysis of written texts: for 
example, reports written for court from a systemic perspective, legal judgments which relate 
to expert reports, or guidelines on how reports should be written or expert evidence given.  I 
could have analysed registers of expert witnesses to attempt to identify how many systemic 
psychotherapists appear.  However, my conclusion was that I wanted to seek to obtain the 
data for this research directly from professionals connected with its subject matter.  An 
important element in this for me was the hope that the act of my asking some of these 
questions would of itself stimulate interest in them and possibly further dialogue about them 
beyond my own “findings”.  In this sense it might have some connections with what Kemmis 
and McTaggart (2000) define as “critical action research”, that is (p568) “the self-reflective 
collective self study of practice, the way language is used, organisation and power in a local 
situation, and action to improve things”.  I had already experienced this in some small 
degree in response to initial informal conversations about this project.  An important decision 
was therefore whether I would seek quantitative or qualitative data (or both). 
Whose Paradigm? Quantitative or qualitative?   
Guba and Lincoln (1994) point out (p105) that historically there has been a heavy emphasis 
on quantification in science, which results in a “widespread conviction that only quantitative 
data are ultimately valid, or of high quality”.  They go on to critique this position on the 
grounds that quantitative approaches pay insufficient attention to context and cannot take 
account of the meanings and purposes of human behaviour. They may also impose an 
outsider perspective which may have no meaning to those “inside”. In addition generalised 
conclusions may not fit individual cases and emphasis on “verification” devalues creativity 
and divergent thinking. 
They then proceed to analyse various paradigms (what they define as a set of basic beliefs 
or first principles which define (p108) “the nature of the world, the individual’s place in it, and 
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the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts”.  These paradigms are 
distinguished by the ontological question (“what is the form and nature of reality?”), the 
epistemological question (“what is the nature of the relationship between the knower or 
would-be knower and what can be known?” and the methodological question (“how can the 
inquirer go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known?”). 
I come to this inquiry with a hypothesis that the paradigms of systemic/family psychotherapy 
and the law might be very different; but even when I first wrote that sentence in my research 
proposal, I realised that, as I pointed out in my literature review, the idea of one systemic or 
one legal paradigm is nonsensical.  The experience of interviewing individuals “living” in 
these worlds has only confirmed the naivety of my initial hypothesis. There may be some 
consensus at some times but paradigms are constantly emerging and evolving in 
communications between individuals.  At the same time questions of ontology (can a 
systemic/family therapist tell a judge “how things really are” in relation to a family?) and 
epistemology (what does it mean to be an “expert” family therapist?  What kind of knowledge 
might he/she be laying claim to and how might it be acquired?  In what senses can that 
“knowledge” be shared or passed on to a judge?) are at its heart.  I have to take a standpoint 
(what Willig (2001) calls a “point of departure”). 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) distinguish between the positions of positivism, post-positivism, 
critical theory and constructivism; Willig (2001) posits a continuum between naive realism 
and radical relativist.  There are doubtless tens, if not hundreds of other distinctions of 
standpoint which could be made.  Willig for example, quotes Reicher’s (2000) distinction 
between experiential research (which “aims to gain a better understanding of people’s ways 
of thinking and actions”) with discursive research “that is concerned with the role of language 
in the construction of reality”.  Madill, Jordan and Shirley (2000) distinguish between “realist”, 
“contextualist” and “radical constructionist”.  For reasons upon which I will expand 
subsequently I chose to locate myself (at least as a point of departure) somewhere in the 
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experiential/contextual constructionist camp.  I therefore concluded that I was committed to 
the principle that at least part of my project should be qualitative. 
It also seemed to me to be at least a pragmatic advantage, if not also ethically less 
compromised, that taking such a position might be seen as slightly more neutral or curious 
(Cecchin 1987) between what I at times conceptualised to myself as the competing 
paradigms of law and systemic psychotherapy.  I hoped it would be easier from this stance 
to take into account the influence of my training and professional allegiance on the way I 
approached this research and the analysis of the data. 
Complexity and Comparison  
My learning in relation to research methodology has been recent and rapid.  There was no 
research element required when I originally qualified and it was only when I began to 
consider undertaking further training that I started reading seriously around the topic and 
attending workshops.  I have found the most useful experience in preparing to undertake this 
research was the opportunity to compare methodological approaches in relation to the same 
data (for example, Burck’s 2005 paper), and to try to put approaches into practice, for 
example during our taught sessions on the doctorate course.  I also found the experience of 
critiquing my final dissertation from a research perspective very enlightening, as it gave me 
the opportunity to experiment with different ideas of analysis with material with which I was 
very familiar. 
The result of these processes of learning and reflection is that I decided to use Grounded 
Theory as a method of analysis.  Pidgeon (1996) describes (p76) how the Glaser and 
Strauss, the originators of the term, chose it “in order to express the idea of theory that is 
generated by (or grounded in) an iterative process involving the continual sampling and 
analysis of qualitative data gathered from concrete settings, such as unstructured data 
obtained from interviews, participant observation  and archival research” .  Charmaz (1996 
p28) claims that “Grounded theory methods allow novices and old hands alike to conduct 
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qualitative research efficiently and effectively” She identifies the distinguishing 
characteristics of this method as including 
 Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis phases of research 
 The creation of analytical codes and categories derived from data, not from pre-
conceived hypotheses 
 The development of middle-range theories to explain behaviour and processes 
 Memo-making (i.e. writing analytic notes to explicate and fill out categories) 
 Sampling for theory construction to check and refine the analyst’s emerging 
conceptual categories  
 Delay of the literature review. 
The grounded theory method appeared to offer a good “fit” both with my chosen 
epistemological position (so long as, in Willig’s (2001) continuum, I opt for the “social 
constructionist version”!), and with the potential data, especially in terms of the lack of 
substantial pre-existing theory, the potential for constant comparison and for refining 
emerging categories to change the focus for future data generation, and the potential for 
analysing and comparing data of various kinds. 
I did consider using discourse analysis. Burck (2005, p251) describes how discourse 
analysts “focus on the way societal discourses are taken up in personal interactions and how 
discourse is shaped through power relationships, and examine its effect on social identity 
and relations”, whilst Potter and Wetherell (1987, p55) describe how a discourse approach 
“shifts the focus from a search for underlying entities – attitudes – to a detailed examination 
of how evaluative expressions are produced in discourse”.   At a workshop about discourse 
analysis (Speed, 2009, personal communication), there was something of a debate amongst 
the participants as to where they would place themselves in the realist/contextualist /radical 
constructionist continuum.  I had to conclude, that despite having always considered myself 
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a bit of a radical, I do believe that it is useful to discuss people’s experience (as a practising 
psychotherapist, how can I not?), and recognised that it was trying to understand 
professionals’ experience of their working worlds, rather than the role of language in the 
construction of their reality, which fascinated me.  I was also concerned pragmatically that 
using the words “discourse analysis” in connection with my research might suggest the 
possibility (following for example Foucault 1980) of its involving the deconstruction (or even 
criticism) of judicial power and thereby lessen the likelihood of judicial participation on the 
grounds of having some political implications. In the writing up of my findings and 
subsequent exploration of further reading (for example comparing the ethic of rights with the 
ethic of care) I have recognised how valuable a discursive analysis of the material would 
also have been. 
Data collection and analysis – the theory 
The proposed method of data generation, in addition to the study of relevant texts, was by 
interview of professionals who have practical experience of the issues in question. I decided 
to conduct semi-structured interviews, that is (following Kvale 1996 p124)” interviews which 
have “a sequence of themes to be covered, as well as suggested questions.  Yet at the 
same time there is openness to changes of sequence and forms of questions in order to 
follow up the answers given and the stories told by the subjects”.   
I planned to analyse transcripts in accordance with Charmaz’s (2006) guide to the practical 
application of grounded theory, that is moving from initial line-by-line coding (“what is being 
done here?”) to focussed codes which “are more directed, selected and conceptual” 
(Charmaz 2006 p57), and use “the most significant and or frequent earlier codes to sift 
through large amounts of data”.  An important element of this process is memo-writing which 
give the researcher “a space ...for making comparisons...and for articulating conjectures 
about these comparisons (p72-3) and which cumulate in the integration of categories into a 
‘theory’”.  The emphasis is on constant comparison. 
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Charmaz highlights (p166) an apparent dilemma in that students submitting a research 
proposal will have been required to have evidenced some prior knowledge of the literature 
relating to their chosen topic, although classic grounded theorists (Glaser and Strauss 1967) 
advocate delaying the review of literature until after the analysis has been completed in 
order to “avoid importing preconceived ideas and imposing them on your work”.  Some of the 
literature to which I have referred earlier in this thesis has been familiar to me for many 
years; some I have discovered and a considerable amount has been written since I started 
the research.  It does not seem to be any more problematic to reflect on the preconceptions I 
am bringing to my data from reading than the ones I am bringing through other life 
experiences.  In my experience the process of “constant comparison” has involved a 
recursive relationship between the data and “new” and “familiar” literature.  I thought it would 
also be important not to delay the analysis of data until all the interviews are complete, so 
that later interviews might reflect ideas or questions grounded in the earlier ones.  I also 
hoped to interweave the systemic and judicial interviews to the same purpose.  This decision 
proved fruitful and I will say more about it when I review the development of the semi-
structured interviews.  I was initially keen to try to conduct all the interviews within a year but 
for this reason actually allowed two years for the interview phase in my bid to the Ministry of 
Justice.   I had anticipated that it might be appropriate to delay the recruitment of some of 
the research participants (both judicial and systemic) in order to apply what Charmaz (2006) 
calls “theoretical sampling” which (Hood 1983) “allows you to tighten up what I call the 
corkscrew or the hermeneutic spiral so that you end up with a theory that perfectly matches 
your data.  Because you choose the next people to talk to...based upon the theoretical 
analysis and you don’t waste your time with all sorts of things that have nothing to do with 
your developing theory”.  Again I will say more about this in the review of selection and 
recruitment. I have learned a lot from attending the seminars where other students’ research 
is presented and have taken the opportunity to attend data analysis sessions throughout the 
process of data collection and analysis in order to generate alternative viewpoints to my 
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own.  I have also been hugely indebted throughout to the availability of my research 
colleagues and supervisors to help me to reflect on how I am positioning myself in these 
processes.  
Quantitative element 
I also considered simultaneously undertaking some quantitative research.  I was not aware 
of any statistical information as to how many of the approximately 700 systemic 
psychotherapists registered with UKCP act as expert witnesses and write reports for court. 
As part of the research for “Bearing Good Witness” (Donaldson 2006), a questionnaire was 
circulated to doctors enquiring whether they currently acted as an expert witness, and if not, 
what were the reasons; if so, the frequency and any training that had been received. (A copy 
is attached as Appendix 1).  I thought it would be very interesting to be able to replicate this 
exercise to some extent for the systemic discipline, and I obtained the necessary PSI licence 
to allow me to adapt Crown Copyright material for this purpose.  This would create some 
opportunity for negative case analysis (Willig 2001 argues for the exploration of cases that 
do not fit as well as those that are likely to generate new insights).  For example, it might be 
possible to ask respondents who had never acted as an expert witness, and had no intention 
of doing so, whether they would be prepared to be interviewed.  I did not imagine that this 
survey would result in findings which could be generalised: the principal purpose would be to 
increase awareness and discussion of the recommendations of “Bearing Good Witness” 
(Donaldson 2006) across the systemic discipline by summarising them as the context for the 
questionnaire, to get some sense of the proportion of respondents who do act as expert 
witnesses, and possibly to compare the responses to question 5A (“why are you not willing 
to act as a witness”) with the emerging data from my interviews. 
The feedback from the panel which reviewed my research proposal was that I would be 
taking on too much to include this quantitative element.  I chose to ignore this advice and 
with the support of Peter Stratton, Academic and Research Development Officer for AFT, 
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wrote a short piece about it which was published in Context (Hickman 2009), a journal which 
is circulated to all the systemic psychotherapists who are members of AFT. This invited 
interested readers to complete an on-line survey (Appendix 2) which as far as possible 
replicated that sent to doctors in preparation for “Bearing Good Witness”; but I was as 
interested in the possibilities of raising awareness of and interest in the topic through the 
article as I was in receiving replies.  This was just as well: because I received a sum total of 
one reply from someone who used to act as an expert witness but was deterred by fear of 
adverse publicity and being referred to a professional body.  It would be tempting to see this 
as an indication of a lack of systemic interest in the topic, but there are of course many other 
ways of understanding it.  At least I was spared the necessity to analyse another large 
quantity of data. 
Recruitment and Selection of research participants 
I have felt throughout the gestation of this project that the active participation of members of 
the judiciary would greatly enrich it.  However, I was initially informed that the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ) would not approve this “unless you can come up with a very strong business 
case which clearly demonstrates the work's potential benefits to the judiciary and/or the 
HMCS”. 
At this point I contacted Lord Justice Thorpe, as Chair of the Experts’ Committee of the FJC, 
which was established in 2004 with the aim (FJC website 2009) of “stimulating better and 
quicker outcomes for families and in the family court service.  The Council sits between 
government and the courts of the family justice system.”  Part of the FJC’s business plan for 
2008/9 in connection with this objective was to examine the use and role of experts in the 
family justice system.  I explained my proposal briefly, highlighting its potential for fitting with 
the FJC’s business plan in relation to experts, and asked for his support.  I was pleased that 
he offered this (Pidgeon 1996 p84 comments that the validity of qualitative research is 
connected with “the notion that grounded theories should ‘work’, ‘fit’, and be recognizable 
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and of relevance to those studied”) and I subsequently put together a formal business plan 
which was submitted to the MoJ at the end of March 2009 (a copy is attached as Appendix 
3).  I received an initial favourable response with the proviso that  the President of the Family 
Division “would need to know which areas and which Judges are to be considered before 
giving his formal agreement to them being approached." 
The necessity to do this meant that I had to make some fairly speedy decisions about the 
number of judges that I wished to interview, and for how long.  I assumed that the cost of 
judicial time, both in financial terms and in terms of its impact on listings, would be a 
significant factor in the MoJ’s decision.  I also had to consider that as a sole researcher there 
would be a limit to the amount of data that I would be able to transcribe and analyse.  The 
number of “five to seven interviews of up to 90 minutes each” was arrived at on the basis of 
these two considerations, with the advice of supervisors and fellow-students. 
I then discovered that I was expected to nominate my preferred judicial participants, having 
had up to that point no idea whether, if I received official approval for the research, I would 
have any say in the selection of participants or whether that choice would be made for me.  It 
will be seen that I had asked that if possible the participants should come from different 
levels of the judiciary (district, circuit and high court judges) and reflect diversity in gender 
and ethnicity; also that I would prefer to interview judges with whom I had no direct or 
indirect connection through my partner.  I resolved therefore to try to apply these criteria in 
my own nominations. The research was limited to the family courts in England. 
Alongside my communications with the MoJ, (which were suspended whilst I sought and 
obtained ethical approval from the University), I had succumbed to a combination of 
enthusiasm and anxiety (fear of not being able to recruit suitable participants) and quickly 
recruited three systemic participants opportunistically, that is on the basis of names 
recommended to me or known to me as systemic psychotherapists who regularly write 
reports for family courts, without much thought about the process.  I then realised that I 
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would need to be able to give a more thoughtful account of my choices and began to pay 
more attention to the working context of potential participants, how closely they might be 
connected to me or to each other, their gender, ethnicity, their geographical base (to avoid a 
bias towards London) and whether they have written or presented anything on this topic. The 
final four systemic participants were therefore selected for a combination of the following 
reasons: 
 Being part of a pilot family court assessment service set up as a result of the 
recommendations in Bearing Good Witness 
 Having written or presented on the topic of acting as an expert witness from a 
systemic perspective (one of the participants was recruited as a “negative case” on 
this basis, having become disenchanted with the process) 
 Increasing the diversity of participants 
 Increasing the geographical scope of the study 
Having recruited the systemic participants, it occurred to me that it might be possible to 
achieve some kind of geographical fit between them and the judicial participants (for 
example, if a systemic participant regularly reports to a specific court, to try to interview a 
judge sitting at that court), and that in turn influenced my comments to the MoJ on the 
nominations which would be most helpful. I also asked for permission to interview two 
specific judges who have either expressed a particular interest in the interface between the 
“psy” professions or who were involved in relevant initiatives. As a result of this I was able to 
achieve an out-of-London geographical match between the judges and the systemic 
participants in three cases, as well as one of the specific requests, which produced some 
very useful data for comparison. I should perhaps say at this point that the pool of people 
involved in this field, both from the judicial and systemic positions, is so small that I thought 
there was a very real possibility of participants being identifiable, at least to each other, and I 
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have tried to minimise this possibility both by being as vague as possible about work settings 
and by not referring to gender.  
One of the judges nominated by the President’s Office as being willing to be interviewed was 
known to me personally through my partner; but in addition to wanting not to look a gift horse 
in the mouth, I felt the usefulness of his senior position outweighed the possible 
disadvantage.  Several of the other judges made the connection with my partner although I 
had never met them personally and had not mentioned him to them. I will discuss this further 
in thinking about self-reflexivity. 
Of the final participant judges two were from the High Court, three circuit judges (two 
designated family judges) and two district judges. Five were men and two were women and 
they were all white British.  Their length of experience on the bench (including time spent as 
deputies prior to full-time appointment) varied from eight years to twenty, with an average of 
16 years.  Five had previous experience as family barristers (for an average over twenty 
years) and two as family solicitors (average 18 years; though one had come to family work 
via specialising in youth crime).   Three of the judges did some other work (civil and crime) 
alongside sitting in family courts.  The proportion of public to private family work they 
undertook (a subjective estimate on their part rather than based on records) varied 
according to the context in which they were sitting (the highest being 90% public to 10% 
private and the lowest 50/50). They were all very familiar with receiving expert witness 
reports, estimating that they featured in at least 50% of cases heard (less commonly in 
private law cases).  The estimated number of those cases in which the expert was required 
to give evidence in person varied from 20% to 80%. 
Five of the systemic psychotherapists interviewed in the course of this research are women 
and two men; six white British and one black British.  All have completed a four year 
advanced clinical training in working with individuals, couples and families.  This is a training 
recognised within the NHS to be equivalent to that of a clinical psychologist.  As is common 
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for systemic psychotherapists (it has been a requirement for admission to a recognised 
training course for several years), all the systemic participants have another professional 
qualification, either as a social worker, clinical psychologist or doctor, and it was usually the 
practice of this first profession that offered the opportunity to begin to work with the courts 
(for example, as a child protection or Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) 
social worker).  If that type of experience is included, the average length of experience in 
writing expert reports is over 20 years.  Two of the participants have either stopped doing 
this kind of work or are considering doing so. The split between public and private varies 
enormously (again this is based on participants’ subjective estimate) from 100% private to 
90% public, as does the estimate of frequency of giving evidence in person from “seldom” to 
50%.  For some participants the public/private split has also changed over time because of 
resourcing issues (expert reports are paid from the LSC (“legal aid”) budget. It should be 
pointed out that none of the systemic participants acts as an expert witness full-time; the role 
is usually undertaken in a private capacity and combined with other systemic activities such 
as therapy, consultation, supervision and training. 
Validity? 
The recent debate about the criteria which the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) uses in relation to “evidence based practice” in psychological therapies and its 
insistence on randomised controlled trials has highlighted that a quantitative approach to 
what constitutes validity and quality in research is still predominant.  Madill et al (2000) 
comment (p17) “...criteria such as objectivity and reliability are appropriate to the evaluation 
of qualitative analysis only to the extent that it is conducted within a naive or scientific realist 
framework”.  The criteria by which this research will be judged will vary depending on the 
context in which it is being evaluated: academically, I need to evidence awareness of and 
consistency within a theoretical framework; pragmatically, the question may be whether it 
interests or is of any use to anyone.  Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) comment (p100) “the 
researcher should always bear in mind that methods are not so much valid in and of 
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themselves, but rather will be more or less useful for particular research purposes”.   They 
distinguish between research which aims to “discover” and that which aims to “generate” and 
I see this research as aiming to do both.   I have attempted to meet the following criteria for 
quality which they suggest for grounded theory analyses: fit, integration of theory at different 
levels of abstraction, visibility of the researcher’s position, documentation of the process, 
analysis of negative cases, sensitivity to negotiated realities and transferability. As Madill et 
al (2000), Reicher (2000) and Willig (2001) point out, quality criteria will inevitable vary 
between methodologies.  
Interviews 
When I wrote the research proposal I included some possible questions that might be asked 
in the semi-structured interviews, such as: 
 What do judges understand by the term “systemic” and what would they consider to be 
the particular “expertise” of systemic clinicians? 
 Would they be able to identify any occasion when a report written from a systemic 
perspective was particularly helpful or unhelpful? 
 What similarities and differences of understanding do systemic “experts” imagine there 
may be between them and the judges who will be the recipients of their reports about the 
meaning of words commonly used in this context, such as “fact”, “opinion”, “truth”, 
“observation”, “knowledge”, “expertise”, “reality” and ”objectivity”? 
 How does their thinking about this issue affect the way they write their reports and their 
interactions with the families who are the subject of them? 
 Have there been any particular interactions with the family justice system which have 
informed their thinking on this issue? 
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 How do systemic experts think about issues of marginalisation or disempowerment in 
their work for courts and how does this affect the way they write their reports? (a 
question which was prompted by the literature overview). 
I became more aware of the possibility that these questions were in some ways embedding 
my “competing paradigms” hypothesis, and , perhaps more importantly, my “them and us” or 
“judges as objects of ethnographical study” stance.  For example, I was assuming common 
understandings and knowledges with the systemic participants and thus co-constructing a 
certain identity as an interviewer (Jorgensen 1991).  This is also evident in my letter to 
participants (Appendix 4). I therefore thought further about these questions both in 
supervision and in my peer group by getting someone to interview me about the 
presuppositions I am bringing to the interviews.   Gubrum and Koro-Ljungberg (2005) stress 
the importance of being clear whether the interview is seen as “neutral data collection” or 
“interpretive and interactive event”, and in thinking about the practical aspects of the 
interview such as who is in control, what language is used, what roles are assumed, what 
“borders” are being made?  Similarly Charmaz (2006), who has been my main source of 
advice on the practicalities of using a grounded theory approach, distinguishes (p32) 
between an “objectivist” researcher’s emphasis on chronology, events, settings and 
behaviours, and a “constructivist”’s emphasis on assumptions, implicit meanings and tacit 
rules. 
The main conclusion of this reflection was to try to develop open-ended questions that 
facilitated comparison of key ideas and values between judges and systemic experts (“how 
far is understanding shared..?”) rather than focussing on potential differences. These 
questions were explored in two pilot interviews (one with a systemic expert and one with a 
family judge), to see how well they fitted.  Both pilot participants were already known to me 
personally and gave me some feedback about the questions.  As a result I noticed some 
omissions (for example in the judicial interview I failed to ask about experience prior to 
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appointment), and some particularly useful questions were highlighted (the impact on 
families of being involved in a legal process).  I also explored some issues with my 
interviewing style (for example, sharing a hypothesis for comment) in a peer-group seminar. 
The systemic pilot interview, after consultation with my supervisor, was retained for data 
analysis; I considered my connection with the judicial pilot participant to be too close for 
inclusion.  
Data collection and analysis – in practice 
I have attached as Appendices 5 and 6 the lists of judicial and systemic questions with notes 
to indicate questions which were added in response to new ideas being generated as the 
interviews progressed.  For example, the first judicial interview alerted me to the question of 
“attraction” to working with families and the idea that family judges differ from other judges in 
many ways, and a question on that topic was retained throughout and also included in the 
systemic interviews.  Likewise the idea of assessment for the purpose of report writing 
having a therapeutic effect was raised by a systemic participant and explored with 
subsequent judicial participants. I would view these as examples of what Charmaz (2006 p 
102) would call “theoretical sampling”, that is the process of “constructing tentative ideas 
about the data, and then examining these ideas through further empirical enquiry”.  I was 
able to a large extent to achieve my aim of “interweaving” the judicial and systemic 
interviews chronologically so that they might inform each other in this way.  I did consider 
whether in later interviews I should exclude certain questions (for example, “what constitutes 
a good report?”) as having reached “saturation” (Glaser 2001 p 191), that is the point when 
the gathering of data no longer generates fresh ideas, but each time there was some new 
nuance and I never made the decision. (This fits for me with Dey’s (1999 p 257) challenge to 
the idea of saturation in that inevitably the subjective selection of data for coding leaves 
open the possibility of unnoticed difference.)  This posed some dilemmas in managing the 
increasing number of questions within the same time frame. Throughout I asked 
supplementary questions (“please say more about X” “what does X mean to you?” to expand 
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implied meanings or tacit rules. I took a list of questions with me to the interviews, initially 
written on prompt cards and latterly printed out (I thought the cards would be less intrusive, 
but in fact they were more so and one participant commented on “taking you away from your 
cards”.) 
I audio-taped the interviews (which all took place at the participant’s work place) for 
subsequent transcription. After an initial scare with my first judicial interview I learned to 
make sure that I had advance security clearance for my recorder (they are banned in most if 
not all court buildings). For the most part this worked well but I had one total disaster 
(operator error) with a judicial interview where I finished up with only six minutes of 
recording.  I had not taken any detailed notes while the interview was progressing (I made a 
practice of only noting particular points to which I wished to return in order to maintain eye 
contact) but wrote down as much as I could remember immediately after this debacle.  The 
judge in question was kind enough to make comments and corrections to these notes and 
my supervisor agreed that these could form part of the data analysis so long as their source 
was made clear. I did not feel it was appropriate or practical to ask for a repeat of the 
interview but as it offered one of the geographical “fits” I was anxious not to lose it 
completely. I ensured that all codes derived indirectly were distinguishable from those taken 
directly from transcripts. 
 I understand that there is considerable debate about the technicalities of transcribing (Potter 
and Hepburn 2005, Smith et al 2005), as to exactly how much information should be 
included in terms of interviewer’s contributions, non-verbal communications, pauses, tones 
and inflections.  I have included all the interviewer’s contributions and any “gross” non-verbal 
behaviour which is detectable from the audio-tape, such as sighs, laughter, and intakes of 
breath. Further details of the recording of pauses and emphases are included in Appendix 7. 
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I have struggled both with the principles and the pragmatics of coding my transcriptions.  My 
computer skills are minimal and I have therefore used tables to correlate the text and the 
codes (two examples are shown in Appendix 8 and 9). Charmaz (2006, p 46) describes 
coding as “the pivotal link between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to 
explain these data”. I tried to follow her advice (p49) to “remain open, stay close to the data, 
keep codes simple, precise and short, preserve actions, compare data with data and move 
quickly through the data”. Applying these principles to my first two interviews (one judicial 
and one systemic) involved collating and comparing the codes on tiny slips of paper to 
experiment with the process of establishing what Charmaz calls (p57) “strong analytical 
direction” with the aim of developing more focussed coding. Early on in the process I 
experimented with creating a “mind map” of connections and ideas (Appendix 10).  I quickly 
realised firstly that it would be totally impossible to keep track of slips of paper from fourteen 
interviews, secondly that I had quite a number of codes which seemed irrelevant to the 
research question (such as anecdotes which illustrated particular points), thirdly that 
Charmaz’s advice to focus on action was resulting in my thinking about the process of the 
interview (“what is being made?”) to the detriment of noticing content, and finally that I was 
developing some new ideas which were more about connection and similarity than about 
difference and lack of fit. 
 
I used supervision and student seminars to explore my difficulties, taking samples of data 
and asking other researchers to code them for comparison.  I decided that I did not find 
Charmaz’s distinctions between and explanations of line by line and incident by incident 
coding (p50 – 53) very helpful.  For example, I could not make sense of the idea that one 
could make a useful interpretation of a set of words which were demarcated from other 
words solely on the basis of the width of the page on which they were written.  I connected 
Charmaz’s idea of “action” with Pearce’s (1994) account of “speech acts” as (p119) 
“configurations in the logic of meaning of conversations” and wondered how far it would be 
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possible for individual codes to reflect the conversational context of the extract of data to 
which they related. I noticed that every time I revisited a coded text I wanted to change the 
code in some way, and wondered how one knows when the “definitive” code is reached and 
whether it matters if the answer is “never”.  I found Rennie et al’s (1988) suggestion (p142) 
of “meaning units” as a more helpful way of thinking about separating text for the purpose of 
coding.  My experience of trying to keep track of data for the purposes of comparison 
(whether paper or electronic) suggested the metaphor of codes as labels.  Ultimately I 
concluded that I had to have the confidence to find a way to undertake this process in a way 
that made sense to me, rather than seeking after an elusive “right” way that might not exist.  
My criteria for the analytic unit of data are that it should have coherence and completeness 
as a speech act (not necessarily grammatically but in terms of meaning) and should be as 
short as possible (if it is possible to separate into another concept or idea then do so). My 
criteria for codes are that they encapsulate an idea or practice that relates in some way to 
the research question, that they are as short as possible, that they give as much sense of 
context as possible and are not dependent on adjacent codes for the meaning to be clear.  I 
have been keen to look for what Charmaz calls (p55) “in vivo codes” that is, innovative terms 
used by participants that capture meaning or experience (an example might be a judge’s 
(J40) use of the phrase “avoiding too much blood on the floor”). The codes were all 
numbered and referenced by participant (e.g. A32) so as to facilitate finding the relevant 
original text. 
Some of the data (for example, a long discursion in interview B about the judge’s clerk’s 
illness) was never divided into analytic units. As a result of the initial review conducted after I 
had coded the first two interviews, some of the analytic units in later interviews were not 
coded, and some codes initially allocated were not used.  The two examples of coded text in 
Appendices 8 and 9 are intended to show the “extremes” of my experimentation with length 
and style of both analytic units and codes to arrive at more focussed coding. Once the 
coding was completed I “extracted” all the codes from each interview to serve as a summary 
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of the interview and to facilitate quick and frequent comparison of the data and begin to 
develop categories. Appendix 11 gives examples from two interviews. At this point I began to 
appreciate the potential for codes to act as “labels” or “pointers” to locating similar ideas or 
connections (hereafter referred to as clusters) between interviews. The process of extraction 
offered an opportunity to revisit decisions both about the meaning units (some were further 
separated and some amalgamated), about the wording of the codes and about the 
relevance of the codes to the research question (some were added and some discarded). 
Some of the connections emerged “top-down”, that is, having recognised an interesting idea 
in one interview (for example, the idea of change occurring in the assessment process) I 
asked a question about it in subsequent interviews (theoretical sampling) and then analysed 
the answers to that question.  I presented some ideas around this at a symposium with 
fellow students, and as a result wondered whether this approach was sufficiently rigorous. I 
therefore developed all subsequent clusters and categories by a process of ensuring that 
every “extracted” code was attributed by reference number to a cluster (on a piece of paper) 
somewhere. (A very few codes were discarded as irrelevant to the research question at this 
stage. I should also clarify that I have used the word “cluster” here to describe a collection of 
codes which “go together” in connecting to a common topic or theme, but without quite 
forming a category. This is not what Charmaz (p86) means by the word). This meant that I 
was able to identify other codes which were relevant to the issue of change in assessment, 
even if their emergence was not connected to the asking of the question (Appendix 12). At 
this stage I experimented with transferring the data to NVivo software but found it too 
unwieldy to manage the multiplicity of clusters, and eventually used a cut and paste 
approach to generate electronic clusters which included the full text of the codes as well as 
the reference number.  This enabled easy comparison when I began to write up the analysis.  
I have struggled throughout with the idea of writing memos, which Charmaz (2006 p 72) 
describes as the “pivotal intermediate step between data collection and writing drafts of 
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papers”, vital because the act of putting thoughts on paper stimulates analysis early in the 
research process. Charmaz gives several examples of her own memos (for example on 
suffering as moral status on p 73) which are beautifully crafted and apparently “finished” in a 
way that I have never achieved. Fortunately she does allow for this to be done in “any – and 
every – way”, and the ways that have worked for me (particularly when I remembered to 
date them!) include: 
 Short “bullet point” ideas saved on the computer, for example on how professionals 
develop and maintain belief in their own competence  26/4/12 (Appendix 13) 
 Pieces written explicitly for discussion in supervision which were later incorporated in 
the writing up, for example “use and awareness of self” (Appendix 14 – also 
undated), which probably come closest to Charmaz’s model, or the second draft 
outline for data analysis (Appendix 17). 
 Hand-written notes, for example on change in assessment (Appendix 16)  
 Notes made in preparation for and during supervision and consultation with the group 
 What Charmaz (p 86) calls clusters and I would call mind maps (Appendix 15)  
These have all helped me to move to a position where I could begin to identify emerging 
major categories such as “beastliness” and “potential for change” and to think how it would 
make sense for these to be written up.  One of the things I have found most challenging is to 
move from a diagrammatic model which shows data clusters in circular relationship to each 
other and can encompass overlap, to giving a written account which inevitably requires a 
linear progression.  
I noticed when I began to write up the analysis that although I found the “extracted” codes in 
their various forms (as a summary of a whole interview or as illustrative of a cluster or 
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category) very helpful as a way of navigating the data, it was also important to check these 
out where possible with the original text. For example, I had coded one section as follows: 
“F46 becoming aware of other professionals’ anxiety 
F46a becoming aware that judges don’t know what to do”  
(this is incidentally an example of a meaning “chunk” which I had decided to sub-divide after 
initial coding). The text actually read: “...I think I just became aware of how anxious most of 
the professionals can be around those families and how judges often really really do not 
know what to do”, where the repetition of the word “really” conveyed for me a sense of 
urgency which the code had entirely failed to capture. Similarly I feel that “E276 developing 
co-incidence of view across professions” fails to do justice to “but I think that nowadays 
there’s um at least there’s um a very fine um co-incidence of view about these cases 
generally, and how to approach them and what’s relevant or irrelevant between the lawyers 
and the judges who often now are very very expert in them and the 
psychologists/psychiatrists”   I am sure there are countless other examples of subtlety of 
language and emphasis which have been lost in this process. 
 Reflections on the research process: “Negotiating the Swamp” (Finlay 2002) and 
“Mea Culpa” (course handbook 2008) 
This section will explore issues of reflexivity as well as sins of omission and commission (my 
interpretation of the phrase suggested by my course handbook may be overly influenced by 
my convent education), and aspects of the process which in hindsight would have benefitted 
from being handled differently. I have experimented with different locations for it within the 
thesis, given that it is both the context for the findings, discussion and conclusion and 
contextualised by them, and I hope that it will be read in that framework even though its final 
location is within the methodology chapter. 
Willig (2001) defines as a measure of quality in qualitative research the location and 
identification of the researcher’s own position and influence on the process, whether it is 
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called “reflexivity” (Henwood and Pidgeon 1992) or “owning one’s perspective” (Elliott et al 
1999).  Wren (2004) defines reflexive researchers as those who “are...prepared to make 
their project itself an object of study” and “accept that... no observations...no accounts from 
interview subjects...have an unequivocal or unproblematic relationship to anything outside 
the empirical material” (p476).  This implies the need to develop an awareness of the “taken 
for granted” by “approaching and re-approaching the empirical data, operating each time at a 
different level of interpretation” (p477). Finlay (2002) identifies (p209) the “muddy ambiguity” 
involved in defining the practices of reflexivity and suggests five categories: (i) introspection; 
(ii) intersubjective reflection; (iii) mutual collaboration; (iv) social critique; and (v) discursive 
deconstruction. I was interested in these distinctions and have experimented with attempting 
to fit the following reflections into this model, signposting these attempts with italics. I have 
also interwoven some  reflections into other chapters of this thesis where they fit: Russell 
and Kelly (2002 para 10) claim that “one way to gain greater understanding of reflexivity is to 
examine the process of research as it unfolds across the different stages of the research 
endeavor” (sic). 
In retrospect I think I paid insufficient attention throughout the process to the difficulties 
posed by my allegiances in different ways to the two groups of participants involved in my 
study.  On the one hand I “took for granted” that I “knew” to what beliefs, values and theories 
the systemic participants would subscribe; and on the other I allowed my personal 
relationship with a judge to prejudice me in favour of the opinion that they do a hard and 
lonely job (an example of reflection as introspection?) 
The first of these assumptions emerged when I was challenged very strongly at the 
beginning of the interview by one of the systemic participants on the language I had used in 
my initial approach and information letter (see appendix 4), where I claimed a particular 
interest in the meaning attributed to “fact”, “opinion”, “truth”, “observation”, “knowledge”, 
“expertise”, “reality” and ”objectivity”.  This elicited a request to define what I meant by 
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“systemic”:   “ You see the reason I asked you the question is because I would see the 
bunching together of those eight terms as coming from a particular aspect of systemic 
thinking which I would not define as systemic thinking ... as representing one very limited 
view of systemic thinking”.  Although this episode vastly increased my awareness of the 
possibility of wide variation in the way systemic therapists would view certain situations, it 
was not until the last systemic interview that I asked the same question in return, and even 
then only at the suggestion of colleagues on the course: 
“How would you position yourself theoretically within the broad systemic...and I was 
struggling for what word to put here, because this is a new question, but I’ve finished 
up with “church”.. does that, that question give you a sense of what I’m asking? 
About a range of theoretical positions systemically and how would you position 
yourself within those?” 
I think it would have been helpful to have included this question throughout the systemic 
interviews, if only to remind myself about my own prejudices on the matter. 
I also think that I had allowed my personal acquaintance with and respect for several family 
judges to “bias” my disposition towards them.  I had a sense of theirs being a difficult and 
often thankless task to which they brought commitment and dedication and because of this 
was more prepared to notice evidence which supported this view than the opposite. When I 
identified this dynamic I made a point of rereading the full text of all the judicial interviews 
and comparing them with the codes I had allocated in case I had missed any negative 
evidence on this point. This sense of “allegiance” was supported by several of the judges 
referring to my partner (and his possible impact on my understanding of the topic) during 
interviews; for example: 
“SH:  You can’t give me a reference for that can you? 
Bryn: Re G, Re G yes I can (long pause while searches law books) You have a 
comprehensive case indexer living with you...” 
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and  
“Jay: Now I emphasise, well you know all this don’t you, I mean you’re married to a 
care judge (laughs)”. 
 
I should make it clear that I took particular pains to avoid using the personal connection to 
recruit the judicial participants and that all the nominations were made by the office of the 
president of the Family Division.  However, my partner is obviously a quite well known fish in 
a comparatively small pool and the connection must obviously have influenced the process 
in some ways although it would be hard to identify how - an inclination to be helpful was 
certainly universally evident but the most helpful gesture (the gift of some relevant books) 
came from a judge who so far as I am aware was not aware of it.  I do not know how I could 
have avoided this dynamic, given the topic and the methodology (an example of inter-
subjective reflection?) 
 
I also regret being so transparent about my hypothesis in my initial approaches to potential 
participants.  Although its inclusion did not preclude the emergence of other equally and 
possibly more interesting issues, it pre-determined the shape of the semi-structured 
interview in terms of the questions asked. It is possible that because I had committed myself 
so firmly to the idea of exploring connections or disconnections at an epistemological level, I 
was less open, at least initially, to noticing  patterns at the level of emotion or ethics.  
I also had difficulty at times in concealing my hypotheses during interviews. The most 
flagrant occurred during the systemic pilot: 
SH One of the things that I think I have found in looking at some of the literature so 
far is that there is a lot of concern that certain voices aren’t heard very much in the 
process of expert reports, particularly children’s voices or parents’ voices ((Alex: um) 
and I, I kind of wonder whether you...I suppose I have a bit of a hypothesis that ...I’ll 
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put that on the table now, that a systemic position may have a particular ability to 
kind of bring forth those... more marginalised or less heard voices and I wondered.. 
do you agree with me?! (laughs) 
Alex: (Also laughing) I definitely agree with you because I think that’s, that’s our 
strength” 
 
I did recognise the inappropriateness of this intervention and brought it for supervision with 
my peer group.  Although I developed new hypotheses during the course of the research I 
tried to frame future questions around them more in terms of points of view expressed by 
other people such as previous participants than in terms of my own ideas: for example (to 
Jay) “some judges have talked about the assessment process and the writing of the report 
as creating an opportunity to bring about some change for the family.  What would be your 
view on that idea?”  
I talked earlier in this chapter about the idea of this research having some elements of action 
research in that simply by asking questions it had the potential to have some practical effect 
on the thinking of other professionals in the family justice system.  The experience of 
engaging in conversation with senior judges about systemic therapy and having their 
attention did at times go to my head. Bryn’s account of a presentation to judges on different 
types of therapy, but which might not have included systemic, elicited an offer from me to 
provide names of potential systemic presenters for future events.  At one point the balance 
of the interview with Kim was completely subverted by Kim asking me a series of questions 
with the result that I moved into the position of interviewee and sharer of opinion and 
passion:  
“SH  ... I think we have an enormous amount to offer... (^^^)..So ...I’m banging my 
drum here. This is a completely... 
..K:  I understand it, it’s not something that I’ve given a lot of thought to 
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SH Um I shouldn’t be doing this in an interview because I’m meant to be being a 
neutral...(laughs) so I shall have to write a big explanation, a self-reflexive comment 
on what I’ve just done (laughs) But yes, I, I would, I think we have a lot to offer 
K:  I’m sure you have. “ 
On the one hand I can see that my part in this exchange is completely inconsistent with 
accepted standards of research practice, but on the other hand I cannot regret being 
seduced by Kim’s invitation into this conversation (Kim’s own passion for creative practice in 
the family courts and informal style may have set the context for this).  However, I do think 
that I muddied the waters for myself in these episodes of becoming a more “active” 
researcher and wonder if I could have achieved the same effect by trying to hold on to the 
ideas and recreate the exchange at the end of the interview (an example of mutual 
collaboration?).  I have noticed the same “passion” in my writing up of findings: for example 
referring to finding it “shocking” that systemic practitioners were so overlooked in the 
consideration of relational questions (an example of discursive deconstruction?). On reading 
a draft one of my supervisors challenged this use of language and asked if I was really 
“shocked”,  and after some thought I concluded that I had been (in the sense of experiencing 
a direct challenge to the assumptions underpinning my professional life),  so I let the word 
stand. 
Another aspect of the judicial recruitment process which I regret is the failure to recruit any 
judges from ethnic minorities, although I did particularly request that this possibility be taken 
into account in the nominations.  However, this is unsurprising given that figures supplied for 
2012 on the Ministry of Justice website show that only 4.2% of judges in all areas of law (I 
have not found a breakdown for family judges) whose ethnicity is known are classified as 
black or from an ethnic minority.  The ethnicity of 18% is not known; whether this shows a 
lack of rigour in collecting the data or a reluctance on the part of judges to define themselves 
I do not know.  The percentage of women is 22.6%, although they are even less well 
represented in more senior posts (for example, 17% in the High Court). The low 
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representation of ethnic minorities in the judiciary might be considered to be of particular 
concern in relation to the fact that children from these groups are so over-represented in the 
population of looked after children (Harker 2012 p2 quotes a figure of 9% in contrast to  3% 
of the general population) (an example of social critique?). 
There are a number of questions that I wish I had asked during the semi-structured 
interview. For example, given the criticism that emerged in Ireland’s (2012) research for the 
FJC of experts who had no foothold in practice, it would have been useful to know what 
proportion of the systemic experts’ time was spent in doing “expert” work and what was the 
focus of their systemic practice for the rest of their time. Some of the answers to this can be 
inferred from the interviews but it would have been helpful to be clearer about this.  I also 
wish I had asked the systemic therapists more about how they understand and manage the 
issue of “confidentiality”; that it, how they talk to families about the fact that the relationship 
will be the subject of a report to court and what impact they think this has on the process.  
This question was asked in some of the interviews but not all (getting lost in the process of 
revising the question order and the technicalities of question prompting). I think it would have 
been helpful to have a more rounded collection of opinions because this was an issue which 
the judges felt particularly relevant to the issue of the psychotherapists acting as experts. 
I should have been more systematic about keeping a research diary: I began well but soon 
lost the routine and discipline.  I do have a “paper trail” in that the development of the 
content and order of the questions in the semi-structured interviews can be tracked in 
relation to the answers from previous interviews, but a properly maintained diary would have 
made the process more transparent. There were some occasions when I omitted to date my 
recording of connections or ideas.  Although I tried to be very rigorous about accurate 
numbering of my “meaning chunks”, there were instances where I lost track of the number 
sequence with the result that there were initial instances of duplication. (an example of 
confession!) 
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At the beginning of this thesis I identified the swings of policy and procedure which have 
impacted on expert witnesses in the family courts over the last twenty years. In the process 
of undertaking this research there have also been swings both in the sense I made of the 
data (about which I will say more in the conclusion) and in the way I related to the research 
question. What began as an academic interest (“how do people make this process work 
theoretically?”) acquired a practical slant (“what might people do differently?”). The final 
chapter of this thesis, therefore, will also include some recommendations. I hope that these 
may encourage some continuing engagement with the dilemmas, not only on my own part 
but hopefully more widely in the systemic and legal communities. 
I have come to appreciate that my own recursive movement between text, codes and written 
analysis constantly generates new ideas, and that I am never going to be satisfied that I 
have arrived at a definitive analysis of the material. If one then takes into account the 
stimulus to one’s thinking of the new perspectives of others generated in response to the 
data and to my analysis, the impossibility of arriving at an “end” becomes even more 
obvious. One of the most challenging aspects of this process is to know not only when to 
present one’s own analysis, however imperfect, but how to present it in a way which best 
facilitates the continuing evolution of creative responses to the material. The next chapter 
will put that aim to the test.  
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Chapter 4: Findings 
Introduction 
As I explained in the methodology section, I have attempted throughout to disguise the 
gender of participants in order to minimise the possibility of their being identifiable. To this 
end,  to add some sense of the real people involved and to facilitate the making of 
connections between individuals’ comments on different topics,  I have given them 
androgynous names rather than numbers in this analysis. The systemic participants are 
Alex, Chris, Fran, Gerry, Les, Nick and Pat; and the judicial participants Bryn, Dale, Evelyn, 
Hilary, Jay, Kim and Mo. 
In order most effectively to address the nub of the research question –that is, how far is 
understanding shared? -  I have analysed the data of these two groups separately, and for 
clarity have signposted in each section whether systemic or judicial perspectives are being 
analysed. Each section concludes with a comparison of the data to address the research 
question, and with some thoughts on the implications of this process. 
The structure of the analysis has emerged from the data and includes some unanticipated 
sections. Participants volunteered interesting ideas about aspects of the interface between 
their worlds, and connections and differences between their ways of thinking about and 
enacting their roles that I had not anticipated. It has been a challenge to arrange these in a 
clear and coherent way because they so often overlap and interconnect. 
An aspect of the findings which will not be overtly discussed in the analysis but may be 
evident at times, is some difference between the two groups in the discursive style of the 
interviews. In general the systemic interviews were longer (although I set the same context 
for both groups in making the appointments) and the style more tentative – there are more 
pauses, more half sentences, more hesitations.  I connect this both with a theoretical 
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commitment to a “both/and” position (Andersen 1992) and the practical daily experiences of 
working in less formal settings, whilst judges’ professional utterances are likely to be 
continually subject to recording and transcription, as well as having the function of “laying 
down the law”. 
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Final outline for categories/subcategories 
 
Systemic views Judicial views 
The elements of a good report and the skills required of an expert witness 
Elements of a good report: 
Practical and presentational  
“Articulating how you have come to think 
the things that you think” 
“Taking a position” 
Introducing new ideas 
What it’s like to be with the family 
Respecting difference  
Keeping the expert in the picture 
Suggesting interventions 
Looking to the past 
Looking to the present and to the future    
Answering the questions 
Professional and unbiased analysis 
Keep it short! 
Show your workings 
 
Skills required: 
Generic interviewing skills 
Therapeutic skills that have been adapted 
to context 
Skills in writing reports 
Courtroom skills 
Experience in court 
Experience in court 
 
How far is understanding shared? 
Introducing new ideas 
Answering the questions/taking a position 
Unbiased analysis/keeping the expert in the picture 
Skills Required 
The suitability of a systemic approach to working as an “expert” in the family 
courts 
Considering the wider network 
Thickening Description 
Challenging Assumptions/ looking at 
context  
Holding multiple positions/tolerating 
uncertainty 
A relational model 
Giving voice to the marginalised 
A useful technique  
Theoretical dissonance 
Negotiating the relationship 
Truth seeking 
Short time frame 
Hedging and Fudging/taking a position 
Helping the court with difficult questions 
An adversarial context 
Lack of recognition, respect and tradition 
Psychotherapist as third best 
Relationships in psychotherapy 
Truth seeking 
Subjectivity/objectivity 
Sources of judicial knowledge about 
systemic/family psychotherapy 
Choice of experts 
Helping the court make complex decisions 
 
 
How far is understanding shared? 
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Change in assessment and in the court process in general 
 Therapeutic aspects of the judicial role 
How far is understanding shared? 
The distinctive features of working in family justice 
The “attraction” of working with families in 
the justice system  
 
The “attraction” of working with families in the 
justice system  
 
How far is understanding shared? 
Less adversarial and more inquisitorial? 
Judicial “intervention” 
Less adversarial and more inquisitorial? 
Judicial “intervention” 
How far is understanding shared? 
“Hybrid knowledges”?  “Hybrid knowledges”?  
How far is understanding shared? 
Working with relationships in the family justice system 
Distinctions between public and private law. 
Beastliness  
Distinctions between public and private law 
Blood on the Carpet 
How far is understanding shared? 
Learning on the Job 
How identity as an expert emerges 
Lack of feedback 
Formal learning opportunities 
 
Listening down the years 
Use of personal experience 
Ongoing learning opportunities 
 “Sitting-in” 
How far is understanding shared? 
Working with inadequate resources 
How far is understanding shared? 
Desired Changes 
Systemic suggestions 
 
 
Judicial suggestions 
 
 
How far is understanding shared? 
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The elements of a good report and the skills required of an expert witness 
One of the aims for this research project was to increase the potential for systemic 
psychotherapists to be helpful to the family court system. It seemed important, therefore, to 
explore how far the judges and the systemic “experts” agreed about what constitutes a 
“good” report, and the appropriate skill set, so I asked them directly about their ideas on this 
point. 
Elements of a good report:  systemic views  
Practical and presentational  
Only two of the seven participants (Nick and Les) stressed the importance of layout: of 
having short, numbered paragraphs for ease of reading, with a summary at the beginning, 
although Nick acknowledged that it is hard initially to get used to this discipline.  Nick felt that 
commercially available templates were helpful, and Les had found the experience of being 
involved in public enquiries a useful preparation.  
Chris commented that it is not necessary to repeat the history: “because I’m not, I’m usually 
not the first professional to be involved, and also like there’s a stack of papers and no-one’s 
reading them anyway I have come to think”.  Chris also said that it is hard to know whether 
reports are the right length because of the lack of feedback (an area which will be explored 
in more detail elsewhere) 
Les and Gerry both commented on the impact of being in a legal arena on their approach to 
the management of the practicalities of writing the report.  Gerry tries “not to write notes 
which could be helpful to the lawyers if they sub-poena’d them” and Les said “[reports] need 
to be crisp, people put way too much kind of content in, you now, going on and on about 
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process stuff and it’s like, look, the more we do that, the more we’re opening up the door to 
allow everyone else in the court to interpret the process” 
“Articulating how you have come to think the things that you think” 
The majority of systemic participants commented on the importance of explaining the basis 
on which any opinion or ideas expressed had been reached (and making a clear distinction 
between “facts” and opinion). This might include explanations of theory and knowledge base, 
making the evidence clear, explaining what had been done and what documents had been 
read, and showing what hypotheses had been considered and favoured. 
“Taking a position” 
“I think that all I’m ever doing is punctuating a view of a family or a situation at one particular 
point in time and answering, helping the court answer some really difficult questions”.  Some 
participants’ comments on the issue of giving a clear opinion suggested to me that they had 
given a lot of thought as to how to articulate the requirements of the expert role within a 
systemic framework:  Alex commented:  
“I can take a position and for me that’s part of the identity I am calling into being; I am 
calling into being the identity of the expert at that point in time...so for me I don’t think 
it’s a conflict, I think I’m acting into the identity I’m being offered at that point in time”.   
Alex described this as “fitting with the court’s story” and might be seen as an example of a 
“contexted speaking ability” or “systemic eloquence” as described by Oliver (1996).  Others 
took a more “taken for granted” approach:  Nick commented that is important to answer the 
questions you have been asked and Les that you should offer your “best professional 
guess”.  Some subtle distinctions were made on the question of whether it was appropriate 
for the report to offer alternatives:  Chris’ view was: 
 “again, what’s the role of the expert witness? It’s to give the facts of...the 
psychological state of somebody or the psychological consequences of x or y, it isn’t 
just to lay out ‘well it could be this, it could be that, it’s a bit of this, it’s a bit of that’”, 
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whereas Pat said:  “I think there’s something about offering alternatives as well, different 
possible trajectories if that’s relevant”.   
Introducing new ideas 
Two participants talked about the importance of the report introducing new ideas to the legal 
system.  This might either be through enabling the creation of new ways for people to be 
portrayed (Alex gave an account of a mother who had been seen as not co-operating well 
with professionals who was able to change the way she was seen by the court as a result of 
her work with Alex) or through “breaking out of the old circles” and unsticking some repetitive 
patterns.  Again this touches on the issue of the possibility of change occurring through the 
process of assessment which will be explored much more fully elsewhere. 
What it’s like to be with the family 
A majority commented on the role of the report in giving a sense of what it is like to be with 
the family, by including their thoughts, words and a “sense of the dialectic” and by giving 
examples of different views within the family and some sense of how things have come to be 
as they are and how conflicts and difficulties have arisen.  There is an expectation of a 
relational rather than an individual account, whilst at the same time emphasising the needs 
of the children and engaging with their position as individuals.  
Respecting difference 
 Alex and Fran both commented on the importance of bringing forth suppressed or unheard 
views and stories and giving voice to more marginalised family members or ways of thinking. 
Alex gave an example of introducing the question of how a dual heritage child could be 
helped to make sense of her origins when the white mother (separated from the child’s black 
father) was apparently oblivious to this issue.  Fran talked about managing the issue of 
allegations and counter-allegations concerning domestic violence and the importance of 
finding a way of respecting both narratives and addressing everyone’s logic. 
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Keeping the expert in the picture 
Two experts talked about the importance of being aware of and making evident in the report 
their impact on and involvement in the system being assessed.  Alex described feeling that a 
commissioning guardian ad litem was expecting a particular “pro-mother” position to be 
evident in the report and struggling to reflect that dynamic in the final report.  Gerry 
commented that it is bad for the expert to be “left out of the picture” in the report by 
“pretending” that totally neutral questions were asked. 
Suggesting interventions 
Chris alone commented that it is not helpful to recommend interventions without identifying 
resources where those interventions might be available. 
Skills required:  systemic views  
The systemic therapists made distinctions between those skills which are an expectation of 
their normal professional role and the skills which have had to be developed or adapted 
specifically for the expert witness task.  I shall keep that distinction in analysing their ideas. 
Generic interviewing skills: 
Alex identified that talking to people and “meeting them where they are” is part of “what we 
do”, with the aim of exploring stories,  understanding how things have come to be as they 
are  and finding out what people want to do differently. Alex, Fran and Les all talked about 
the importance of untangling and remaining even-handed between the many narratives or 
stories that might be around (Les thought there was a possibility in expert witness work of 
there being more “dissonance” between narratives than normally in therapy) with the hope of 
creating “new and unstuck” narratives: what Fran called “emotional not practical truths”.  
Alex and Fran both talked about the importance of bringing forth subdued voices and 
particularly of sharing the experience of the children. Alex talked about “enriching but 
challenging” a family’s account, and Gerry about not being afraid of asking awkward 
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questions  and “pushing the system beyond the limit of tolerance” in order to get it to act out 
(there is probably a wide variation among therapists as to how far these positions would be 
regarded as part of “normal” therapeutic interaction). 
In terms of helpful systemic theory Alex and Nick both mentioned the usefulness of the 
(2002) article by Blow and Daniel which introduced the idea of frozen narratives as a lens for 
making sense of post-divorce contact disputes. Fran commented that not much had been 
written systemically about working as an expert witness. Pat uses ideas from attachment 
theory. 
Unsurprisingly given the emphasis in systemic practice (following Bateson 1979) on the 
usefulness of binocular vision or a “double description” , five of the therapists interviewed 
cited the advantage of working with a colleague, particularly to resist “entanglement “ ,to 
retain even-handedness and to introduce a different perspective.  Gerry suggested doing 
joint interviews with other professionals involved in the case such as guardians ad litem or 
social workers in order to save time in creating opportunities for exploring differences of 
opinion.  Nick, who works in one of the pilot assessment teams set up in response to 
Bearing Good Witness (Donaldson 2006), felt that working in a multi-disciplinary team offers 
more support and containment to the expert and allows for more creativity and access to 
different opinions and expertise. Pat emphasised the importance of having good supervision. 
Therapeutic skills that have been adapted to context: 
Chris talked a lot about how court directed work requires different skills from therapy, seeing 
it as being much more directive, more focussed because of the limit on the time one would 
be involved with a family so requiring “brevity and intensity” and including elements of 
psychoeducation and coaching.  This makes sense in the context of Chris’ unquestioning 
commitment to the idea of enabling maximum change within the process, whilst feeling that 
being directive may be less helpful to the family than a “normal” therapeutic approach. Alex 
also identified the short term nature of the work and the “minimal engagement” or reluctance 
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of families as requiring different skills from therapy, comparing it to working with families and 
young people in school settings. Fran identified that undertaking a therapeutic assessment 
has a wider context than therapy and can create helpful distancing. 
Skills in writing reports 
Chris and Pat talked about the importance of the skill of being able to articulate what you are 
thinking and to show how you have arrived at your conclusion so that the judges can see the 
basis of it, with Gerry spelling out that thoughts should be phrased in a way the court will 
understand, because they will not be interested in “systemic tangles” (this comment will be 
explored further elsewhere).  Pat commented that it is necessary to be able to distinguish 
opinion from fact and Gerry elaborated on this idea in stressing the importance of making 
distinctions in the report between inferences from observation, reported speech and beliefs 
about beliefs, and explaining that one cannot “know” the experience of others, only what 
they say. Nick mentioned the necessary skill of writing “convincingly and carefully” and of 
making it clear to the court that nothing is simple or black and white. Both Nick and Les felt 
that it was important to be able to use and integrate research based evidence into the report.  
Courtroom skills 
It is interesting that only three of the systemic participants talked about the courtroom 
experience in the context of necessary skills, although all seven had interesting accounts to 
give of courtroom experiences.  Nick talked about the importance of using “bread and butter” 
therapeutic skills such as thinking process, scanning the room, “working the relationship”, 
engaging with people and being reflective not reactive, using words carefully, thinking about 
how one is coming across, reflecting on one’s thoughts and deciding when to share them. 
Nick distinguished these from specially acquired skills such as knowing about procedures, 
coming across with authority and authenticity and not going outside the remit, also 
mentioning the possibility of making oneself vulnerable.  This theme was developed more 
strongly by Les, who talked about the importance of being able to think in the witness box 
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and knowing how to argue with lawyers and other experts in a “non-hysterical way” in order 
to justify one’s opinion and avoid the possibility of “humiliation”. Pat thought that experts 
need a “thick skin” and the ability to understand themselves and to tolerate intense feeling; 
Les also mentioned the potential for being exposed to disturbing accounts of abuse and 
violence. 
Experience in court 
Anxiety about having to give oral evidence in court was one of the significant factors 
identified by Donaldson (2006) as deterring doctors from taking on the expert witness role. 
Alex specifically identified this as one of the factors which deter fellow systemic therapists: “I 
think it’s usually about the court appearances”.  I asked the systemic participants about the 
frequency and quality of their court appearances and their accounts would seem to 
complement and illuminate what has already been said about courtroom skills. There is also 
an opportunity to compare how the experts’ expectations of the judges in the courtroom 
compare with the judges’ sense of their responsibility to the experts. The frequency of being 
called to give oral evidence varied between “a low proportion” of cases to about half (only a 
rough estimate was invited). Fran felt that the more experienced the expert becomes the 
less likely s/he is to be called; also that there is an increasing tendency to save money by 
not calling experts. Pat felt that the likelihood of being called is higher in high conflict private 
law cases. 
Alex described feeling unsupported by a judge when accused by a barrister  of having “made 
something up” (the information referred to had been included in some of the court bundles – 
the collection of papers placed before all the parties to the case - including that supplied to 
Alex, but not to the barrister and his client).  Alex talked about losing confidence and having 
to become defensive, feeling that the barrister was out of order and the judge should have 
intervened. Gerry on the other hand thought that most family judges were good at “putting 
down aggressive barristers” and only got rattled in exceptional circumstances.  Les felt that 
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barristers were disrespectful of experts and their expertise, assuming that they “understand 
what it takes years to learn”, and telling others what to do in a way which they would not 
tolerate themselves. Les described feeling unprotected and outnumbered at times, with a 
sense that judges and lawyers were completely unaware of the effect of “having to field 
questions from five different people, all right, for hours and hours going over the same 
ground, having to explain things to people in a really hostile environment”. Les also thought 
that sometimes judges form too “fawning” a relationship with an expert who is familiar 
through regular court appearances. 
Interestingly some of the skills necessary for the expert role which were less familiar to the 
systemic participants were also sources of satisfaction and even enjoyment, such as the 
intellectual challenge, and actual writing of the report,. Gerry also admitted enjoying times 
when the drama of the court was helpful for people and also “even though I know I shouldn’t, 
um winning my point”.  Nick talked about balancing the stress of giving evidence against the 
enjoyment of the other aspects of the work. These included being in a position where it was 
acceptable to lay claim to “a level of knowledge and expertise which I can find ways of 
sharing with people” (which resonates with Cade’s (2002) article on being an “unashamed” 
expert).  Pat enjoyed finding coherence, seeing the logic of the system and generally being a 
“little Poirot”! 
Elements of a good report: judicial views: 
 “Well the best analysis of an expert report was one given at a presentation by Dr Danya 
Glaser, and she said what is required is a history, a diagnosis and a prognosis” (Bryn) 
Looking to the past 
Bryn commented that it is important for the judge to understand the “factual basis” on which 
the expert is reporting.  Other judges wanted to receive an analysis of how the problems 
arose over time, the nature or causes of psychological injury and a document which 
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demonstrated understanding of the background. On the other hand, Dale and Mo 
commented that it was a waste of money and “irritating” for the expert to rehearse the history 
because it is the judge’s job to have read the papers and know the history. 
Looking to the present and to the future    
Despite the above quote from Bryn, I found that other judges did not use the word 
“diagnosis”.  I had originally intended to separate out the “present” and the “future” in 
analysing their comments.  However, it seemed that the two were intertwined: Evelyn, for 
example, required a report to “judge the quality of a relationship” and to address a parent’s 
capacity for caring, as well as offering a “clearance of safety”.  Jay wanted an insight into 
current mental functioning in order to understand parenting capacity for the future and 
barriers to understanding and Bryn feedback on “capacity for action”. 
Hilary was alone in saying that good reports should aim to achieve change, “convince” 
parents to change and “give clues” for change (whilst commenting that because funding is 
only available for assessment it is not acceptable to say this!)  Hilary talks of seeing the 
report as having multiple audiences, that is the families and local authorities involved as well 
as the court (those systems being seen as dynamic not static).    The question of change in 
the process of assessment is explored more fully elsewhere. 
Answering the questions 
Dale, Hilary, Kim and Mo all commented specifically on the importance of the expert 
answering the questions that s/he had been asked (that is, in the “letter of instruction” which 
is sent to the expert commissioning the report and clarifying the specific questions that the 
court would like answered.  A number of other interesting issues have emerged in relation to 
the drafting and acceptance of letters of instruction which are addressed elsewhere). 
All but two of the judges interviewed specified that they wanted an opinion (although, as 
Bryn was keen to clarify, not a decision, that being the role of the judge.) Dale expects the 
expert to take a position and make a recommendation without  ambiguity, a clear view being 
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more helpful than “on the one hand, on the other”;  Bryn says that it may be acceptable to 
offer alternative hypotheses , or to say that it is too soon to decide or that more evidence is 
needed. Kim wants advice and recommendations; Hilary talks of “speaking to” the judge and 
recommending action to the local authority. 
Professional and unbiased analysis 
Several judges commented on the unhelpfulness of (quoting Dale) “polarised reports which 
are very obviously not neutral”.  Jay described the need to factor out personal feelings, and 
to avoid being driven by pre-conceptions or pet theories. Evelyn felt that the move towards 
joint instruction (i.e. one expert being commissioned) had made it easier for experts to deal 
with things “straight down the middle” and Hilary and Mo referred to the need for “lack of 
partiality” towards any party in the proceedings.  The helpfulness of “analysis” was identified 
by the majority of judges. 
Keep it short! 
Research by Tuffnell et al (1996) identified that 20 pages was the length of report preferred 
by judges.  Five of the seven judges interviewed identified brevity as a desired quality in an 
expert’s report, with Evelyn specifying a length of ...20 to 30 pages.  Jay talked about the 
huge amount of paperwork connected to cases in the family courts and how insufficient time 
is allowed for reading, so that judges are often reading reports in their “own” time in the 
evenings.  Dale, Evelyn and Jay all recommended summarising findings at the beginning of 
the report and including supporting information in appendices.  (A letter of instruction 
mentioned (para 17) in a 2013 case in the High Court – Re CtL and CmL – included a 
judicial direction “that your report shall be no longer than 10 pages. Any need to refer to 
interviews or observations should be included as an annexe”. The subsequent judgment 
referred (para 32) to the “tedious, even mind-numbing detail” of the 74 page report 
eventually produced).  The President of the Family Division (Munby 2013) recommends 
(p820) “more focus on analysis and opinion than on history and narrative” with a suggested 
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length of 25 pages. Dale and Evelyn both mentioned their dislike of jargon and technical 
language and Evelyn specifically commented that theoretical explanations were 
unnecessary.  
Show your workings 
Hilary emphasised this message with an anecdote about being penalised in an arithmetic 
exam for not showing workings even though all the answers were correct.  Bryn and Mo 
explained that judges need to know the basis upon which an opinion is reached so that they 
can evaluate one in the context of the other. 
Skills required:  judicial views  
Interestingly the judges were more interested in identifying skills connected with the 
courtroom than with the writing of the report.  So while the importance of being able to 
express oneself clearly and concisely in good English (Evelyn, Hilary, Jay and Kim) and of 
analytic skills (Hilary and Kim), was stressed, more emphasis was placed on what Evelyn 
called “thinking on your feet” and Hilary “coping with challenge” , that is, not being fazed, 
holding one’s ground, not losing one’s temper or getting rattled, being “robust but not 
arrogant” and generally “keeping a cool head”(Jay) , a “calm overview” and “calmness under 
fire” (Hilary and Kim). 
Experience in court 
After I had heard Alex’s account of feeling that the judge had not offered protection, I asked 
the judges what expectations they imagined the experts would have of them and how they 
would see their responsibilities towards the expert in the courtroom. 
Bryn’s view was that the expert was entitled to expect the judge to “hold the ring” and to 
ensure that proceedings were civilised and that the expert was not exposed to unreasonable 
questions.  Dale talked about intervening to prevent discomfort, embarrassment or difficulty 
to the expert or “hostile” cross-examination; Dale would also establish a dialogue with the 
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expert in order to “test my own theories”.  Evelyn recognised that judicial criticism of an 
expert witness could be very damaging and takes care to balance negative with positive 
comments, whilst commenting that it is not the judge’s role to protect the witness from proper 
questions. Hilary distinguished between “nannying” and protecting from unfair bullying. Jay 
advised experts to “expect attack” whilst seeing it as the judge’s role to protect from 
unjustified attack. Mo talked about the expert’s evidence needing to be put to the test in 
cross-examination (“the hammer and the anvil”) and expects professionals to be able to look 
after themselves and not be over-protected.  
Bryn and Evelyn talked about the temptation for experts to exceed their brief by making 
judgments and decisions, and explained how this is likely to get the judge on his/her “high 
horse”.                         
How far is understanding shared? 
An important factor to recognise in considering the interface between expert witnesses and 
the judiciary is that whilst at some levels it could be seen as a collaborative process  or even 
one where the expert  by definition “knows” more than the judge, the legal structure creates 
a power imbalance.  The experts’ actions are controlled and determined not only by statute 
but by the power of the judge to lay down what happens within the process, and the expert 
has to act into a context over which s/he has no control.  Chris talked about the experience 
of “not being embedded in this world and being a visitor to the world”. The experts’ 
experience of feeling unprotected, outnumbered and lacking in confidence may be 
exacerbated by this imbalance of power. 
The two systemic participants who emphasised the importance of summarising and making 
the report easier to read appear to have understood the judges’ requirements well, and Chris 
had grasped the challenge of working with “a stack of papers”.  There also appeared to be a 
consensus in principle on the importance of “showing your workings”/”articulating the basis 
of how you have come to think what you think”.  What might be more problematic are the 
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questions of how far to include a theoretical framework for thinking (which would usually be 
an expectation of a systemic report) and how and when to include reflections on the 
dynamics of the wider system (see for example Alex’s account of the influence of other 
professionals). 
Most of the judges commented on the importance of getting a sense of the quality of 
relationships and more specifically the potential for parents to care appropriately for their 
child. However, it seemed that some judges felt that this opinion might be reached on the 
assessment of an individual rather than a relationship: Jay for example said “The...apparent 
presentation which I as a layman see and the actual psychological functioning of the parent 
may well be two very different things...I’ve been much better able to form a view about the 
parent’s ...parenting capacity having got this insight into the way their mind works”.  Gerry on 
the other hand focuses on interaction: “I like the judge to be able to sort of imagine that he 
was living with the family.  I want to bring it to life so that it’s, it, he gets a sense of who these 
people are and how they live”, whilst Fran says “I will try to create a narrative of how 
relationally this has come about”.  However, Gerry also tells an anecdote about a well-known 
family judge: “I’d written this report and I thought it was not bad and she said ‘well, you 
haven’t given a very interactional description, Dr X, of the way this family operates’ and I 
thought ‘wow’ so that was an interesting eye-opener!” It will be useful to pay attention to the 
difference of emphasis given to individual and relational assessment in analysis of other 
areas of data. 
Introducing new ideas:  
Only two of the systemic therapists specifically identified the introduction of change or 
“unstuckness” as being a feature of a good report, although it is obvious from their answers 
to other questions that they all believed that change of some kind was inevitable in the 
process.  It was clear from answers to other questions that the judges want to know about 
the capacity for change and some named the capacity of the process to create change (Bryn 
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comments: “people are ...able to change: they change within the court process”) but only 
Hilary identified the eliciting of change as a desideratum in the report, whilst commenting: 
“We mustn’t call it that because the LSC won’t pay for it”. This ambivalence around the 
naming of change will be another area for further and fuller consideration and exploration. 
Answering the questions/taking a position: 
The judges clearly wanted unequivocal answers to the questions the experts had been 
employed to answer that would help them in the making of difficult decisions.  Bryn 
commented specifically on how much the judges rely on experts in making complex 
decisions and wondered whether too many answers are expected of them.  On the other 
hand the judge does not want the expert to go beyond his/her remit by pre-empting the 
judge’s role in being the final arbiter on the issue in question. The systemic experts’ answers 
suggested that they might have different ideas about the possibility of reaching an 
unequivocal position.  For me this connects to a systemic tension around the idea of 
“knowing” (Les specifically advised against “going into court with a ‘not-knowing’ position”) 
which was identified in the literature review and will be explored more fully elsewhere in this 
analysis in relation to the way in which the systemic experts make sense of the expert role 
within a systemic theoretical framework.   
Unbiased analysis/keeping the expert in the picture 
Experts are legally required to approach their role with “objectivity”.  In family law the 
historical context for understanding this word is the idea of the expert as “hired gun” who is 
recruited to give evidence in a situation because of his/her known bias towards a particular 
position and who will therefore be expected to be partisan towards one party or position in a 
hearing.  It is in this context that I understand the judges’ use of words such as “neutral”, 
“straight down the middle”, “factoring out the personal feelings”, “avoiding partiality”.  On the 
one hand this fits with systemic ideas about neutrality as respecting and understanding the 
logic of all positions (Cecchin 1987) and Fran’s comment about “emotional truths”; on the 
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other hand Gerry’s idea that the effect of the expert’s beliefs and actions on the process of 
assessment should be clearly evident in the report does not fit so well.  Alex’s account of 
choosing to introduce to the assessment the “subjugated story” of dual heritage (not a 
question that had been asked) could be described as acting on a personal “prejudice” and 
therefore not wholly impartial.  What is the effect on the judicial system of believing or of 
having to behave as if one believes that complete impartiality is achievable? 
Skills Required: 
Several points strike me in comparing the expert and judicial comments on this point. 
Firstly, the systemic experts were connected in emphasising the relevance of their 
therapeutic skills to the role, even in the sense of highlighting how they had had to adapt 
them or how different they were in some ways. I wonder whether in the light of the difficulties 
they face in undertaking the role, and their awareness that it is comparatively unusual 
practice within the systemic field, there is a certain element of self-reassurance in this. 
The judges focussed more on the courtroom skills than the report writing skills, even though 
they acknowledged that the majority of cases before them do not involve court appearances. 
One conclusion might be that this is an area where experts are most likely to be found 
wanting by the judges, for example by not holding their ground, losing their temper, getting 
rattled or going outside their remit. This is in contrast to the experts’ review of required skills 
where only three mentioned courtroom skills.  Could this reflect a lack of opportunity (or a 
lack of awareness of opportunity) for acquiring or developing courtroom skills in the same 
way that confidence and competence in therapeutic skills can be enhanced through training? 
Alternatively, are courtroom skills seen as being different in some way, a matter of 
temperament or character (“having a thick skin”) rather than something that can be taught or 
learned? 
I was struck by the military symbolism used by the judges in talking about experts’ 
appearances in court (“calmness under fire”, “attack”, “hostile”).  I do not expect these 
comments to reassure any potential experts who are currently deterred by the possibility of 
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appearing in court! The adversarial aspects of court process will be discussed further in the 
next section.  
The judges seemed to be describing a fine balance that they would need to consider 
between allowing the experts’ evidence to be put to the test by the parties to the case and 
paying attention to the comfort and protection of the expert. One might imagine that exactly 
how this balancing exercise is shown in practice varies enormously from judge to judge. I 
have tried throughout this analysis not to identify the gender of any of the individual 
participants in order to minimise the possibility of their being identifiable in a limited field.  
However, I think it is relevant at this point to say that it was not possible to make any 
connection between the gender of the judge and their position on the testing/protecting 
spectrum. In contrast one of the female systemic experts identified a dynamic which could 
result in distinctions being made according to gender and discipline between “hard and “soft” 
experts; for example a female psychologist might be seen as soft and a male psychiatrist as 
hard. Smart (1989) comments (p86) on the connection that is often made between the 
adversarial style of many legal systems and “masculine aggressive verbosity and machismo” 
but argues that rather than making naturalistic assumptions (“men are aggressive therefore 
suited to law”) we should deconstruct the discourses by which law and 
masculinity/femininity, and the overlaps between them, are constituted.  The same argument 
would apply to constructions of gender and hard/softness in the “psy” professions. 
So far some differences and similarities of thinking between the judicial and the systemic 
participants on what constitutes a good report/expert, have been identified. The next section 
will consider the implications of these differences and similarities for deciding how well a 
systemic approach is suited to the process of acting as an expert.  
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The suitability of a systemic approach to working as an “expert” in the family 
courts 
Systemic views 
Unsurprisingly most of the systemic psychotherapists interviewed argued with conviction that 
their discipline has a huge amount to offer to the process of writing expert reports, although 
they also recognised that some aspects of their theory and practice fitted less well than 
others within a legal discourse. I will summarise the general comments first, before analysing 
in detail the systemic ways of thinking and practising that were felt to be particularly well 
suited to the forensic arena as well as those which were seen as more problematic. 
Alex argued that all expert reports should be systemic, and that a systemic report 
“strengthens the expert’s hand” by bringing a different quality that is lacking in reports by 
professionals from other disciplines.  Chris said that the families involved would benefit if 
more systemic experts were working in this area: a demand for Chris’ services in cases 
where family dynamics were a feature had developed because they were seen as helping to 
shift cases stuck in the court system (a comment which Nick also made. The question of 
whether assessment is seen as a process involving change is so significant that a 
subsequent section will be devoted exclusively to it).  Chris felt that a systemic approach 
could be even more helpful with earlier involvement. Fran and Nick commented on how well 
“systemic complexity”  fits with the complexity of family court process and Fran claimed that 
judges value it and that systemic experts “have a huge amount to offer”; Les, who has a first 
qualification as a psychologist, said that that discipline could not offer the same advantages 
as systemic training. 
So where are these strengths seen to lie? (Although I have attempted to cluster the data and 
make some distinctions, many of the clusters overlap and it has been a challenge to 
distinguish these strands of thinking from each other without being repetitive. There is also 
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some overlap with the data on what constitutes a good report, given that the respondents 
would define a good report by its systemic qualities!) 
Considering the wider network 
Alex thought that looking at how systems relate to each other is a systemic strength, 
illustrating this with an account of seeing a guardian ad litem triangulated in the family 
system to the extent that the children of the family saw her as taking the mother’s side. Alex 
described how systemic training strengthened resistance to the possibility of becoming 
collusive in this pattern, and enabled it to be reflected in the report. Chris talked about a case 
where a previous expert had alienated the professionals working with the mother and 
created schism; Chris was able to create new conversations with the other professionals in a 
way that moved things on, seeing giving voice to all parts of the system equally as a 
systemic strength. Gerry claimed that a systemic approach can be more comprehensive and 
lessened the possibility of repeated assessments by thinking: 
“about the whole system um and try and keep knitting the bits together instead of 
flying, you know you have a learning disability assessment and an alcohol 
assessment, a psychiatric assessment, a risk assessment for sexual abuse all over 
the place”. 
 Les argued that systemic practitioners are better able to recognise their own position in the 
system and to point out patterns of interaction repeating over time (for example, how early 
abuse can be relived in later relationships), while Pat saw “widening the lens” and changing 
perspectives as a systemic strength. 
Thickening Description 
Alex talked about the expectations of the expert’s role: 
”.. I have to fit with the description that’s already in the court, the court’s got a story 
and part of what I see myself doing is fleshing that out, making it bigger, making it 
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richer and making it thicker um and that to me fits with what I do” (that is, as a 
systemic practitioner). 
 Alex describes getting feedback on more than one occasion from individuals assessed, 
whatever the outcome of the case, that they were pleased that the court had seen a “bigger 
picture”.   This might involve looking at resources as well as deficits, getting both sides of a 
story and enabling people to show different aspects of themselves. Gerry’s idea of giving the 
court 
 “a picture which the judicial process doesn’t give them access to of the family so that 
they have a more human and specific... (5)....image” 
 might also fit this description. 
Challenging Assumptions/ looking at context  
Alex saw the systemic expert’s skill as lying in enriching but challenging the family’s account, 
in deconstructing ideas, turning questions around and enabling the development of 
alternative narratives. Chris described the systemic strengths of offering different ways of 
thinking about the meaning of experience, and adding new and different ideas. Fran 
describes moving away from the idea that professionals have a monopoly of sources of 
wisdom. For example, grandparents may be seen as being obstructive because they are 
“trying to get this biological parent out of this child’s life” when it might be more helpful to try 
to understand the logic behind that position (“a different era, where clean breaks...would be 
what’s expected of you”). In this way, a new story may emerge, for the court if not for the 
family, instead of “going round and round the same old circle”. Gerry identified the potential 
for challenging “the desperate attempt to find individual diagnoses all over the place” as well 
as “a lot of the assumptions and language that gets used”, for example barristers asking 
questions about bonding: 
 “moving from you know individual labelling to um even if you have got labelling to 
seeing it in an interactional context, I think that is something we can contribute”.  
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Les also gave an example of how “being able to look at the meaning of, of behaviours within 
a context” can change views about how things are understood:  
” so thinking about some of the reports that I wrote about the transgenerational 
transmission of trauma for example, that was a really key idea and concept for 
judges to get a hold of and barristers, and that came from a syst.., from thinking 
systemically”.  
Holding multiple positions/tolerating uncertainty 
The therapists see the generation of many new and different ideas as requiring a parallel 
skill of being able to make sense of holding or moving between what might appear to be 
seen as conflicting or inconsistent positions. Thus Fran talked about the skill of “holding 
different ideas as contingent” and described as “absolutely key” 
 “holding multiple positions: which is why it worked very very well when two of us 
worked together, it was invaluable, because one of us could hold as the observer in 
the room other positions, which might be the court’s position or it might be the 
children or the other partner and really kind of weaving that into the process of the 
work”.  
Fran considers that this ability is a way to try to map a system and to understand it. Chris 
identified the systemic skill of being able to hold multiple possibilities in mind, describing a 
case where a boy accused his father (separated from the mother with whom the child was 
living) of having hit him so that contact was stopped. Chris’ ability to hold open the possibility 
of other positions and hypotheses allowed the explanation to emerge that in fact it was the 
travelling that was involved in the contact with his father that was really distressing the boy 
but the father was unable to hear that, so the child made the accusation of violence. The 
discomfort of being unable totally to discount the possibility of violence is obvious from Chris’ 
account: 
 “while still holding....because I had to hold in mind that this guy could have 
been...once I met him and he was 6’5” and was very temperamental, it seemed to fit 
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that he might have indeed have been out of control and he was in a cer.., to a certain 
extent...but I think it was that sense of keeping open to hypotheses that I could do in 
a way that used my skills”.  
Gerry thought that a systemic approach could give a “more human and specific” picture than 
would be available from other kinds of report with more information on what the options are. 
Les emphasised the importance of developing multiple narratives and hypotheses, exploring 
underlying meanings and reframing behaviours in a way which had the potential to activate 
compassion and understanding. Nick stressed the helpfulness of a systemic report being 
able to work with different assertions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, and to describe different 
perspectives:  
“and I think it just kind of makes everything much more multi-levelled, you know, 
multi-layered (SH um) er it’s very complicated and I think that’s the main strength. I 
think also that we’re, that we’re able, we’re trained to tolerate um... (1)... living with 
that sort of uncertainty.”  
Pat also talked about using the concept of “safe uncertainty” (probably referencing Mason 
1993) as a guideline. 
A relational model 
Chris was of the opinion, having always been more interested in the relational aspects of 
human life than in individuals, that the emphasis on individual assessment in the family 
courts, and the tendency towards an individual focus in letters of instruction, is unhelpful. 
This point was illustrated by a case example, where the issue was disputed residence 
between the child’s maternal grandmother, with whom the child had been for three years, 
and the child’s mother, who had a history of drug and alcohol abuse but had since “got 
herself together”.  The family story was that the mother had been abused by her mother’s 
partner. A psychiatric expert assessed the grandmother’s ability to care for the child in 
question, and the mental health of the mother, but made no comment (because they had not 
been asked to do so) on the crucial relationship between the grandmother and her daughter.  
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“The lawyers of the granny were very happy with the report and thought it was very 
clear that they were seeing the problem as lying with the young woman....the lawyers 
of the young mother were contesting and so nothing happened.  So the clients 
didn’t...it never...changed anything, things stayed exactly as they were and now 
they’ve asked me to try to do something because they decided that someone needs 
to try to do something within the families”. 
Chris’ sense was therefore that the other professionals involved had concluded that an 
assessment approach which focussed on relationships might succeed where others had 
failed. Chris argued that all work in the family courts is about relationships and that therefore 
an approach in which relationships rather than individuals are at the centre is particularly 
suited to this context. 
Gerry made the same point, stressing the importance of showing the meaning of individual 
behaviour in interaction rather than in a “vacuum”, and suggesting, for example, that it is 
more helpful to think about “the nature of the relationships between the mother and the child” 
than to talk about “attachment”. Nick, who has experience of working in a multi-disciplinary 
assessment team, said that within the team assessing the impact of parental relationships is 
seen as the “dead centre” of a systemic remit and may even be part of a “psychiatric” 
assessment; however, it is sometimes difficult to convince referring professionals of this. Les 
and Pat both saw the ability to locate the behaviour of individuals and families in context as a 
particular systemic strength. Pat gave an account of a recent instruction where “in spite of 
the fact that they’ve had lots of assessments, that parenting information isn’t there”. 
Giving voice to the marginalised 
Alex felt that working from a systemic perspective “gives me permission” to bring forth 
marginalised voices and to argue for doing that when writing the report or talking to solicitors 
(the introduction of the dual heritage issue,  which was discussed in the section on what 
constitutes a good report,  illustrates this in practice).  Chris talked about the systemic 
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strength of giving voice to all parts of the system equally, and, for example, helping women 
who might have been “overpowered” in a relationship to “find their voice”.  Fran and Nick 
both stressed the importance of getting children’s narratives into the system as they can 
easily be overridden by adult voices, Fran feeling that mediators were too fearful of engaging 
with children. Nick makes a point of using children’s own words in writing reports in order to 
promote their views, and said that this practice has resulted in the judge wanting to meet the 
children involved in a case, and the children wanting to meet the judge. Les felt that the 
systemic approach’s potential for promoting social justice, creating different perspectives on 
dominant discourses and giving an audience to subordinated narratives had been one of the 
main incentives to getting involved in forensic work in the first place. 
A useful technique 
Alex and Nick both named the use of genograms (relational diagrams developed in systemic 
practice) as enhancing their reports.  Interestingly a “social work statement and genogram” 
are listed as specific documents to be annexed by Practice Direction 36C.  
Theoretical dissonance 
The systemic experts varied in how far they identified problematic areas of practice or 
theory. Alex and Fran were both very clear that they did not see any “conflict”: 
“I don’t see any contradictions whatsoever between being a systemic thinker and 
doing this kind of work ...because being aware of the context in which you are 
working is something you should do in any kind of work...”   
Chris and Nick both felt that acting as an expert witness fitted some beliefs but not others.  
Gerry felt that there was no conflict experienced personally but  others might find it more 
difficult depending on how they interpreted what it means to be systemic: “I think the problem 
is more with the people who define themselves as systemic than with the courts actually”; 
although on reflection Gerry identified a colleague who might have fallen into that category 
and commented: “I know she uses this kind of language much more than I would although 
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actually working together there’s no conflict so I think a lot of this is language rather than 
actual thinking”.   
Negotiating the relationship 
I was interested in how the systemic experts explained their role to the families they were 
assessing and how this influenced the subsequent relationship, given that their relationship 
with an individual or family was not usually freely sought but requested by the court and 
would certainly not be subject to the usual understandings of confidentiality in that everything 
relevant would be reported to the court. Alex was very clear about the importance of 
informing families at the beginning that their thoughts were wanted and that they would be 
shown the report and have an opportunity to challenge what was said, even though Alex 
would reserve the right to disagree. Alex referred to the systemic idea of domains in talking 
about this issue (see my discussion in the literature review of Lang et al’s 1990 paper on 
domains of action). Alex described how the process of continually working hard to engage a 
reluctant mother in the process in this way had had surprising therapeutic effects by enabling 
strengths and resources to be identified as well as deficits. I was interested that when I 
asked Alex about the effect of my interview in highlighting issues this was the area identified 
as being the most significant. 
On the other hand neither Nick, Pat nor Chris show families the report in private law cases, 
because of timing issues (although for Chris public law would be different, and factual 
inaccuracies would be corrected).  Pat was not even sure that it was legal to show families 
the report before it was submitted to the court. Chris also talked about the importance of 
working in a particular way to develop a relationship with the subjects of the report, 
recognising the “scariness” and fraughtness of the process, and the fact that families are 
often powerless and coerced, as well as possibly being under financial pressure in the 
private law cases. Chris emphasised the importance of being clear about the time frame and 
the focus of the report, and clarity of explanation was also stressed by Fran, Pat and Nick. 
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All three of them (in different contexts) had leaflets available so that families would know 
what to expect.  
Gerry makes a point of specifying when accepting instructions that the letter of instruction 
would be read and explained to the family by the solicitor before the assessment began in 
order not to “waste” the first interview (although this does not always happen as it should). 
Gerry also explains that the priority is to represent children’s best interests so that parents 
will not necessarily know what their children have said, and finds that clarifying issues 
beforehand “forestalls complaints”. Nick also talked about the difficulty if families had not 
seen the letter of instruction and clarifies with families that the duty of the expert is to the 
court rather than to any party, how notes will be taken and how everything will be reported 
back. Nick felt that the legal professionals who were familiar with the process could be very 
helpful in preparing families for the assessment, helping them to understand the mandate 
and to get the most from the experience. 
Les described using the overarching context of the court process as a way of getting families 
to reflect on their relationship with wider society, how they are perceived by figures in 
authority and what they would need to do in order to satisfy the court that it does not need to 
intervene.  
These systemic experts do not see a conflict in using their therapeutic skills in this context, 
because they have developed a theoretical frame for making sense of the apparent 
dilemmas, and developed practices of transparency, openness and explanation to 
circumvent them. The Marlborough Family Service, which undertakes assessment for courts, 
has developed this idea more formally in the practice of the initial “network meeting” for 
adults only which is attended by the key professionals and the parents or other primary 
carers. This discusses the letter of instruction and decisions are then made as to the form 
and duration of the proposed assessment and this is summarised in a subsequent letter.  
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This process and its effects have recently been the focus of doctoral research by Phillippe 
Mandin. 
Truth seeking 
Chris identified this as a problematic area, thinking that the court is looking for “the truth” and 
wants the expert to say what is wrong while a systemic expert is not trying to arrive at a truth 
but simply sharing a way of thinking. Fran used the concept of “emotional truth” as distinct 
from “practical truth” to encompass differences of opinion or belief about something which 
the court had defined as a “fact” and which had therefore to be treated as true for practical 
purposes. Gerry commented that a “finding of fact” is “really” the judge’s opinion: 
“the fact about truth.., obviously everybody knows within the legal profession that 
truth is the truth being used by a particular party at a particular time”.   
Gerry commented that in this context the concepts of “reality” and “objectivity” would have 
“certain problems” but was the only systemic expert to name them specifically as potentially 
problematic. Gerry also pointed out how confused families get around different “truths” 
established by different thresholds of proof between the criminal and family courts (for 
example, it can be found as a “fact” that X abused Y even though X has not been found 
guilty of the abuse in the criminal court); Gerry’s view is that this even confuses some 
experts, although the problem is not as pressing for mental health experts as, for example, 
paediatricians. Les considered that the court believes in objective truth and wants a clear 
path to be defined. Les had worked with some children who were due to give evidence about 
being abused and felt the need to prepare them for the possibility of the alleged abuser not 
being found guilty by stressing the importance of the child knowing “your truth” (perhaps a 
similar idea to Fran’s “emotional truth”?) Nick mentioned the difficulty of accepting that one 
has to work to the judge’s fact even if one is not sure that one agrees with the finding, and 
considered that the legal system adheres to “evidence” whereas this is not a systemic 
concept. 
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Short time frame 
Chris commented that it is hard to  know what one thinks in a short assessment frame, and 
that it is easier to be systemic on private law because one has “longer to mess around”; 
Chris thought that having  more time for assessment helped to create more ideas, and for 
the expert to be more confident. At the same time Chris wondered whether the idea of a 
longer time frame helping was an “illusion” and more connected with a personal reluctance 
to be “certain” and a sense that a longer time frame contributed to “feeling better” as a result 
of “not being certain too quickly”. Fran on the other hand felt that it was important to stand 
firm on the amount of time needed and that “nothing was going to be lost by making it six 
months instead of three”.  Nick’s opinion was that the court context may not allow enough 
time to form a “therapeutic relationship”, and Pat felt pressured to “report too quickly” 
resulting in a “snapshot” rather than a “bigger picture”. Pat wanted at least twelve weeks to 
allow for six sessions, recognising the importance of gaps between sessions. 
The idea that a minimum length of time is needed to do a thorough assessment seems to 
me to be connected to two “therapeutic” positions: that part of the assessment is based on 
the therapist/expert’s sense of the nature of the relationship that is formed with the person or 
persons being assessed, which will inevitably take some time to develop, and that time is 
also needed for change to take place (hence Pat’s emphasis on the length of time between 
sessions). These positions are both potentially in conflict with the requirements of the court: 
firstly on a practical level because there is a huge emphasis on reducing delay in court 
proceedings, and secondly on a theoretical level because in legal terms change is not the 
purpose of the assessment. 
The Children Act 1989 spells out (S 1 (2)) the general principle that in court proceedings 
regarding children’s upbringing any delay “is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child”. The 
whole thrust of the Norgrove (2011) Family Justice Review and of Ryder’s (2012) judicial 
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response was to reduce the “unconscionable delay” inherent in the system as it has 
developed in the last twenty four years: 
“The average care case in county courts now takes over 60 weeks and many take 
much longer – an age in the life of a child” (Norgrove p3). 
The time taken to obtain  expert reports was identified by the Family Justice Review (p117) 
as a significant factor in creating delay and this is supported by research findings (for 
example Ward et al 2012). Even prior to the publication of Ryder some courts were only 
instructing experts who were prepared to report within a three month time frame (Cooper 
2011).  The justice system is now producing (and educating the judges in) psychological 
evidence for this emphasis on reducing delay: see for example Brown and Ward (2013) on 
the need to make decisions based on the needs of the child at different developmental 
phases. The implications of this issue for systemic experts who are keen to take their time 
over assessment cannot be overlooked and will be covered more fully in the discussion 
section. 
Hedging and Fudging/taking a position 
Whilst being very clear that being required as an expert to  take a position was not 
problematic but an aspect of professional identity that was called into being by the context,  
Alex at different points in the interview used the words “I kind of hedged one [question] 
because I was kind of unsure...” and “I think that was where I kind of felt like I fudged it” [in 
relation to a question as to the most appropriate residence for a child] and describes 
questioning the decision reached in the report. Similarly Chris described being reluctant to 
be as certain as the legal system wants one to be, and feeling that in one case the judge 
had been frustrated: 
 “and then I start maundering (? wandering) around in a systemic psychotherapist 
way. That isn’t what they wanted; they wanted me to say ‘yes she will’ or ‘no she 
won’t’ and also I have always tried to stay curious about everybody’s position and not 
necessarily neutral you know in the way that we do or we don’t but to be seen as 
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someone who is not too much in alliance with either at different points and so it does 
mean that there can be a certain..what might be interpreted as wooliness?” 
 Chris thought this might cause irritation (“I was a bit irritated with myself in a way”) and 
questioning of the expert’s professionalism. Fran on the other hand was clear that holding 
multiple positions could be distinguished from not being able to make up one’s mind. Gerry 
said that it was important to recognise that the court was not interested in “systemic tangles”, 
that the expert is being paid to make a recommendation and give a clear opinion. Les 
explicitly commented “don’t go into court with a not-knowing position” (a reference to 
Anderson and Goolishian 1992) because the expert is being paid to know.  Les added that it 
can be possible to reconcile different ideas by taking a “best guess” position, but on the 
whole judges prefer experts to state a preference for one position rather than another, 
avoiding waffling and mind-changing.  Nick talked about helping the court to understand that 
nothing is simple and black or white, whilst still being irritated by the “lack of certainty” (which 
Nick connected with a social constructionist theoretical position) in the “family therapy 
community”. Pat (a self-defined social constructionist) explored the concept of “systemic 
expert”:  
“... (2)...It’s, it’s almost a contradiction in terms isn’t it? Because, because of the 
whole thing about ‘oh no we don’t have expertise, we’re not experts, family therapists 
are not experts’ but I think we’ve shot ourselves in the foot with that one to be honest 
because of course we have expertise. Why would anybody come for any kind of 
therapy if they weren’t coming to someone who knew something about it?! So it’s that 
idea about what are the boundaries of our expertise I guess”. 
 Gerry also felt that the theoretical position of some systemic practitioners (particularly the 
“dangerous” ideas of Maturana) could be thought of as wearing “destructive blinkers” and 
located them as their own worst enemy. 
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Helping the court with difficult questions 
Most of the systemic experts commented specifically on the difficulty of the decisions that 
judges in family courts are being asked to make. Alex talked about “giving” the judge an idea 
of the complexity, “enabling” thinking and “offering” a position; but of seeing the expert’s role 
as distinct from the process of decision making:  
“because I think we’re in two very different domains, I think the domain they’re in is 
difficult and I don’t want to be (laughs) part of, of that, I really don’t.” 
 Chris talked about giving “true help” to the court in answering some really difficult questions, 
recognising that the judge has to make a yes or no decision and needs to know where the 
expert stands: in this context experts who seem out of their depth, anxious, or lacking in 
confidence or competence are no use. Fran has become more aware of the anxiety of other 
professionals and that judges often “really really do not know what to do”; Fran also talked 
about seeing solicitors working to change their own clients and not knowing how to manage 
the process: it can then be “time well spent” to acknowledge their frustration and help them 
manage the process better. Gerry told a story about being rung on a mobile phone whilst in 
a restaurant abroad and suddenly realising that what had been anticipated as a five minute 
call was in fact a conference call from the court which lasted an hour and a quarter :  
“then at the end after an hour the judge wanted to ask me questions, you know he 
was telling me about his quandary and I said ‘well I quite understand your quandary 
but you know I couldn’t really answer it for you, this is what I think (SH yes) but 
actually I can’t decide it for you’” . 
 Les felt that judges were quick to remind experts that they are the ones who make the 
decisions but “actually once I, you get into that frame of saying, ‘I don’t have to make the 
decision, my job is to, is to aid the court and to give the judge the material that they need to 
make the decision’, that’s quite liberating”.  Nick talked about recognising the constraints 
within which the judges have to work and growing in respect for the way decisions are made. 
Further on in the interview, when talking about the emotional impact of working in public law 
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family cases, Nick wondered about the amount of support available for judges and what it is 
like to hear a continuing succession of painful cases:  
“how do you, how do you deal with all that level of stuff and decision making? um and 
they’re big, ... (1)...unpleasant decisions for anybody to have to make (SH um)”. 
An adversarial context 
In a later section of the analysis which addresses the ways in which family law is different 
from other areas of law, I will explore further the question as to exactly how far the process is 
adversarial.  For now I am focussing on interactions which the systemic experts have 
experienced as adversarial and how far they feel able to manage this within a systemic 
approach. Systemic practice emphasises collaboration; it might therefore be expected that 
an adversarial atmosphere would be uncomfortable for systemic experts. As I have already 
described, Alex found one experience of cross-examination particularly unsettling, thinking 
that the barrister’s use of language was “inappropriate” and more suited to the criminal than 
to the family court. Fran felt that courts tend to go for the middle ground or “fair division of 
the child” which implies an adversarial context. Gerry commented that barristers were 
prevented by their adversarial role from thinking out of the box and that the “one-sided” 
thinking of advocates is “anti-systemic”. However, Gerry was also of the opinion that whilst 
an adversarial system can result in aggressive barristers, such barristers are improper in the 
family courts and most judges are good at “putting them down”. Les, who made the 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” experts, blamed the adversarial nature of the court for 
confrontations between these positions (although it would be fair to say that these comments 
related to a less recent part of Les’ forensic experience).  Nick felt that the pressure for 
certainty and firm diagnoses came more from the lawyers than from the judges, but that they 
are only doing what the system requires: “I think the system is you know often pretty awful 
(SH um) and protracted you know and keeps things going and er it’s still too adversarial, it 
promotes that (SH um)”. 
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Lack of recognition, respect and tradition 
One of the systemic experts was unsure how aware judges were of their professional 
discipline and its implications in terms of what might be expected from the report. Alex did 
not know if judges were aware of the distinguishing qualities of a systemic report but 
assumed that good feedback about systemic reports might indicate awareness.  Some of 
Alex’s first instructions had come via guardians ad litem who had attended training courses 
run by Alex, suggesting that the personal connection was significant. Nick, Pat and Chris 
were more certain that neither judges nor other legal professionals know what are the skills 
of a systemic therapist, although some other professionals such as guardians might. (This is 
particularly significant in the case of solicitors, who are often responsible for suggesting 
which experts should be approached in a particular case and in drafting the letter of 
instruction.) Nick explained that in the multi-disciplinary team systemic input is never 
requested by the instructing solicitors, and has to be explained and justified by the team, 
though the local judges are more familiar with the idea and will sometimes suggest it. Chris 
thought that the small number of systemic therapists and the fact that they are spread out 
might account for this: also that it is not clear who speaks for the discipline 
 “or how clear we are about what we can do in those contexts.... (passage describing 
psychologist colleague who does cognitive assessments) but the skills they’re calling 
upon are the ones that they know quite clearly what they do and the psychiatrist is 
obvious so I think it isn’t so obvious what we do and you know what our expert 
witness, where is our expertise.”  
Thus it seems that judges assess Chris’ professional status more by workplace than by 
discipline. Nick considered that judicial knowledge, increased reliance on and increased 
recognition of the usefulness of the discipline could be developed through systemic 
presence in multi-disciplinary court assessment teams. Chris felt that the lack of a systemic 
tradition of doing expert witness work and the smallness of the profession made it hard to 
strategise for the recognition of the potential usefulness of systemic experts.  
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It is not only judges whose familiarity with systemic therapists is relevant to the question as 
to whether they have a useful role to play as expert witnesses.  Experts are often nominated 
or suggested by other professionals such as solicitors, guardians, CAFCASS staff or social 
workers, although they have to be agreed by the judge. They are usually sounded out as to 
availability and willingness to act by solicitors, who are also responsible for drafting the 
letters of instruction, which include the question/s the expert is required to answer. Although 
this aspect of the process did not feature sufficiently in the systemic experts’ interviews to 
include fuller analysis, Chris and Nick both described problems with this process owing to 
the lack of knowledge of the “instructor” about the nature of their expertise: Chris, for 
example, was asked for a diagnosis in the formal instruction despite having agreed verbally 
that the assessment would be relational. 
In addition I have already indicated that there is a strand of opinion among the systemic 
experts that the systemic profession has “shot itself in the foot” or been its own worst enemy 
in emphasising certain theoretical positions – principally the disclaiming of expertise. Other 
participants commented on feeling that gender might disadvantage some experts, with male 
experts getting into bantering dialogue with judges while females might be more tentative or 
reserved. Pat, Les and Chris commented that courts often assume that doctors are “senior” 
in some way to any other discipline. Finally Pat highlighted the recent development of the 
omission of systemic psychotherapy from the Legal Services Commission’s 2011 approved 
list of expert professions, so that special approval is required for a systemic report.  
Judicial Perspectives: 
None of the judges professed awareness of having received reports directly from a 
systemic/family psychotherapist, although two commented that they had either received a 
joint report to which a systemic therapist had contributed or a systemic report attached as an 
addendum to the main report.  This was despite the fact that three of the judges were sitting 
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in courts where systemic expert participants had regularly contributed reports.  One of the 
judges even named a systemic participant but was unaware of her discipline. Similarly when 
asked how much they knew about systemic psychotherapy answers ranged from Mo’s 
succinct “zero!” to Dale’s “not a great deal”. 
Psychotherapist as third best 
I also asked what discipline of expert judges would normally expect to be instructed for what 
type of question. All the judges would want to instruct a psychiatrist where mental illness 
were in question, for example (Dale) to know how far “illness” was a contributory factor in a 
parent injuring a child. Psychologists might also be instructed for behavioural or cognitive 
problems (Bryn) or for assessment of intellectual functioning or to understand the internal 
workings of the brain (Jay). Dale would go to a child and adolescent psychiatrist for 
assessment of the impact of warring parents on children, because s/he might be able to  
offer ideas as to how the behaviour might be changed, while Mo would approach a 
psychologist where there were issues concerning behaviour and to consider the future 
possibilities for family relationships. Bryn would ask a psychiatrist whether an individual or a 
family would benefit from a particular therapy because therapy would be the “recommended 
treatment”.  Evelyn answered: 
“..(5)...well where you’ve got a child or parent with a possible mental illness then you 
reach for the psychiatric report; absent that, I think you would reach for the 
psychological report 
SH So the psychotherapist would be quite a long way down the... 
E the psychotherapist would be quite a long way down the, down the line 
SH down the line, yup 
E I think you’d really want a consultant psychiatrist or a chartered psychologist but if 
you couldn’t get any of those you’d content yourself with a psychotherapist 
SH Definitely third best? 
E I think so” 
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Thus there was a strong presumption that a psychotherapist was ruled out by definition from 
being suited to the expert role, and because there was no recognised experience of 
systemic reports having been received, no opportunity for that presumption to be challenged. 
The reasons for this are largely connected with the judges’ understanding of the relat ionship 
between psychotherapist and “client”, rather than the areas which the systemic group 
identified as more problematic, although some comments emerged  which connect with 
those such as the search for truth, the meaning of objectivity and the usefulness of taking a 
position. 
Relationships in psychotherapy 
The judges saw the role of psychotherapy as treatment: for example Bryn expected that a 
systemic report would address the appropriateness of treatment and how it would help: “I 
wouldn’t necessarily expect the psychotherapist to have the um the sort of background that 
would lead them to the initial broader analysis of the problems that a family or people have.” 
Bryn, Dale and Kim regarded systemic or family therapy as something that might be 
recommended by another expert. There was a consistent assumption that psychotherapists 
do not offer to do assessments because they are constrained by in certain ways: for 
example, Bryn was confident that psychotherapists do not offer to do assessments because 
of “confidential rapport” and Dale that giving evidence would be seen as compromising the 
therapeutic role. Kim thought that family therapists were deterred from acting as experts 
“because of the confidentiality issue”. Evelyn said that judges: 
“have clear principles against drawing those who are working in a therapeutic 
environment with a family into a court arena where they may be required to criticise A 
and praise B and so in relation to therapists who are actually administering therapy 
(SH no) we steer clear of them”. 
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 The task of the therapist is broadly understood to be “listening and absorbing” whilst probing 
for underlying difficulties, rather than offering the explanations and opinions required by the 
court.  Any reports which might be received were expected to be limited to broad 
assessment of the progress of therapy (possibly with the client’s agreement) or whether 
clients had engaged with work which the court had considered might be helpful. Kim 
described having seen reports of systemic therapy appended to an expert’s report and 
thought that: 
 “they’re much more “up here” to the person we’re talking about... (passage 
describing context of appended report)...It takes me one step closer to the person I 
am having to worry about”.  
Truth seeking 
Bryn talked about the importance of facts being supplied to the expert and the necessity for 
the court to “find” facts if they were not clearly established. Bryn expected experts’ 
professional training to lead them to believe what they are told and that medical people are 
more trusting and less cynical than the courts.  I now wonder if Bryn was subtly suggesting 
that the fact-finding process minimises the possibility of gullible experts being deceived! Bryn 
also saw what happened in the court process as part of the facts of the case and 
distinguished between the family and other courts in that family work is about deciding what 
is going to happen rather than what has happened. Dale said that establishing the truth is 
the main task of family work and also emphasised the importance to this end of the judge 
paying attention (“eyes and ears are on alert all the while”) to process in court.  Mo 
distinguished between finding the truth and “finding a fact” which is accorded the status of 
truth for the purposes of the legal proceedings. 
Subjectivity/objectivity 
I asked the judges what objectivity meant to them. Dale defined it in terms of avoiding 
polarised positions, not getting enmeshed, and not sympathising with one side. Evelyn 
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talked about the need to “play it straight down the middle” and Hilary about being 
disinterested and having no agenda or partiality (Mo also defined objectivity in terms of lack 
of partiality). Jay stressed the importance of factoring out personal feelings and not allowing 
oneself to be driven by preconceptions or pet theories. 
Interestingly, some of the judges also spoke spontaneously about subjectivity, both in 
relation to the expert witness and to themselves. Hilary recognised that the subjectivity of the 
expert could affect the assessment, but also that “I don’t suppose we can any of us shed 
subjectivity completely”, although that should be the aim. Hilary and Kim both discussed the 
welfare checklist which is prescribed for judges to use in cases involving children as an 
attempt to set an objective standard which in practice had to be applied subjectively – Hilary 
described the process as using “structured discretion”. I had an interesting exchange with 
Jay on a similar point: 
“SH How far do you think it’s possible to shed pre-conceptions? 
Jay  I don’t think you can shed your pre-conceptions, I think the key thing, and this is 
something which judges have to bear in mind too, is to be aware of what your 
preconceptions are and make sure that they don’t drive the conclusions which you 
reach. Pre-conceptions of course could be, I’m the one who used it, could be a 
slightly loaded word, one might think of one’s experience of life 
SH Systemically, there’s a systemic theorist who calls them prejudices which is an 
even stronger word 
Jay Yeah well, they all mean the same thing depending on which angle you look at 
them from, don’t they?” 
Mo talked about the possibility that judges have a “natural preference” to keep a family 
together, but that “subjective preferences” should be kept in check applying the “overriding 
objective”. 
Dale commented that: 
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“I think anyone who’s been in the family justice system for a bit, whether as a 
barrister, solicitor, or as a forensic expert, rapidly assimilates the philosophies and 
the guidelines that underpin what we do.  So you find that everyone’s moving in the 
same direction and concentrating on the same issues”   
I subsequently asked for a further explanation of this and received this reply: 
“The philosophies and guidelines which underpin what we do are essentially these –  
Wherever possible consistent with their welfare needs, children should be brought up by 
their parents or within their natural families. 
Placing a child in care on the basis of a plan for adoption would always be a matter of last 
resort.  
In the private law context, consensus between parents is infinitely preferable to a solution 
imposed by the court. 
The court, in whichever context, will always strive to protect children from harm.  
Delay in the court process is inimical to a child's welfare.” 
Sources of judicial knowledge about systemic/family psychotherapy 
Bryn, Dale, Evelyn, Hilary, Kim and Mo claimed to have learned more about mental health 
and therapeutic issues, and particularly about systemic/family psychotherapy, from hearing 
cases over the years than from formal training. Bryn had also been informed by having 
friends in the field and by personal experience of mental health issues within the family. Dale 
had never done any reading or judicial training on family therapy but had learned through 
reading expert reports. Bryn remembered:  
“.. years and years ago we had a presentation on different types of therapy from 
someone who sort of described all the different types of therapy that there were, 
hundreds and hundreds (SH oh right) and tried to explain the difference, analytic and 
cognitive analytical theory, cognitive behavioural therapy and all the rest of it” 
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but could not recall whether family therapy had featured in this presentation. Evelyn called 
judicial training “pie in the sky” because there is simply not the time available to take it; Mo 
could not manage more than 10 hours per year.  Jay described trying to prioritise training in 
family work (having a caseload which includes some civil cases) and reading the Judicial 
College website to catch up on the content of any relevant courses missed. Hilary was the 
only judge who claimed with certainty to have received any formal training on the systemic 
approach. 
Choice of experts 
Jay and Kim both felt that there were also problems in this process from the judicial point of 
view: Jay described having to trust the advocates through not having access to information, 
or sufficient time, that would enable challenge to their suggestions for appropriate experts, 
and sometimes being disappointed by expert reports.  Jay thought information about experts’ 
suitability was exchanged by word of mouth, and felt that judges being more active in this 
area might be desirable (as recommended (2011) by research conducted by Pearce and 
Masson on the representation of parents in care proceedings) but was not practicable. Kim 
would prefer to have more input into the choice of expert:  
“I’d prefer they came into court and said ‘Judge, we’re having a discussion as to what 
we need in the way of experts’ reports, can we draw you into that discussion?’ 
because I think that’s more helpful.  If people come into me and say ‘We’ve already 
agreed’ and the parents’ solicitor is saying ‘well we’ve already agreed that we want a 
report from Dr Snooks’ and I actually don’t agree with it, the perception of that party’s 
fairness of the process if I say ‘no, you’re not having that’, they think you’ve 
prejudged them and it’s gone already”. 
Helping the court make complex decisions 
Despite their concerns that experts were used too often, that sometimes inappropriate 
choices are made, and that there can be a  wide variation of opinion on the same issue 
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between experts, the judges were keen to point out how much they rely on them when it 
comes to making really difficult decisions, and how harmful “bad” expert advice can be. Bryn 
for example had requested a report on the impact of a child giving evidence; the expert had 
recommended that it was important for the child’s voice to be heard, but Bryn had realised 
subsequently that this had not been helpful. Bryn felt that there was a dearth of appropriately 
qualified experts and was keen to encourage any untapped source of expertise; but also 
wondered whether judges sometimes expect too many answers of the experts. Earlier in the 
interview Bryn had described how experts rely on and trust what is said to them by the 
people they are assessing, whereas judges are “more cynical”. Subsequently in commenting 
on the lack of able experts, the “imprecision” of their work and the possibility that judges 
might expect too much of them Bryn observed:  
“the lawyer wants precision and the doctor... (1) tries things out, we’ll try this, we’ll try 
that, inevitably because they, it’s an uncertain field”,  
going on to say that experts would offer as much certainty as they can.  It is also clear from 
the judicial definition of a good report that the judges in this project find certainty much more 
helpful than uncertainty.  
How far is understanding shared? 
It is impossible to compare the systemic experts’  views of what makes their discipline 
particularly suited to the process of assessment for court with judicial views because the 
judges were totally unaware of it’s being used in that way.  All that can be said is that if one 
looks at the judicial definition of a good report most of the qualities claimed for the systemic 
approach would be among those identified as desirable by the judges. The exceptions are 
probably the relational model (simply presumably because the judges are more used to 
reports and assessments being of individuals) and more significantly the whole question of 
the toleration of uncertainty and the ability to take a firm position in relation to the questions 
asked of the expert.  The issues of the meaning of “truth” in different contexts and the 
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implications of using the title of psychotherapist also merit further analysis.  The significance 
of all these potential differences of understanding will be explored more fully in the 
discussion section.  
Another aspect of the suitability of the systemic approach to the expert role is its relationship 
with the idea of change and how well it fits with forensic process. This emerged with such 
emphasis from the data that I have analysed it separately in the following section. 
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Change in assessment and in the court process in general 
The issue of how far the process of assessing an individual or family might bring about what 
I have chosen to call “helpful change” or have a therapeutic effect was not one which was 
reflected in the questions asked in my first two systemic interviews. However the idea 
emerged so strongly in my interview with Chris (and was also clearly present when I 
revisited Alex’s and Bryn’s interviews in the light of Chris’ comments) that I subsequently 
included a question about it in all interviews, including the judicial. 
Systemic views 
Alex felt that by aiming in the assessment to create a “bigger picture”, and to focus on 
strengths and resources as well as deficits, an opportunity was created for individuals and 
families to be portrayed in new ways, and that such shifts could have significance for the 
outcome of cases. Alex described work which resulted in a mother thinking of herself very 
differently, with consequent therapeutic effect.  Alex believed that the subsequent decision of 
a younger child to move back to live with this mother “had something to do with what they 
were hearing and what she was hearing about herself”. 
Chris in talking about what was rewarding about working as an expert identified the 
satisfaction in being able to facilitate change, such as enabling families in private law cases 
to stop being in court, and subsequently commented: “that’s how I treat my role as expert in 
any case whatever they want to call me, is doing a therapeutic assessment, I’m always 
doing that”.  Chris saw creating an enabling relationship with the family as part of that 
process. At the same time Chris recognised that there would be no payment for “anything 
that they (my italics) call therapy”. 
 Fran went further in saying that there was an external expectation that the assessment 
would bring about some change, largely as a result of having a relational focus rather than a 
linear individual assessment. Fran saw the ability to begin to involve people in thinking about 
the possibilities for change, however stuck patterns of behaviour seemed to be at the time, 
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as “one of the keystones” of the work, emphasising that assessing the possibility for change 
is the only way to be useful. Fran thought that there had been a time when the judge “would  
say, you know, ’oh I think they need more therapy’ nudge, nudge, wink, wink, ‘we’ll ask for 
another assessment’ but we don’t get that any more”. Like Alex, Fran talked about creating a 
new narrative which brought about changes in behaviour through changing beliefs about 
relationships (for example, introducing new ways of understanding disputed accounts of the 
same event). Fran also considered that that could be created by considering the effect of 
marginalisation on families in the court system and “trying to convey that you really will listen 
even though you’re not necessarily agreeing with what the person says, I think that’s a very 
important part of the therapeutic process”. Fran also described working with a couple where 
there had been a breakdown of contact but feeling that there was a “wave that we could 
ride”. Fran attributed the swelling of this wave to work which had already been done by the 
guardian (although Fran did not think that the guardian was fully aware of the effect of her 
own work). 
Gerry considered that the fact that families have no choice about the process means that 
they “have to listen” in a different way from how they  may listen in other contexts, and that 
the “drama” of court is helpful for some, resulting in long term change in some cases.  Gerry 
spelt out the dilemma hinted at by Chris and Fran: “I think this is an interesting problem 
because I do see the assessment as an intervention and this isn’t the way the Legal 
Services Commission thinks about it, they think it’s an assessment” (the LSC is the body that 
approves the appointment of experts and administers their fees). Gerry, like Fran, argued 
that it is impossible to assess the potential for change (which is often what the expert is 
asked to assess) without a trial of change. Gerry’s opinion was that the judges and other 
lawyers understand this dynamic but that it does not fit the model required by the 
administrative system and that it is not possible to talk openly about this dilemma: 
 “I mean I, I always make it explicit but I still think they’re not, they can all sort of nod 
wisely but they’re not allowed to say it or they don’t feel they’re allowed to say it 
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SH There’s a constraint around the language? 
Gerry There’s a conspiracy around the language, yes!”  
Interestingly Pat also talked about the need to “whisper” the idea that some judges allow 
more extended assessments because they recognise the potential for change.  
Les also thought that regardless of the outcome in court a good expert assessment could 
have therapeutic effects and keep cases out of court.  This might be by offering an 
opportunity to make sense of an experience or inviting the participants to see things from a 
different perspective by asking what systemically would be called “circular questions” 
(Burnham 1986 pp 108 - 125). Questions could include asking why the parent thinks the 
social worker doubts his parenting ability or what would need to change for the child to come 
home. Unlike the other systemic experts, Les was not convinced that the judges were aware 
or made use of this potential. 
Nick also believed that particularly in the private law cases there could be a sense of their 
being pervaded by frustration and the hope that “somebody like you will be able to sort this 
lot out”. Nick emphasised that a “proper” assessment would involve meeting a family three or 
four times and forming a relationship with them “and as we all know, assessments are 
interventions”.  In expanding this idea, Nick talked about the potential for that relationship to 
be containing, and for questions to be asked that had never been asked before, so that while 
change may not “be on the agenda”, in undertaking the assessment, it is not off the agenda 
either, and “I work from the assumption that my, our involvement has the potential of 
creating some change”. 
Like Chris, Pat was and is drawn to the work by the high potential for change when families 
are “in extremis”. Pat’s view was that the expert position made it more possible to explore 
options for intervention and to introduce alternative ways of seeing families such as 
explaining the context of behaviour such as external threats to the family from local gangs.  
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As well as the therapeutic potential in the assessment process, the systemic experts 
recognised some activities or effects which could be described as therapeutic in other 
aspects of the court process.  Chris, for example, had noticed judges talking to children more 
about their dilemmas in making decisions, or writing to children to explain their decisions.  
Fran felt that although judges in private law might be geared towards compromise and 
“meeting in the middle”, in one case she remembered  
“one very robust barrister saying ‘this is ridiculous, this child can’t go on seeing her 
dad in the contact centre, it’s got to move on’ and I think I was slightly kind of saying 
’yes but’ and actually I think she was right.  I think her saying ‘it’s got to move on’ was 
very well timed and it did move on”. 
 Fran thought that it could be useful for judges, experts and other lawyers involved in cases 
like this to develop dialogues and have conversations outside the court room about this kind 
of issue. 
Gerry had witnessed judges intervening personally in cases, for example trying t o make a 
positive engagement with families.  Both Gerry and Les felt that this could potentially be 
helpful but equally there was potential for damage to be done. Nick felt that the respect 
shown by judges to the parties, and their commitment to ensuring a fair process, was 
therapeutic. Like Chris, Pat had found judges 
“thoughtful and child centred generally speaking... (2)... able to be child centred I 
mean (some text omitted)... that judge was very.., asked some very penetrating 
questions you know and er really made us think and made us defend our position 
very clearly but was willing to go with, in a very child-centred way, with reunification”. 
Some judicial interventions were considered to be unhelpful; for example, Fran thought that 
judges getting frustrated with conflicted parents and using their authority to “chasten” them 
only made them blame each other more.  Gerry was annoyed by judges who were 
committed to a particular belief system or theory such as parental alienation which might 
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result in unwanted contact being enforced.  Les talked about a parent in a public law case 
who said 
 ‘look, it’s like they put you in a bull ring and run you around and around until you 
drop dead from exhaustion  ... (4)... you know, constant assessments”. 
Judicial Views 
Some judges were very emphatic that a clear distinction must be made between assessment 
and treatment. Bryn recognised that people might change in the court process, but went to 
great pains to find  for me the case reference (Re G 2006) that established  ‘The court has 
no power to make an order for an assessment if the main purpose is to provide a continuing 
course of psychotherapy to the mother’. Bryn pointed out that Baroness Hale had said in this 
case that treatment was a matter for the health authority and Bryn felt that the furthest 
judges could go in the matter of helping families to access treatment was to lean on the local 
authority.  
Hilary felt that a report could and should have some therapeutic effect by drawing the 
attention of various captive audiences, especially the parents, to the possibilities of change, 
and should be aiming to achieve some change, because families are dynamic, not static. 
That emphasis on creating a context for change should be an aspect of the assessment 
process as well as the final report but “we mustn’t call it that because the LSC won’t pay for 
it”. 
When I shared this comment, Jay was very clear that “ that’s not the goal of the expert: the 
goal of the expert  is to use their expertise to answer the questions they are asked; of course 
the recommendations they make are likely to influence the outcome of the case to a greater 
or lesser extent but I think they would be losing the plot somewhat if the way their reports 
were written had that in mind to any extent”, and later summarised the High Court’s view on 
this matter as “it’s not the job of the legal aid fund to help someone become a better parent”. 
Jay’s view was that although people do learn things in assessments, that is not the object of 
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the assessment, which should be delinked from therapy as far as possible; any shift or 
change is secondary to the main objective. Kim on the other hand thought that ideally 
change should happen as part of the assessment, but realistically it was likely to be a by-
product. Mo thought that for the expert to have a change agenda would imply a lack of 
objectivity and was therefore undesirable. 
There were thus two main strands to the judges’ thinking about the possibility of change in 
the assessment process, and a considerable variation of opinion as to its desirability. The 
first strand was that the achievement of change was specifically excluded, both by case law 
and by the terms of reference of the LSC as an object of the assessment process; on this 
point the judges varied from what can only be described as subversion (Hilary) to 
compliance (Jay).  The second strand was that any intentionality towards change on the part 
of the assessor would compromise the objectivity required of the expert. This was expressed 
most clearly by Mo but was also reflected in general judicial discomfort with the idea of 
psychotherapists acting as experts. 
 As was explored in the section on the potential usefulness of a systemic approach to the 
expert role, the very title of psychotherapy creates an expectation that treatment will be the 
object of the relationship and that assessment will be seen as incompatible with it, because 
of potential breaches of confidentiality and compromise of the therapeutic relationship.  Jay 
and Mo were also concerned that psychotherapists (unlike other experts) develop the sort of 
relationship (presumably a partiality?) with their clients which makes it impossible to remain 
objective.   It is encouraging in one sense that the judges have paid attention to the views of 
some psychotherapists and respect the special status of some kinds of therapeutic 
relationship. However, taking this position on board so whole-heartedly does seem to have 
closed down their openness to other ways of understanding a therapeutic relationship.  In 
the course of my interview with Kim we got into a conversation about my own beliefs about 
the potential for a systemic approach to be useful to the courts (an episode which I will be 
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exploring in more detail in relation to my interviewing style!).  Kim remained convinced that I 
would be fighting a losing battle if I were to argue for more systemic psychotherapist experts 
because they would be deterred by the need to compromise therapeutic confidentiality.  
Therapeutic aspects of the judicial role 
When I began to interview the judges it quickly became clear that they viewed family law as 
allowing the judge to be more active in ways that could be thought of as therapeutic (the 
“difference” of family law from other areas of law will be explored further in the next section).  
For example, Dale described “feeling that I’m trying to mediate, conciliate, achieve a better 
outcome”.  I subsequently included a question for the judges about what aspects of what 
they do as a judge or the court process in general they considered to be therapeutic.  Evelyn 
thought it was important for judges to listen carefully to parents’ complaints in order for them 
to be able to let off steam rather than keeping things bottled up so that they could move on 
more easily.   Hilary aimed to work in such a way that “most” of the process was therapeutic, 
talking about a united multi-disciplinary effort to work simultaneously at the levels of content 
and process: 
 “but you do notice it when the lawyers and the experts are working towards a, an 
improvement or whatever it might be, you know and so er the way people cross-
examine, the way people present their evidence, the way experts word their reports, 
the way they describe their conclusion, all of them have you know sort of double 
edge really, that they are saying what they think and why they think it, but also how 
they would like it to be used”.  
Jay talked about the therapeutic effect of parents knowing that they had fought for their child, 
and like Evelyn and Kim, mentioned the importance of listening to people, treating them with 
respect and giving them an explanation.  
In preparing the literature review I had read an article (Kaplan, 1998) about a family therapist 
who was working on a case where the father had killed the mother. The issue was which of 
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the families would have responsibility for raising the children. The author described talking to 
the advocates involved in the case in order to try to persuade them not to exacerbate the 
already difficult relationships between the two families by aggressive cross-examination.  I 
thought this was an interesting example of an expert taking a very active step to promote 
change and at the end of the judicial interviews gave the judges a brief account of what 
Kaplan had done and asked their opinions about it. 
Bryn and Dale felt that it should not be necessary for the expert to take that action, because 
either the judge or the barristers should realise the need for sensitivity. Bryn compared a 
recent case where wealthy parents had lined up five days in court with QCs over disputed 
contact: 
 “So I went into court and I sat down and I said: ‘Everyone’s come here to spend five 
days, but what I can guarantee Is that at the end of slinging mud at each other across 
the court for five days with very very experienced barristers asking awful questions 
over..Things will be much worse between you, family relationships will be much 
worse, your chance of agreeing as to what will be the best for the child will be 
hopeless. It will do a lot of harm and I have to tell you it’s not going to happen in my 
court, I’m just not going to do it. Now you’re going to go away and adjourn and sort 
this out’. And they did, it worked!  But so they did, but er um they don’t always do 
what they’re told”   
 Dale called Kaplan’s action “admirable”, and commented that the court case in such cases 
is often the watershed which functions to “draw the poison” from the problem.  Evelyn and 
Jay thought that Kaplan should have consulted the judge as it was unhelpful to create the 
possibility of being seen as taking sides, but Evelyn thought the judge would have 
encouraged the intervention. Hilary said that  judicial ignorance was bliss in this case, Kim 
that it would probably elicit official disapproval , and Mo was the most disapproving, thinking 
that this practice would contravene Bar Council guidelines and that the justification for it was 
“too woolly”.  The huge range of judicial opinions on this issue was very helpful to me in 
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challenging any simplistic assumptions that it would be possible to identify one judicial 
position. 
I was able to establish over the course of these interviews, though I obviously did not share 
this at the time, that one of the judicial participants had received reports from one of the 
systemic participants who was very committed to the idea of therapeutic assessment. It is 
interesting that this position was visible to the judge, whose comment was that the 
assessment and the therapeutic side were more closely entangled than would ordinarily be 
seen with expert reports. 
How far is understanding shared? 
In the literature review I identified that a key principle of a systemic approach is the idea that 
an observer cannot help making a difference by the very act of observation: a theory which 
is sometimes called (for example Hoffman 1985) second-order cybernetics.  It seemed clear 
from my interviews that all the systemic participants subscribed to this theory. Most of the 
judges spoke as if they believed that providing the expert remains “objective” in the sense of 
lacking partiality to any position or person, it is possible to undertake an assessment which 
does not influence what is being assessed and which somehow gives a picture of some kind 
of reality: Jay for example said “examples of psychological reports which have been helpful 
is when they have given me a real insight into the mental functioning of a parent in a 
case..um...where because I’ve read the psychological report I can have a much better 
understanding of the way the parent presents.” The judge who came nearest to a “second 
order” way of thinking was Hilary, who talked about families being dynamic not static.  It 
seemed that some of the systemic experts were frustrated by this lack of common ground.  
Chris for example, when asked whether judges’ understanding of the process of assessment 
and reporting might be improved in any way, said 
 “.. this whole thing about assessment, therapy, what it means to be engaged with 
people, human beings, at this point of stress, in order to try to find a way out of a 
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situation that has clearly deteriorated either within the home or within the 
relationships and how to redefine the notion of what working with somebody...that 
assessing..(2)...well either assessing whether work is possible is always part of what 
you’re doing but you also have to do a bit of work”. 
Gerry was equally direct, but with a more practical slant: 
 “.. I do see the assessment as an intervention and this isn’t the way the Legal 
Services Commission thinks about it, they think it’s an assessment,  I’ve, you know 
I’ve repeatedly argued that you can’t assess people’s potential for change without  a 
trial of change, um, and your assessment is to assess people’s capacity to adapt and 
do something different, so you have to do something, and in the legal thinking they 
find that idea difficult, but though the judges understand it perfectly well, it’s, it’s only 
the , it’s actually the LSC that find it difficult “.  
 The significance of this statement lies in the fact that no expert can be instructed or 
commissioned without the approval of the LSC so if the second order issue is not visible to 
them it has to remain “underground”, unrecognised and unspoken. To name it would be to 
make it even less likely that change could be on the agenda. 
I have already commented on the significant changes which have happened in relation to 
expert witnesses in family law since I first conceived this project in 2009.  The latest 
development at the time of writing (February 2013) is that whereas previously expert 
evidence  would be heard if it was “reasonably required” now judges will apply a tougher test 
and only allow the evidence if it is “necessary”. This surely makes it even less likely that the 
beneficial effects of independent expert assessment which both judicial and systemic 
participants in this project claim to have identified could be reproduced in the future.  
Earlier in this section I referred to the possibility that family law creates opportunity for judges 
to be more active and “interventive” than in other areas of law. The next section will explore 
this idea further, as well as looking at other ways in which working in the family courts may 
differ from working in other forensic settings.
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The distinctive features of working in family justice. 
When I began this research I was expecting to find a number of areas where there were  
some gaps of understanding between the judges and the systemic experts about certain  
key concepts; and certainly a few, though not as many as I imagined, have emerged. What I 
did not expect was that such a strong sense would emerge, particularly from the judicial 
participants, of the “separateness” of family law from other areas of law, and the 
opportunities which it offers to them to do something different. The systemic experts (apart 
from Les who had some experience working in civil law and crime) were not in a position to 
make this comparison, but there were connections in the ways that they talked about their 
experience of working in the family court system. This section will include three subsections 
which are quite diverse from each other and for ease of understanding I have analysed and 
compared these separately.  
1) The “attraction” of working with families in the justice system  
Systemic Views 
This is not a question that I asked specifically of all participants (though on thoroughly 
reviewing what has emerged from the data, I wish that I had).  I did ask the systemic 
participants what drew them to the court work. There seemed to be two main strands to their 
answers. 
Firstly they seemed to share a satisfaction in redressing power imbalances and giving voice 
to the marginalised, whether at the level of the child within the family, the woman within the 
couple or the family within the family justice system.  For example, Alex found that any 
apparently contradictory aspects of the expert role were reconciled by the idea of “taking the 
child’s side”; bringing forth marginalised voices and ensuring that families felt they had been 
treated justly.  Chris found intellectual and practical interest in applying a systemic 
perspective to situations where the state was intervening in families’ lives.  Fran commented 
that  the process  “gets to your sense of justice” and was interested in the potential for the 
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legal system to redress power imbalances within families (for example in abusive 
relationships) whilst also recognising the possibility of power imbalances being replicated 
within the legal process and wanting to be able to challenge this. Fran saw advocating the 
childrens’ position as the cornerstone of court work, while Nick expressed equal passion 
about foregrounding the interests of the children and ensuring that their voices were heard. 
On a more abstract level Les was drawn by the possibility of pursuing a social justice 
agenda and highlighting dominant and subordinated discourses. 
The second major strand of connection was around the reward of being able in Chris’ words 
to “facilitate some sort of change”. Gerry talked about the “very nice warm fuzzy feeling” of 
being able to avoid contested hearings and Pat said that it was “lovely” to be able to reach 
agreement in public law cases and get the family on board for thinking about change. Pat’s 
“passionate belief” that children are best raised in their own families where possible was also 
a strong motivator. 
Other “attractions” of the work included intellectual challenge, and enjoying the interviewing 
and writing of the report. Gerry also admitted enjoying times when the drama of the court 
was helpful for people and also “even though I know I shouldn’t, um winning my point”.  Nick 
talked about balancing the stress of giving evidence against the enjoyment of the other 
aspects of the work. Pat enjoyed finding coherence, seeing the logic of the system and 
generally being a “little Poirot”! 
It is hardly surprising to find such a strong interest in and commitment to the wellbeing of 
children and families but it does raise the question as to why so few systemic therapists are 
moved or attracted to direct their passion along this particular pathway. 
Judicial perspectives 
Although I did not ask all the judicial participants specifically about this issue some 
comments emerged spontaneously from their interviews. In my first interview I asked Bryn 
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how account was taken of the effects of the court process on the present and future 
emotional wellbeing and relationships of the participants. The reply was: 
“To me it’s the great attraction of family work, what makes it totally different from any 
other sort of work actually. Because crime, the criminal court is deciding what 
happened and the civil court is deciding what happened, was it a breach of contract, 
was there a road accident. But actually although in the family court you need to know 
what’s been going on, it’s about what’s going to happen 
SH Or what is happening 
B or what is happening, and the thing that strikes has always struck me is that the 
actual court process is part of the facts of the case and the parents respond to being 
in court and it brings about change sometimes”. 
Dale was interested in securing favourable outcomes for people, particularly children, 
commenting that the judge’s traditional role was less important than the interests of the child, 
to the extent that he or she almost becomes one of the professional team working around 
the child. The judge requires great sensitivity to the participants, watching for emotional 
reactions. Evelyn found the scope for proactivity in the resolution of family problems a 
source of satisfaction: 
”and sometimes, perhaps outside the tramlines of a conventional court hearing, you 
could achieve something, a way ahead, or a limited way ahead, or the next step 
ahead at least. So I really felt that (identifying text omitted) there was a role to be 
constructed in the resolution of family problems”.  
Evelyn talked about how times had changed from when judges sat back and listened from a 
very great height, and how they are now making themselves more accessible to the public 
and coming across as real people. Like Bryn, Hilary felt that being aware of the impact of the 
court processes was part of being “family-minded”, alongside the application of “structured 
discretion”, and like Jay drew attention to the different status of “facts” found in the family 
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court from those in the criminal court.  Mo wondered if family judges have a natural 
preference to keep families together. 
How far is understanding shared? 
The judges and the systemic experts seemed connected in appearing to find a lot of “job 
satisfaction” in making a difference in people’s lives and in changing things for the better, or 
at least ensuring that they did not get any worse. The judges placed more emphasis on the 
potential for working creatively “outside the tramlines” whilst the potential for highlighting and 
challenging injustice and marginalisation was an important concern for the experts. I wonder 
if this difference is connected to being inside or outside the system, and how possible it is for 
judges to talk about lack of justice when in a sense they may be expected to embody it? 
Certainly Kim gave a clear example of acting to address an imbalance of power (refusing to 
allow the cross-examination) without naming it in those terms. 
 
2) Less adversarial and more inquisitorial? Judicial “intervention” 
In a recent case (Re C 2012) Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, said that it 
was fundamental in family proceedings for the judge to have an essentially inquisitorial role, 
“his (sic) duty being to further the welfare of the children which is, by statute, his paramount 
consideration”, this role allowing a much broader discretion than in civil jurisdiction (compare 
this with Hilary’s comment about “structured discretion”).  The Ryder (2012) proposals also 
stress the inquisitorial role of the family judge. Hilary and Jay both commented on how this 
might look in practice: 
“Family cases are a bit different, the procedural structure is basically adversarial but 
courts are required to adopt a quasi-inquisitorial approach and to try so far as 
possible to move the parties towards reaching their own agreement through 
negotiation and settlement”. 
My understanding of the distinction between the two models is that the inquisitorial approach 
allows the judge, and indeed other parties to the process, to have a much more active role in 
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determining not only how the case should proceed but how the “facts” at issue should be 
explored. In contrast, an adversarial position requires conflicting positions (e.g. between 
prosecution and defence) to be “fought out “with the judge as referee rather than active 
participant).  Bottomley and Roche pointed out as long ago as 1988 that it is misleading to 
characterise family law in purely adversarial terms, seeing it rather (p 95) as “a modern 
amalgam of traditions...which has continued to emphasise ...the importance of the court’s 
responsibility for enquiry”. However, whilst the overall approach in family law may be 
inquisitorial, there may remain adversarial aspects (for example, parents may have opposing 
positions in private law cases or in public  law  may see themselves in opposition to the local 
authority); and a legal system framed in terms of rights may also encourage contesting 
positions.   
Systemic perspectives 
I have already described how the systemic experts can experience adversarial attitudes as 
unhelpful to families and “anti-systemic”, and it seems relevant in thinking about what is 
distinctive about family justice to explore the dichotomy between adversarial and inquisitorial 
processes.   Several of the systemic participants were keen to advocate a more inquisitorial 
approach, for example Alex had thought a dialogue that had developed in the court between 
her and the judge had been very helpful and Fran argued for therapists to work alongside 
lawyers before cases get so entrenched in the court system”.  One might see an inquisitorial 
system as more likely to result in dialogue (while an adversarial system might tend to bring 
forth monologues) and therefore probably more attractive from a systemic/social 
constructionist viewpoint (see for example Bertrando’s 2007 book about the “dialogical 
therapist”). The continuing interest in this dichotomy is evidenced by the recent (May 2013) 
suggestion by a contributor to the AFT discussion forum that the statement “Dialogue is just 
two monologues clashing” should be an essay topic for trainees. 
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Within the inquisitorial frame there is a huge emphasis on family judges becoming more 
interventive  (Wall,  Law in Action interview 2010 , Norgrove 2011, Ryder 2012) in order to 
take more active control over the management of the case and to try to reduce delay.  There 
is also a strong emphasis (as there would be in therapy!) on continuity of personnel, 
particularly the judge. I was curious about the use of the word “intervention” which is also  
commonly used in a therapeutic sense to describe the actions of the therapist which are 
intended to facilitate the process of change (although I found no evidence of any awareness 
of that nuance of meaning in the judicial context) . I therefore asked the systemic therapists 
how they understood the use of the word in a forensic context and what they thought about 
the effectiveness of judges’ “interventions”. 
Fran was not aware of the active encouragement for judges to “intervene” but when I offered 
an example (Bryn’s account of refusing to go ahead with the five day trial) “would applaud 
that actually provided something else happens (my emphasis)” Fran had other ideas for 
judicial interventions such as having court review dates booked six months ahead so as to 
give some structure and support to plans approved by the court  (maybe suggested by the 
pattern of regular reviews of care plans for children who are looked after?) , and also making 
it possible for children to read all the court statements as part of bringing them “right into the 
middle of the process” in a way that they are not currently. Gerry envisaged judges being 
interventive as engaging with the family and trying to get them to realise that they could play 
a more positive part in the process, though having concerns that they might do something 
“stupid”.  Nick thought it might mean judges being more directive of the parties at an earlier 
stage or possibly insisting for example in private law cases that families go through a 
mediation process. Pat was approving of judges having a stronger hand on case 
management and had had good experience with “thoughtful and child-centred” judges. 
Les on the other hand had a much more negative view of the process and as a result was no 
longer acting as an expert in the local court.  Judicial intervention was seen as “telling people 
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what to do”, and feeling entitled to instruct the expert on what type of therapies should be 
offered.  Les could understand that some initiative was needed to stop cases dragging on for 
years but was not sure that an “authoritarian linear way of dealing with things was going to 
solve the problem”, calling instead for a more negotiated  and less adversarial framework, 
which takes account of other professionals involved such as social workers.  
Judicial perspectives  
I did not ask the judges about the impact of this “mixture” of adversarial and inquisitorial 
processes and they made no comment about it, other than seeing a need for evidence to be 
tested in cross-examination (as evidenced in the section on courtroom skills). However, it 
seems clear from their comments about what draws them to family law that the flexibility and 
creativity allowed by an inquisitorial framework, and the potential for “intervening”, are part of 
that attraction. 
Dale felt that judges have a responsibility to use their wisdom and experience to intervene 
and that it would be “a rum do if I were sitting there like a pudding”. Dale gave an example of 
rejecting a local authority’s care plan because no thought had been given to continuing 
sibling contact.   Dale stressed the need for not making up one’s mind too early so that the 
parties felt they were being denied a fair hearing, but at the same time they should be given 
a sense of where the judge thinks the case ought to be going.  Hilary felt that being 
interventionist  involved “ a balancing exercise because we have to remain judges even 
though we do quite a lot which is not  judgely in a way, it’s difficult...” and talked about 
“walking a tightrope” to ensure fairness. In this context Hilary talked very disarmingly about 
dreaming about cases and about trying to look “Delphic” whilst imagining “a big bubble 
above my head as to what I’m really thinking”. (This connected for me with what Sachs 
(2009) says about the “tock-tick” working of the judicial mind  - moving constantly between 
one viewpoint and another -when preparing judgments, as well as the process which Chris 
and Alex described as “hedging and fudging”).  
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Several of the judges felt a huge responsibility in that, compared with decisions made in 
other areas of law, the decisions that are made by family judges are going to have lifelong 
implications for the children and families involved. Bryn wanted potential experts to be 
reminded of this. Dale talked about the judges needing to remember that families would be 
living long term with the consequences after the end of the case, and Hilary about “the story 
continuing”. 
 Kim gave several examples of taking  very active interventions, for example, refusing to 
allow a further assessment of a parent  in order to avoid more delay for the child in the 
resolution of the case, refusing to allow the cross-examination of an abuse victim by the 
abusive  litigant in person, refusing to allow a guardian who had not spoken to the child on 
whom she was reporting to give evidence, and  holding a very high number of regular 
hearings in order to that a mother could gradually be convinced with the safety net of the 
court  that it was safe for the child’s father to share residence. Kim felt that any one of these 
interventions could have been appealed or challenged and that it was only through family 
judges being full-time in the family courts that they would develop the experience and 
confidence to take the risk.  Mo‘s ideas about judicial intervention focussed on minimising 
delay and applying scarce resources to many demands. Thus there was a wide range of 
views as to how far “outside the tramlines” it might be appropriate to go which resonates with 
the very different experiences the systemic participants had had of judicial intervention, and 
raises the same question about how much is known about the practice of individual judges. 
How far is understanding shared? 
The systemic experts seemed more aware of and more troubled by the adversarial aspects 
of the process than the judges. This is hardly surprising given that most if not all of the 
judges had had long experience of advocacy in an adversarial setting before their 
appointment whereas for experts it was largely unfamiliar and off-putting.  It seemed to me 
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that Jay neatly captured these different emphases in making a distinction between an 
inquisitorial approach (which was the focus of the judicial comments) and adversarial 
procedures which had impacted more on the experts. (perhaps akin to the distinction which 
Burnham 1992 made between systemic approach, method and technique).  This disparity of 
focus is obviously connected with the fact that the experts are entering into unknown territory 
and having to play by unfamiliar rules: Chris talked about “not being embedded in this world 
and being a visitor to the world”.  Within this fluid structure It may be difficult for experts to 
know how to place themselves, what to expect, or how to make sense of this uncertainty in 
any given moment.  
With one exception the experts were generally positive about the inquisitorial actions or 
“interventions” they had witnessed or heard about, although there was some concern for the 
damage that might be done inadvertently.  There is obviously potential for a huge variety of 
practice which may be subject to little scrutiny beyond the possibility of legal appeal. Judicial 
interventions can provoke strong reactions and one wonders what oversight and 
understanding there is of the different ways in which family judges interpret this requirement 
of their role. This will be explored further in the discussion section. 
 
3)  “Hybrid knowledges”?  
In the literature review I raised the question as to how far family law might be a legal area in 
which what Valverde (2003) calls “hybrid knowledges” may be evolving in the interactions 
between legal and “psy” discourses. This question obviously has huge implications for this 
research not only in terms of how far understanding is already shared between judges and 
systemic experts but what potential there might be for greater shared understanding in the 
future. 
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Systemic views 
Bryn’s comments about the different ways of thinking between the “medical” and legal 
professions (alongside the comment that lawyers are “more cynical”) led me to ask all the 
participants about their views on this. It should be noted that systemic participants might 
distinguish not only between legal and “psy” discourses, but also between systemic and 
other “psy” perspectives. Chris for example answered by giving a case example which 
distinguished  a relational  approach to thinking about families from  the individual approach 
shown by experts from other disciplines as well as the judges. Fran thought judges and 
lawyers are aiming to be very pragmatic, and to get decisions made and things sorted as 
quickly as possible.  Fran thought that judges generally engage very well with systemic ideas 
but that they did not want too much complexity from the expert.  Gerry talked about judges 
relying on “homespun thinking”, that is opinions formed through life and experience rather 
than formal training. Gerry felt that this was not necessarily “any worse” than systemic 
professionals’  thinking, however, the fact that judges are organised by caselaw means that 
they have a limited range of decisions open to them.  Les felt that judges had a different 
concept of time, being very focussed on the here and now, and that sometimes care plans 
were made which did not meet the developmental needs of the child over time. Nick’s 
experience suggested that the nature of family court work encouraged a systemic disposition 
in the judges, whereas Pat thought the fact that judges rarely see children makes a big 
difference to their way of thinking. However, Pat also saw a shift in the judiciary over time, 
especially in the higher courts, away from a “good parent/ not good parent” dichotomy 
towards more appreciation of complexity. When asked for a possible explanation of this shift, 
Pat said with a laugh “maybe we’ve had an impact!” Which raises the question: how would it 
be possible to know what has an influence? 
Judicial views 
The judges varied in their ideas of the difference between judicial and “psy” thinking (and it is 
important to remember that they would be thinking about psychiatrists and psychologists in 
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relation to this question) Dale felt that there are “remarkable similarities” and that everyone in 
the justice system, whether lawyer or expert assimilates the same philosophies and 
guidelines and is moving in the same direction. Evelyn thought that there was no clear 
dividing line, and that a “coincidence of view” is developing. Hilary thought that judges were 
more “case hardened” (exactly what was meant by this I omitted to clarify, but it connects for 
me with Bryn’s word “cynical”), and also that judges took the long view and decided in the 
light of the whole picture; similarly Mo felt that judges take a much wider view of the whole 
system than experts usually do. My understanding of this comment is that while the expert is 
focussing on the individual or family that s/he has been instructed to assess, the judge is 
also looking at professional networks including internal court processes and timetables, 
resources, policies and procedures and the legal as well as the social implications of 
decisions. 
How far is understanding shared?  
I asked Dale to clarify the nature of the “philosophies and guidelines” which were seen as 
being commonly shared with the following result: 
“Wherever possible consistent with their welfare needs, children should be brought 
up by their parents or within their natural families. 
· Placing a child in care on the basis of a plan for adoption would always be a matter 
of last resort.  
· In the private law context, consensus between parents is infinitely preferable to a 
solution imposed by the court. · The court, in whichever context, will always strive to 
protect children from harm.  
· Delay in the court process is inimical to a child's welfare.”  
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These are the principles set out in Part 1 of the Children Act 1989, but also supported by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, particularly article 8, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which include the right to know and be brought up by 
one’s parents. Bainham (2005) points out (p40) that the thrust of these principles, with their 
emphasis on parental responsibility and on avoiding state intervention wherever possible 
(the “no order” principle) could be seen as the “privatisation” or “deregulation” of family life 
(comparing this with the contemporaneous privatisation of industries), strengthening the 
position of parents in relation to the state or local authorities.  It is obvious that in one sense 
law does create a common knowledge, because everyone is bound by it, and I found no 
evidence in my interviews that Dale was wrong in claiming a shared commitment to the 
principles outlined above. The interest lies in how much understanding is shared in the 
interpretation and daily practice of those principles: for example, how far issues of 
marginalisation on grounds of gender or race are addressed, and how far the “political” 
aspects of legal processes are acknowledged. Another issue raised is how appropriate and 
desirable it is for judges to claim knowledge of other disciplines such as the “psy” 
professions. Both these questions will be explored further in the discussion section. 
Finally research participants talked a great deal about the particular emotional impact – on 
themselves as well as on the children and families concerned – of involvement in family 
court proceedings. There was concern especially about children involved in private law 
disputes. The next section will consider this in more detail.  
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Working with relationships in the family justice system 
They fuck you up, your mum and dad. 
  They may not mean to, but they do. 
They fill you with the faults they had 
  And add some extra, just for you. 
 
Philip Larkin This be the Verse. 
This poem was quoted in a judgment (CP v AR & Anor [2009]) by Lord Justice Wall (so 
famously that I understand the case in which he did so is now known informally as “Re F”) 
and for me encapsulates an issue which has emerged as preoccupying all of my research 
participants: their desire to alleviate the distress arising from unhelpful patterns of interaction 
which have been established within families, whether maliciously or unintentionally. 
Systemic views: 
Distinctions between public and private law. 
I had not considered when I began this research that participants might have different things 
to say about these two aspects of family law , as well as changing patterns of connection 
with each (for Chris practice changed from a predominance of public law cases to mostly 
private, whilst Nick’s has gone in  the opposite direction). Fran highlighted the dynamic that 
public law involves much more working with other professionals such as social services and 
that relationships may need to be “smoothed over”; also interventions from other agencies 
are still “rolling on” while the case is proceeding.  Nick felt that there was an expectation in 
private law cases that the expert would somehow “sort it out”, a pressure which was not felt 
in public law.  Nick commented on the distressing aspects of public law in that a lot of blame 
was thrown about with a painful impact on everybody. However, the main difference for 
several participants was the “beastliness” of private law cases. 
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Beastliness 
Several of the systemic participants talked about the “beastliness” (Fran’s word) of working 
with conflicted parents, how hard it was to handle the dynamics and how the children’s 
voices in these situations were not being heard. Pat talked about being driven “crazy” by 
private law cases, referring to the “excruciating” suffering of children involved in them. Gerry, 
who mostly specialised in public law cases, described working with private law cases as 
“hell”.  Chris was worried about the financial pressure on families involved in private law 
disputes and quoted a case where a single mother bankrolled by her mother had nearly 
been bankrupted, incurring debts of £30,000. Nick talked about the loudness of parents’ 
voices overpowering the voices of their children. There was complete unanimity in 
emphasising the distress of children involved in conflicted private law cases and the 
inadequacy of the system to address it.  Yet this is not an issue which appears to be causing 
much concern outside those professionals directly involved and one has to wonder whether 
more attention should be paid to it. 
Judicial views: 
Distinctions between public and private law. 
Only Kim and Mo made any comment about distinctions between public and private law. Kim 
echoed many of the systemic comments (for me the long pauses and repetitions suggest the 
considerable impact on Kim of working with these cases): 
“..(10)...private (assume “public” meant in the light of following comment)  law the 
focus will always be the safety of the child, and I’m not talking about physical safety, 
you know what I’m talking about, I’m talking about emotional safety much more often 
than physical safety..(4)... so that’s the underlying... (2)... driver for public law. Private 
law is more complex, it can involve that but it’s the whole... (4)... understanding – can 
anybody understand the way these parents treat each other and their children. The 
whole – you’re much less involved, as an expert, you’re much less involved in 
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understanding the different roles of the people in the process than you would be in 
public law.  In private law you’ve got to understand the incredibly complex, complex 
dynamic of some of these families”  
Mo commented only on the pragmatic difference that there are more experts in public law 
and disputed cases. However, there were more judicial comments on the potential for 
distress in family proceedings and the need to manage it. 
Blood on the Carpet 
Both Bryn and Kim commented on the tremendous stress that must be involved for parents 
in having their private lives made public. Jay and Kim found a common metaphor in their 
desire to avoid “blood on the floor”, that is to manage proceedings with a view to minimising 
distress. Kim talked about the importance in public law cases of creating space where 
parents could come to a better understanding of what their children needed from them and 
how it was that they had not been able to provide it. Jay explained that part of what makes a 
family judge is the ability to give parties “a pat and a stroke”, and to say or do something 
which will help them to be more understanding or respectful of the position of the opponent.  
Jay described trying to find time to talk informally to parents 
“because I think it’s, I think it’s important, if one can achieve it, that they, they go 
away from the court feeling that they er are people who’ve been doing their best, 
perhaps not very adequate best, that they’ve been listened to, and that their view has 
been treated with respect.” 
How far is understanding shared? 
It is interesting that both groups appear to find the conflicted private law cases more 
emotionally taxing than the public law. The following two extracts give an opportunity to 
compare “systemic expert” and judicial analyses of a similar family interaction: 
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Pat (expert)  
:” the child who’s denigrating the father just is...I feel he’s just being torn apart,  
(some text omitted)  when he came down with his mother, (some text omitted ) she 
said he just harangued her the whole time, called her a f**ing bitch because she was 
making him come and see the father (some text omitted) and so I commiserated with 
him about that and asked him how he wanted the session to run with his dad and he 
had some ideas and brought the dad in and we had a lovely session, a brilliant 
session (some text omitted) and then I’m told by the mother that the child is saying to 
her that he can’t really express himself. So how you keep the voice of the child – I’m 
seeing him with his mother tomorrow – how you keep that voice authentic (SH um) is 
really hard, it’s really hard, because kids are trapped in these horrible processes”  
Bryn (judge):  
“I’ve had one case recently of an intractable contact dispute which you will 
understand. And they ...the...as I understand the sort of general syndrome if one 
could call it that of the um.....determined mother who stops all contact I say 
determined because...with hesitation because that’s not quite the word I suspect in 
most cases it’s an emotional block that operates not a callous calculated intention to 
stop it. But that then leads the child to find some way of feeling comfortable with their 
situation and having to resolve it by developing quite a deeply expressed hatred of 
the absent parent”. 
 
I would argue that these accounts are connected not only in the attention paid to 
understanding the complex dynamics of relationship involved in such situations, and in not 
attributing “blame”, but also in recognising the difficult experience of the child.  I will say 
more about this issue in the discussion chapter. The next section will focus on the process 
by which judges and systemic experts have acquired the professional knowledge and 
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identity which has informed their comments to date, and the implications of this for their 
interactions with each other. 
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Learning on the Job 
From the beginning of this project I had been interested in the process by which systemic 
therapists had been recruited to the expert role and what training had been helpful to them in 
that process.  Bearing Good Witness had established the need to attract more skilled 
professionals to the task and it seemed important to cast some light both on what informal 
factors might be involved in doing this as well as more formal factors such as the availability 
of appropriate training.  I had also been told by what was then the Judicial Studies Board 
(now the Judicial College) that there were no training materials available to the judiciary on 
systemic psychotherapy, so I was interested to explore both how much the judges knew 
about the discipline and how that knowledge had been acquired.  My semi-structured 
interviews therefore included questions on these areas. However, what emerged was a 
much more complex picture than I had expected of the circular relationship between practice 
and learning, and between confidence and competence. What was especially interesting 
was that this seemed to apply as much to the judges as to the experts.  
 Systemic Views 
“SH What experiences do you think have been the most helpful um in preparing you 
for and developing your skills in being an expert? 
Les... Well, just doing it, the (laughs) accumulated experience of doing it um so I 
learned on the job really” 
 
How identity as an expert emerges 
For most of the systemic therapists the move into the expert witness role happened almost 
by accident rather than being a definite career choice.  Alex, Chris, Nick and Pat were dually 
qualified as social workers and had had some experience of working in statutory contexts or 
doing some sort of assessment for social services departments whilst working with risky 
families who were involved in care proceedings.  (Alex commented that colleagues were 
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often reluctant to take on any work involving the court). This led naturally to being invited to 
become involved more formally, for example by joining a specialist business or team or 
being invited to work with a colleague who was already undertaking expert work.  Fran, Les 
and Gerry had also become involved in court as a result either of working in a context where 
there was more exposure to contact with forensic processes (such as a rape crisis centre 
where reports were required on the psychological effects of sexual violence) or of working 
with a colleague who was already involved in court work. 
All felt that the most helpful learning in relation to undertaking expert witness work had come 
either through practical experience in various contexts or through observing other people, 
either other experts or even the lawyers. Alex had adapted pre-existing skills acquired from 
different working contexts and areas of systemic practice such as teaching (bringing forth 
subdued voices), clinical work (engaging reluctant families) and working in schools (working 
in the short term and with minimal engagement).   Les felt that a psychology background 
helped with skills of analysing and weighing evidence and made it easier not to get “bogged 
down”.   Nick had found making formal presentations and evaluating research evidence 
(which involved reading huge amounts of material and “separating the wheat from the chaff”) 
a useful preparation.  Chris, Fran, Gerry and Pat all identified working with a more 
experienced colleague as the most significant factor in their learning; Fran and Alex still 
preferred working with a colleague as it helps to share the difficult aspects of the work as 
well as allowing a different perspective on process, even though both had moved on to 
working independently as an expert some of the time. Fran identified the work of a number 
of systemic theorists as influential even though “they don’t specifically write about this area” 
including Cecchin for prejudices and context, and Asen for “thinking about ways round 
impasses” (both are well known systemic practitioners and writers), as well as other 
colleagues who have helped on an informal level.  
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It seemed that there was a common theme for the experts that through their initial exposure 
to the work (usually “on the back” of an already involved organisation or individual) they 
would gradually acquire a reputation and identity as an expert, which would lead to their 
being approached to undertake further work by people familiar with what they had already 
done. Thus personal acquaintance and connection with professionals such as guardians ad 
litem or solicitors would lead to further instruction in other cases, developing their experience 
and reputation further.  Chris and Les both said specifically that they had never sought out 
the work or advertised, but had responded to approaches.  As a result there was a sense 
that “you are only as good as your last case” (to adapt an idiom of which I have been unable 
to find the source): Alex, for example, was concerned that the goodwill of a guardian ad litem 
who had previously been a source of several commissions might have been lost by Alex’s 
latest report taking a position which did not “favour the mother” as much as the guardian 
might have expected.   To some extent the reputation of the professional who recommends 
the expert to the court is also on the line: Alex reported one guardian’s comment:  
“well when we go into court I need to know that whatever you put into your report you 
can represent otherwise it makes me look like a fool” 
 so that the expert’s ability to be able in court to articulate and defend the position taken in 
the report becomes a factor in being instructed.   
 
Lack of feedback 
There appeared to be no formal mechanism for feedback to the experts on how their reports 
or performance in court had been received by any of the parties, including the judges, with 
the result that the experts were often left trying to make sense of outcomes in other ways, 
being approached again in the future being one of the most important.  Judicial feedback 
was rare but much valued when it was received:   
“but he (the judge) asked for myself and the, the guardian to come into court and he 
thanked each of us.  He thanked me for the way I’d written the report which he said 
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was helpful to his decision making and that felt really, really good, it’s the one and 
only time a judge has actually..he, he he said ‘I’d like to see you in the court’ and so 
we went into the court and he said that and that was really nice.” 
Chris also commented on the infrequency of judicial feedback and also raised the question 
of how much it feels possible to rely on it: 
“because the judge was very nice about my being respectful to everybody, and that 
respectfulness being helpful.  However, that was a very interesting one, he did 
decide himself that it was I who had finally said what ought to happen when in fact it 
wasn’t, or what would be damaging or not because the whole point was that I’d just 
sort of maundered around the place and didn’t actually say.  So it’s very interesting 
when in his summing up where I was he said C has been very helpful (laughs)” 
Nick had noticed that judges familiar with multi-disciplinary team reports were asking more 
often for there to be systemic involvement. 
It seemed that the way the families involved felt about the process might be important as 
well as how the professionals had reacted. Alex gave several examples of experiences 
which had provided useful feedback, including being approached by one of the parties after 
a case to offer some private therapy and being phoned with the outcome by a father after the 
case had finished, and even the meaning given to receiving a smile from a mother who had 
been the subject of a report. Les told a story about being informed by a guardian about the 
death of a young person who as a result of Les’s intervention had been able to have a final 
unsupervised contact with her mother. Les was deeply touched both by having made a 
significant difference in the young woman’s life and by the fact that the guardian had noticed 
this enough to contact Les with the information and concluded: “So that’s what makes you 
think why you might want to do this work”.  Nick was very pleased to have got some positive 
feedback from children who were seen again about a year after the initial assessment had 
been completed, but felt that such opportunities were all too rare. 
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All the experts were keen to receive more feedback: not only about the format of the report 
and whether it has been written as required (length for example), but also about usefulness, 
about the way the case was concluded and about longer term outcomes for the children and 
families involved.  Nick commented on how hard is was to get feedback from the parties, and 
even when formal requests for feedback are sent to the instructing solicitors, it is only 
received in 30% to 40% of cases.  Pat said that the outcome was not seen as the expert’s 
business by other professionals and that sometimes the expert contacts the family to find out 
what has happened. 
I was surprised by how eager the experts were to get any kind of response to the work they 
had put into a report and how much could be read into what seemed to be fairly insignificant 
exchanges. There was a sense that they had made a big investment in engaging and 
making a relationship with the families which was abruptly truncated by the court case.  This 
disconnection was heightened by not knowing what had happened to the families 
subsequently.   This meant that as well as leaving a possible emotional aftermath the 
opportunity was lost of reflecting in the light of subsequent events on their formulations and 
the sense they had made of family dynamics. It also seemed unhelpful that there was so 
little formal feedback about the usefulness or quality of their reports, which could have 
helped not only them but others to develop their professional skills. It appeared that there 
might be a circular connection between the confidence which comes from getting good 
feedback in whatever form, which then provides  encouragement to continue to make 
oneself available for the work, which in turn contributes to the further development of the 
competence which should be essential to the work, and thus to increased confidence. 
Formal learning opportunities 
Because on the whole the systemic participants’ expert work was often a minor part of their 
practice, it seemed that there might have been less attention paid to accessing specialist 
supervision or continuing professional development in working as an expert than in other 
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areas of their practice. Chris was very clear that more would have been beneficial: there had 
been some meetings with other systemic experts but there had not seemed to be much 
systemic training on this topic. Fran thought that there was little systemic literature relevant 
to the expert witness role   Chris was one of a number of participants who commented 
specifically on the helpfulness of Blow and Daniel’s (2002) article on post-divorce processes 
and contact disputes, and Alex mentioned Tuffnell’s (1993) research on the relevance of a 
systems approach to psychiatric court reports in child care cases. Otherwise the theoretical 
ideas used to support court work practice tended to be more general, for example 
genograms, structural ideas, attachment theory, transgenerational scripts, narrative and 
solution focussed approaches were cited as being influential. Only one participant mentioned 
having completed formal expert witness training.    
Being approached to take part in this research project appears to have provoked some 
interesting reflections on the usefulness of devoting time to thinking about making sense of 
the expert role systemically. Alex and Pat felt that the interview had brought out some ideas 
about the development of an “expert identity” over time and had highlighted aspects of 
practice which were particularly strongly espoused. Chris felt that the interview had 
highlighted how valuable it was to allow time and space to think about the issues discussed. 
Les valued the interest shown in working as an expert and commented that one of the 
reasons for no longer acting as an expert was that 
“really nobody cares about it, so you put all this thought and time and energy and 
sensitivity and hold all these incredibly traumatic distressing stories and in the end 
nobody really gives a damn; so that bit about you’re interested, so I thought, yeah, 
it’s amazing to have somebody actually interested in wanting to know about this as 
an experience because it’s one really powerful part of my own professional 
development” 
I wrote earlier about the “invisibility” of systemic expertise to the lawyers within the family 
justice system, but I wonder if the court work of systemic practitioners is also “invisible” in a 
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sense to their therapeutic colleagues.  I have no idea how many systemic psychotherapists 
regularly undertake this work; certainly when I tried to get some idea about this by 
advertising in a professional journal I had only one response.  The people who attended the 
workshop on court work at the AFT conference in 2011 were on the whole initially of the view 
that a systemic approach and working as an expert were incompatible, and there is very little 
literature or continuing professional development on the topic.  Several of the participants 
named each other as learning resources which reinforced for me the conclusion that this is a 
very small and possibly isolated group who have to be very resourceful to find ways to 
enhance their practice.  
Judicial views 
“SH Can I ask what knowledge you do have about family therapy, where have you acquired 
that? 
Dale:  Only by, only by listening to the cases down the years. I have never done any reading 
around the subject.  It’s just what I absorb from expert reports I suppose: advice that’s given 
in court, er reports I’ve read in cases. Nothing I’m afraid more sophisticated than that. 
SH I just wondered whether there had been any judicial training for example? 
D No, none at all about family therapy, no none” 
Listening down the years 
I should clarify that the judicial comments reported here only refer to their learning in relation 
to the “psychological” issues rather than to the legal issues.  The quote above encapsulates 
the judges’ account both of their learning about family therapy in particular and the process 
of being a family judge in general; that far more is learnt through life or judicial experience 
than through formal training (both Hilary and Kim made this point specifically). Cited sources 
of this learning included professional friendships or family connections (Bryn and Jay), 
expert witnesses via reports or court appearances (Bryn and Dale) and “learning at the coal 
face” (Bryn, Dale, Evelyn, Hilary, Kim and Mo) 
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Bryn, Hilary, Evelyn and Jay said that judicial training had been part of their learning 
(although not as influential as the experience acquired in sitting: Evelyn described it as “pie 
in the sky”) and Jay had also done research on websites.   Mo expressed concern that there 
was insufficient time to undertake much formal training. 
This situation would seem likely to work against the wider involvement of systemic/family 
therapists in the family courts as well as to limit the amount of formal training on the topic 
available to judges.  To date most experts have been  commissioned to write reports at the 
suggestion of solicitors or guardians ad litem  (Brophy and Bates 1998 and 1999, Brophy et 
al 1999) and judges not often involved (Pearce et al 2011), though Ryder (2012) 
recommends more judicial involvement.  Experts are approached because they are already 
known to these professionals from earlier cases to be able to produce a report which will 
meet the court’s needs; experts usually come to the notice of professionals in the first place 
because they are working alongside someone else who already had credibility within the 
system (see systemic data on first and continuing involvement).  “Known” experts are the 
ones most likely to be invited to deliver judicial training.  
Use of personal experience 
Most of the judges had had experience in family law, either as barristers or solicitors, before 
appointment:  Dale said that it was harder for the “money specialists” to acquire the 
particular skills and knowledge required for family work; but added that their experience as 
parents and grandparents and their “broad experience of life” would compensate for this.  
Dale was the only judge specifically to connect “how you were brought up as a child” and the 
interactions learnt there as being a factor in this learning.  However, it is clear that the judges 
did consider personal life experience was an important factor in becoming professionally 
competent:   
“and I sometimes think that if I have been a good family judge - as I believe I have 
for a long time - it’s partly because I have so many problems of my own that enable 
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me to understand personal problems and enable me to empathise with those that 
have problems like my own or different from my own and so I..I don’t let it all hang 
out I can assure you” (Evelyn) 
While being keen “not to let it all hang out”, Evelyn also emphasised the importance of 
judges using their personal experience to make themselves accessible and “come across as 
real people”. Kim thought that the judge shouldn’t just sit back but show empathy:    
 “People say you shouldn’t get involved: I don’t think you should do family work 
unless you’re prepared to get involved to a degree (SH um) obviously not completely 
involved, but I want people to know that I bleed, I want people to know that I care 
what happens to their children”. 
 Kim saw some similarities between the judge’s relationship with families and that of a GP in 
the need for trust to be able to develop; this view was informed by having a GP in the family. 
One judge had learnt a lot from the experience of a family member with mental illness. Bryn 
felt empathy with parents who had difficulty in retaining any self-respect while people were 
“prodding around in their most personal lives and tearing them to bits” and this personal 
connection informed determination to make the process as acceptable as possible.   
Hilary and Kim both referred to the potential for family law to be subjective:  for example in 
what Hilary calls “structured discretion”, that is applying subjective judgments to established 
“objective” guidelines such as the welfare checklist.  Hilary comments that the subjectivity of 
the expert interviewer can affect the assessment and goes on to say that no-one can shed 
subjectivity completely, although judges should make efforts to avoid stereotyping and 
compartmentalising their emotions: “getting real but not cynical”. Jay also emphasised the 
importance of being aware of one’s own preconceptions and making sure that one is not 
driven by them. Evelyn gave an account of feedback received from an expert who had felt 
unfairly treated and described the steps taken to explore this issue further and to make some 
changes in practice as a result.  
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I discuss elsewhere the potential for family judges to step “outside the tramlines” and to 
make interventions which are based either on personal beliefs and values, their own 
understanding of psychological theory, or their own experience. Kaganas has argued that in 
both public (2010) and private (2012) law judges’ views about what it means to be a good 
parent, and particularly a good mother, are having a negative and coercive impact on 
women, and Wallbank (2010) has also drawn attention to the implications in this context of a 
“utopian” (p117) vision of gender-neutral patterns of care and responsibilities. It may be that 
the potential for judges to use personal experience as part of their “learning on the job” 
would benefit from closer analysis and scrutiny. 
Ongoing learning opportunities 
Learning from watching judges in practice prior to their own appointment was identified as a 
significant factor in their learning by most of the judges. However, Hilary and Kim both talked 
about the fact that once judges are appointed they do not have the opportunity to observe 
other judges in practice, although they do obviously talk to each other about cases both 
informally (as Kim said “over a sandwich”) and more formally on judicial training courses. Jay 
also talked about the unremitting effect of the turnover of cases both in terms of the quantity 
of papers that have to be read and the difficulty of knowing what effect any judicial 
intervention has had:  
“because they walk out of that door and the next case then comes in and when 
they’ve walked out of the door that’s the last I see of it” 
As with the systemic experts, there seems to be a missed opportunity here for judges to 
learn both from watching each other and from getting more feedback about the outcome of 
the case they have decided. 
“Sitting-in” 
I asked the judges what advice they would give to anyone who was keen to develop their 
skills in acting as an expert witness. Dale, Hilary, Jay and Mo all recommended “sitting-in”: 
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that is, observing the processes of the family court.  This is an opportunity which is usually 
offered formally to registrars (doctors whose consultants are acting as experts) via the 
Family Justice Council, but the judges seemed confident that anyone who was interested 
would be able to arrange such an opportunity directly by contacting the designated family 
judge in his or her chosen court. 
How far is understanding shared? 
When I originally conceived this research project on the interface between two disciplines I 
had not considered the issue of how a sense of professional identity and competence is 
acquired and developed beyond a fairly pragmatic curiosity about the availability of formal 
training on interdisciplinary issues.  At that level it seems clear that the participants in this 
research have shared experience of not finding very much appropriate formal training to 
support them in developing their knowledge of each other’s professional worlds, and of 
relying considerably on informal learning opportunities.  The implications of this will be 
explored further in the discussion section.   The wider issue of how a professional comes to 
experience her/himself and to be seen as competent and confident is fascinating but beyond 
the scope of this project to explore further.  
This section has explored the processes by which participants have developed the 
knowledge, beliefs and values which inform their professional actions. The final section of 
this chapter presents some of the strongly felt ideas and opinions which have emerged in 
those processes. 
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Working with inadequate resources 
Systemic views 
I did not include any questions about resources in my semi-structured interviews. However, 
almost all the participants commented in one way or another on the resources available for 
children and families either in the justice system or more generally.  Chris, Gerry and Nick 
described specifically how the role and involvement of the expert was constrained by the 
funding limits imposed by the LSC. Nick drew attention to the additional cuts in legal aid 
which were about to come into effect at the time of the interview and would remove almost 
all private law cases from eligibility, thus reducing even further the money available for 
expert assessment. Pat considered that the judges were responding to this by writing 
requirements for therapy or assessment to be funded by the parties into court orders. 
Sometimes these two concepts could be blurred with the court asking for both at the same 
time. 
The experts also commented on the difficulties and dilemmas created by the lack of 
resources for families outside the assessment process. Gerry spoke about the position of 
judges who might have a very clear idea of a family’s ongoing therapeutic needs but would 
not have available any disposal which would provide these. Gerry’s belief was that the 
expert should ignore the resource issue and say what was needed even if aware that it was 
unlikely to be available. Gerry felt that some experts were influenced by the political climate 
into toning down their recommendations to fit available resources.  This had led at times to 
Gerry being criticised for recommending resources that the local authority was unable or 
unwilling to provide.  Chris on the other hand felt that it was not helpful 
“ for the case, the people, to be able to say well I think this, this and this now go and 
work on that somewhere else - because there isn’t anywhere else that they’re going 
to work on it”. 
  156  
 
Les talked about being disaffected by making recommendations for therapy that could not be 
met. Les was also concerned by the “horse-trading” that could go on outside the courtroom 
which might result in suggesting inappropriate but cheaper (or available) resources, such as 
putting a Schedule 1 offender for a non-accidental injury into a Webster Stratton parenting 
group. 
The systemic participants also talked about the impact of financial pressures on their expert 
role. Fran emphasised the hard and time-consuming work that is involved in producing 
expert reports and felt that the charge being made for the service was less than what it 
actually cost. Gerry felt that the financial pressure created a “downer” and the reduction in 
fees which was being discussed at the time would be a deterrent to continuing with the work. 
Pat was more dependent on the income from expert work and, noticing referrals “drying up” 
after October 2011, had felt compelled to “say yes to everything”.  This had resulted in Pat’s 
caseload being overloaded with private law “therapy” cases where  “often people feel that if 
you’re, you know if they’re paying for it then you ought to do what they say and you know to 
come to the conclusions that, that they have and see things their way”. 
Les was wary of the solution whereby the expert offers to do the work s/he is recommending, 
citing a recent example of a case where an assessment was carried out by an agency based 
a considerable distance from the court (and family’s) local area.  Although the work 
recommended could have been done in the local NHS, the court accepted the 
recommendation for the work to be done by the distant private agency, with the local 
authority having to pick up the bill.  Les considered that this set the NHS up as a “booby 
prize” as well as being disrespectful to the family, and  felt that it should be a requirement for 
all experts to explore the availability of local resources and take account of them in their 
recommendations for ongoing work. Les deplored the lack of clinical governance for experts 
and was emphatic that the whole expert “industry” had lost the plot and was feeding off the 
legal aid budget. Both Gerry and Les thought that too much was being spent on experts and 
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that it would be preferable to enhance the skills and credibility in this role of local resources 
such as social workers.   
These comments are significant in the context of reductions in finance which are currently 
being implemented not only in legal aid but in local authority and health spending, which may 
result in even more difficulties of the type described. I will consider the implications further in 
the discussion section. 
Gerry also commented (in 2011) that the Judicial College has had a number of “pet” experts 
to train judges on “psy” topics and that these have not always been “the right ones” or the 
training sufficiently radical. I am not sure what the criterion for being “right” would be, but this 
comment does connect with my earlier observation that there tends to be a closed and self-
perpetuating circle of preferred experts in which process judicial training can also become 
entwined. 
Judicial views 
All the judges drew attention to the fact that the intervention of experts is limited to 
assessment by the Legal Services Commission, following a decision in the House of Lords 
quoted by Bryn. There was a variation in their attitude to this restriction: for example Hilary 
was keen to achieve as much therapeutic change as was possible, almost by the back door, 
while Jay was clear that it was not the job of the legal aid fund to make someone a better 
parent. Dale was concerned that local authorities were not prepared to pay for assessments, 
putting more pressure on the legal aid budget. Bryn and Hilary were concerned about the 
constraints put on the availability of therapy for parents and children by budgetary 
constraints, and Hilary saw the commissioning of assessments as a gateway to accessing 
resources for families from the local authorities. 
There was some discussion of the role of the NHS, and particularly of CAMHS, in meeting 
the needs of children in the family justice system.  Bryn quoted Baroness Hale (in the House 
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of Lords decision referred to above) as saying that treatment should be provided by the 
health services; but as Bryn pointed out, if cases are referred to CAMHS:  
“that again is difficult because in a lot of cases they interview the pers...the child, if 
it’s going to be child.., or that’s where there’s child therapy, and they say ‘well, the 
child doesn’t need treatment or is unwilling to have treatment’, or more often than not 
they say ‘we’re not prepared to start treatment until proceedings are over’, so that 
doesn’t work very well” 
 
Dale and Mo both referred to the many demands on scarce resources. Bryn did mention 
“Bearing Good Witness” and the scheme to make more expertise available through the NHS, 
but commented (this was in spring 2010) that it did not seem to be working very well. This 
was based on trying to contact one of the pilot sites to undertake some work in April and 
being told that they could not even look at the case to consider acceptance until November.  
At the same time the site had been in touch to ask why its services were not being used 
more: thus Bryn’s comment that some therapy resources were completely out of phase with 
the timetable of the court.   
Dissatisfaction with social services’ decision making was expressed by some of the judges. 
Bryn felt that local authorities are sometimes responsible for unnecessary delay and Kim that 
they are too “safety conscious” and should assess risk more effectively rather than aiming 
for 100% safety; Kim felt that it was perceived to be easier to remove children from parents 
than to put resources in place to support them within their families. Alternatively neglect is 
allowed to drag on because cases which do not reach the threshold are closed but may be 
reopened several times before any significant action is taken. Kim stressed that this view 
was not “anti-social worker” but a recognition of the pressures that are around in an 
“important and difficult” job. Bryn was also concerned that family group conferences were 
often “not very well run” and could be used inappropriately for example in cases of domestic 
  159  
 
violence . (“A family group conference is a process led by family members to plan and make 
decisions for a child who is at risk. ...Families, including extended family members are 
assisted by an independent family group conference coordinator to prepare for the meeting. 
At the first part of the meeting, social workers and other professionals set out their concerns 
and what support could be made available. In the second part of the meeting family 
members then meet on their own to make a plan for the child” – information from the Family 
Rights Group website). 
From the judicial perspective the experts themselves also constitute a resource.  Bryn felt 
that there was a “dearth” of experienced experts and that inappropriate and potentially 
damaging advice was sometimes given, quoting an opinion in relation to the impact of a child 
giving evidence, where the expert had proved to be unaware of research evidence.  Bryn 
and Hilary had both had experience of enormous variation in opinion between experts and 
Bryn wondered if they were sometimes over-influenced by their training institution.  Jay felt 
that experts made a “nice little living” from diagnosing and that better use cou ld be made of 
the “treating professional” as expert.  Kim told a story about an expert who regularly recycles 
his reports, merely changing the names and personal details whilst including large chunks of 
his own publications.  Kim was also dismissive of lawyers who want experts instructed when 
the outcome is predictable: 
“I said ‘what’s the specific subject?’ well, it’s to do with mother’s recovery’ and I said ‘I 
don’t need it. I’ve read 50 of his reports this year.  They all conclude the same thing: 
12 months clean and sober.  So let’s not waste 16 weeks getting a report from him, 
let’s start from 12 months clean and sober’”. 
As a result Kim felt that it would be helpful if further “template” expert reports, such as that 
produced by Sturge and Glaser (2000) on the effects on children of domestic violence, could 
be commissioned on other subjects.  
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Bryn thought that the distinction between child and adolescent and adult psychiatry could 
also be problematic, with the former being “more resistant” to categorising mental illness (the 
implication being that a clear diagnosis is more helpful to the judge). 
How far is understanding shared? 
It seems that there is common ground between the judges and the experts in relation to: 
 A lack of therapeutic resources for children and families who are in distress within the 
family justice system (not necessarily as a result of being within it – sometimes they 
are in the system with the aim of alleviating distress that is already being caused – 
but sometimes as a direct result). Children who are the subject (or object) of private 
law proceedings may be particularly at risk in this respect. 
 An over-reliance on experts  and a possible underuse of expertise already existing in 
the professional network (there is a nice example of parallel comment from Gerry and 
Jay on this point) 
However, Bryn’s comment about the lack of clear diagnosis available from a child and 
adolescent psychiatrist is clearly at odds with the emphasis placed by the systemic experts 
throughout their interviews on the importance of assessing relationships rather than 
individuals. It connects with the disadvantages of having specialists in either adults or 
children and adolescents about which more will be said in the discussion section.  
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Desired changes 
Several of the research participants made spontaneous suggestions for changes in the 
family justice system. 
Systemic suggestions: 
Chris would welcome the opportunity to work alongside the judge and talk to him or her 
about making decisions about children. Nick was also keen to work in a more integrated way 
and possibly to be part of a multi-disciplinary court team. Les felt that generally the system 
should be less adversarial.  
Fran thought that in private law keeping things in the legal system (for example with short 
review hearings) could provide a containing framework for parents which would keep 
arrangements on track. Fran also thought that children should be able to read the court 
statements and be brought more into the middle of the court process. 
Gerry and Pat both thought that it would be helpful if judges spoke more to children; 
although recognising that it is important that the experience should be a positive one for 
children, Gerry considered that the ritual aspect of being heard is very important to them, 
and that they often feel that their views have been “twisted” when they are reported to the 
court indirectly. 
Judicial suggestions: 
“I’d like to have a team of experts attached to this court. I’d like to go down the road of the 
French system and where - I’m putting more work on myself –where the judge holds the 
budget and the parties come into court and say ‘we’ve identified the problems as these, and 
we’ve come to an agreed list as to what we think the problems are’, and then we give it to 
the expert team and they decide who in the team can answer the questions that have been 
asked by the court. And you get one report back (SH um)... (2)... that’s what I’d like 
SH um. Is it ever going to happen? 
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Kim Ho, ho, ho!” 
Kim also wondered whether too many important decisions about children’s lives were being 
made by “amateurs” in the magistrates’ court, as well as believing (as explored elsewhere) 
that family judges should always be full-time.  The importance of judicial continuity was also 
emphasised by Kim, and this is reflected in the aims of the current family justice review. 
How far is understanding shared? 
As no specific question was asked on this topic the thinking of only one of the judges is 
represented. However, there is an interesting strand of connection on the idea of a team of 
experts attached to the court.   
The next chapter will discuss in greater detail the connection of these findings to theory, as 
well as their implications for my own practice, for systemic psychotherapy in general, for 
systemic psychotherapists who act as expert witnesses already or who may be considering 
doing so, and more widely for the children and families, and other professionals, who are 
involved in the family justice system.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The elements of a good report and the skills required 
 Obviously there would be no basis for claiming that my findings have established a definitive 
account of what constitutes a “good” report, especially given that “good” is such an imprecise 
word in this context (I wish I had sought more precision in the interviews).  Since I began this 
project Ireland’s research for the FJC on the quality of expert evidence has been published, 
as a result of concern that (p4-5) 
“Currently courts are left to judge the quality of a report that essentially falls 
outside their content specialism. Although the quality of the process can be assessed 
(^^^)..., the specialist content cannot. This is particularly true of family courts where 
proceedings are private and access to subject specialist reports is not routinely 
permissible. This restricts the peer review of such reports”.  
(My finding that it is unusual for experts to receive feedback on their reports also connects to 
this issue). Ireland’s team developed a series of proposed quality measures and following 
consultation a set of standards for experts has been agreed which will be implemented from 
April 2014. These include (MoJ press release 2013) appropriate knowledge and experience 
relevant to the case, regulation or accreditation, relevant qualifications and training and 
compliance with safeguarding requirements. 
Ireland’s report was limited to psychologists, but it is interesting to consider how systemic 
views on what constitutes a good report would fit with her “objective” quality measures.  
Certainly my systemic participants emphasised the importance of distinguishing between 
fact and opinion, and paid particular attention to the use of language; the question of method 
is more challenging. Psychologists are used to using specific assessment tools, whereas the 
systemic experts may rely on less measurable factors such as the ability to engage in the 
process and make use of new ideas or ways of seeing things (the “trial of change”). It may 
thus be harder to show that an opinion is “deduced in accordance with peer-reviewed and 
  164  
 
tested technique, research and experience accepted as a consensus in the scientific 
community” as required by Practice Direction 25. The field of systemic expert witnesses is 
small and feels under threat from recent changes, but those who are keen to continue this 
area of their practice may need to think what quality measures specific to a systemic report 
would look like.   
The suitability of a systemic approach to expert witness work in the family courts 
A relational model 
The whole focus of systemic practice is family and relationships and I found it shocking that 
thoughtful and well-informed professionals in the field of family law should appear to be 
unaware of its usefulness in the “broader analysis of the problems that a family or people 
have” or the ability to “advise you about the ways in which the parents’ behaviour is 
adversely affecting the child” and “have some innovative ideas as to how they might be 
persuaded to change their patterns of behaviour”. It seems to me that the “invisibility” to 
family lawyers of systemic/family practice (other than as a disposal) is potentially resulting in 
missed opportunities to create deeper, more complex and more rounded accounts of 
families in the justice system  (what Kim called “one step closer to the person I am having to 
worry about”).  However, it might also be the case that the systemic  relational approach fits 
better with an “ethic of care” model than with the “ethics of rights” /individualistic discourse 
which appears to dominate some aspects of family law (this concept will be discussed in 
more detail subsequently). See for example Herring’s (2010) argument  for the concept of 
“relational autonomy”, which recognises “the interdependency and vulnerability of both 
children and adults” (p275). 
The voice of the child 
In the course of this research I attended a training course for expert witnesses and was 
struck by the lack of confidence of some of the experts about talking to children. I connect 
this with the way our health services, and especially our mental health services, are 
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demarcated between adults and children. In my experience most workers in Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health Services have a broadly “systemic” approach, even if they are 
from other disciplines, because they are used to seeing children in the context of their 
families. Expert witnesses with a background in adult mental health are much more 
orientated towards the individual and this may contribute to the marginalisation of other 
family members and especially children. The systemic experts were very aware of this 
dynamic and appeared well placed to counter it. Ryder (2012) is committed to improving 
ways to allow children’s voices to be heard and I wonder if one quality standard for expert 
witnesses in the family courts should be experience of and qualification in working with 
children and families. 
Negotiating the relationship 
It seems that systemic abilities to use the concept of domains to negotiate a collaborative 
relationship with families who might otherwise be the “objects” of assessment open up the 
possibility for different kinds of information to emerge for the court. I have not yet had the 
opportunity to read the results of Philippe Mandin’s research on this topic, but it would seem 
important to any systemic practitioner who is undertaking any work of this kind in the future 
to become familiar with it, as well as considering in what ways the expert might “warm the 
context” (Burnham 2005) in order that families might use the experience “more productively, 
openly and whole-heartedly” (p4-5). This might include preparing leaflets of the kind 
described by some participants.   
Time frame 
I think that this issue poses a real difficulty for undertaking a systemic assessment for the 
family courts. I discussed it recently with systemic doctoral colleagues, one of whom is 
working in this context. She described how the time for assessment had recently changed 
from three months to six weeks and  how she felt that this was “letting down “ families. 
Others talked of an  “ethical compromise” between the belief that a systemic approach is 
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more effective and the belief that ideally more time should be allowed. Relevant factors on 
deciding whether this obstacle can be overcome in particular cases might include: 
 The nature and complexity of the questions asked 
 The style and orientation of the practitioner (Chris commented that some 
psychotherapists work naturally in shorter time frames than others) 
 Whether there is funding available to involve a team and/or offer more frequent 
sessions 
It may be that for some systemic practitioners this difficulty would present an insurmountable 
obstacle to undertaking expert assessments. In the conclusion I will consider some 
alternative ways of introducing a systemic element to family court processes.  
Certainty/Uncertainty 
It is very clear that those systemic experts who felt they had sometimes been disappointingly 
uncertain, or who advised against going into court with a not-knowing position, had read well 
what the judges want from an expert.  The judicial interviews clearly identified their sense of  
having to take enormously significant decisions and wanting clear, well-informed and 
unambiguous advice (rather than a “systemic tangle”?) upon which they could “rely” (or 
adopt as a legal truth?) in doing so.  Judges have to produce reasoned, sometimes written 
judgments “justifying” their decisions, with, as at least two of the judicial participants pointed 
out, the possibility of an appeal always in mind. In that sense there may be in Goodrich’s 
(1987) terms a “rhetorical” or persuasive element to the use made of the expert report, which 
in family law may be more likely to be relied upon than case law.  
I no longer see this as problematic for systemic thinkers.  Most systemic therapists regularly 
have to take unambiguous positions on issues in the course of their work (what should I do 
with this disclosure?  Is this under 16 competent to make decisions about her own 
  167  
 
treatment?)  and will know families who find it more helpful when they are certain than when 
they are tentative. The problem may lie more in becoming more pre-occupied with narrow 
definitions of words such as expertise ( an error into which I think I have fallen myself at 
times) than in working out how the underlying principles can be applied in practical contexts. 
The systemic idea of domains (Lang et al 1990) may be particularly helpful in this context.  
It may be that the family courts,  with what appears from these interviews to be a 
concentration on future possibilities rather than past events, are less distant 
epistemologically from the systemic position than other forensic settings. Any differences in  
philosophical or semantic understanding of the meaning of truth or certainty do not appear to 
have great practical significance, though the issue  of the relative power of different 
discourses (legal/psy, medical/allied health professions, male/female, white/black) obviously 
does.  Similarly  on the question of objectivity: my sense that the judicial definition was not 
very remote from  systemic ideas about neutrality, curiosity  and prejudice (Cecchin 1987 
and Cecchin et al eds 1994) will have been obvious from the extract I quoted from my 
interview with Jay.  In spite of my initial hypothesis that “objectivity” might be a problematic 
area,  and Gerry’s comment about the “dangerous”  ideas of Maturana, my “pre-conceptions” 
on this matter were not supported by the other systemic interviews. 
Truth 
I found it fascinating that there appeared to be some common ground in thinking about the 
search for truth: for example Gerry and Mo gave almost identical accounts of the status of a 
“finding of fact”.  This process would appear to be a good example of what Balkin (2003 p 
102) described as law’s ability to create truth : “it makes things true as a matter of law”. It 
seems important therefore to distinguish between ideas about truth as a philosophical 
concept and ideas about things that are true as a matter of law, and to decide which of these 
issues is relevant to this study.  
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It would be possible to get drawn at this point into a comparative analysis of positivist and 
post-modern thinking in relation to the nature of truth and reality in systemic practice and the 
law. I outlined some of the theory very briefly in the literature review. Valverde’s (2003) 
argument for distinguishing between “the capital-T, non-specific ‘Truth’ that continues to 
haunt both philosophy and positivist science”(p8) and the notion of “small t” or “local” truths 
about particular events seems very helpful in considering what concept of truth it is most 
helpful to consider in the context of family justice. It seems to me that what judges want from 
expert witnesses is  what Wittgenstein (1953 , 179) called “knowing how to go on” in the 
immediacy and locality of the complex decisions they are called upon to make, rather than 
something which can be established as universal and timeless.  This idea would appear to 
be supported by Sedley’s (2011) summary of his chapter on truth (titled “Rarely pure and 
never simple”): “how the legal system establishes the facts on which it is going to 
adjudicate. How, in other words, do lawyers and judges set about ascertaining the truth?” 
(my emphasis). Possibly Aristotle’s concept of “ἡ ᾀληθεια πρακτικη” (“practical truth”) 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1139a26-7) would also fit.  In this context it might be much easier to 
conclude that there is not as much distance between the systemic experts and the judges as 
one might imagine about what it means to seek the truth.     
This leaves the question about the process by which a systemic local truth (for example, that 
there is potential for unhelpful patterns of interaction within a family to change) might be 
“adopted” (or not) as a legal truth (for example, that there are/are not grounds for making a 
care order). Goodrich (1987) argues (p180) that legal discourse gives its “authorised users” 
the power to “assimilate” other languages and vocabularies without necessarily 
acknowledging that it is doing so.  Haack (2008) analysed the process by which scientific 
truths get entrenched as legally reliable: “Legal truths are made true by legal decisions; and 
so, sometimes, are scientific ‘truths.’” (p586). It is possible therefore that within the “psy” 
sciences or areas of knowledge some truths may be more likely to be assimilated than 
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others: for example, ideas about the emotional impact of domestic violence have clearly 
been fully assimilated, whilst there appears to be still some scepticism about “parental 
alienation syndrome”.  Research in the United States following the Daubert decision (which 
relied on the assumption that judges would have enough scientific knowledge to gatekeep 
the admissibility of expert evidence) found “staggering levels of scientific ignorance” (Moreno 
2003) and as Sallavaci (2013) comments (p5) “it can be argued that this picture would 
unlikely be any brighter for English judges.” The “scientific” credentials of the expert may 
have an important effect in this process: for example, Chris’ legal standing rested on 
institutional connections rather than professional qualifications, whilst Pat was always 
assumed to be “junior” to a medical colleague. It could also be argued that clear “diagnosis” 
(see Bryn’s definition of a good report) and certainty are both easier to understand and give 
a clearer steer than a report which identifies complexity and ambiguity.  Gender may also be 
a factor: Smart (1989) clearly identified (p2) “how law exercises power and how it disqualifies 
women’s experience/knowledge”. Two of the female systemic participants in this research 
recounted experiences of sensing that their contributions were less valued than those of 
male colleagues.         
Invisibility 
The systemic experts understood that the lack of a tradition in systemic witness work and a 
preference for instructing psychiatrists or psychologists made their presence in the family 
courts as a discipline invisible. Another factor in this is the tendency to use a small pool of 
known experts in a way which becomes self-fulfilling, so that most of the systemic 
participants had got into the work on the coat-tails of someone already well-known in the 
system (usually a psychiatrist) before establishing their own competence and credibility as 
individuals. Illustrative of the smallness of the pool is the fact that Bryn and Kim both 
mentioned personally favoured experts which included several names in common with the 
list of potential experts (psychiatrists) quoted in S (Children) [2010]. (Drs Kirk Weir, Hamish 
Cameron, Judith Trowell and Danya Glaser). 
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This view of the limited possibility of systemic/family psychotherapy being of any assistance 
to the court is reflected in the literature for and about expert witnesses: for example Kennedy 
(2005) p11-12 “when it comes to interviewing and assessing children and families, a number 
of different professionals have a role to play, including the child psychiatrist, ..the child 
psychotherapist,..the clinical psychologist, ..., social workers...”, with no mention of family or 
systemic therapists.  Neither are they visible in Bearing Good Witness, the Legal Services 
Commission’s brief for the expert witness pilot scheme or the FJC’s research on the quality 
of expert reports.  Psychotherapists are not included in the current fee rates for expert 
witnesses on the LSC’s website, and systemic/family psychotherapists were not one of the 
professions represented by the Consortium of Expert Witnesses who reported to the House 
of Commons in 2010 on the effects of the proposed changes in legal aid. 
The “lack of tradition” may also connect with the fact that for most of the systemic experts 
the court work was a minor part of their practice, with active work with families, training and 
supervision featuring in the rest of their workload.   Most of them had had to contend with an 
initial reluctance to expose themselves to the adversarial aspects of the work.  (This is a 
deterrent to forensic work also identified by the research done with doctors for Bearing Good 
Witness (Donaldson 2006)).  The only way identified to overcome this reluctance and to 
become confident about one’s courtroom performance was to expose oneself to it; the more 
one does, the easier it becomes.  Yet Ireland’s (2012) research for the Family Justice 
Council was critical of experts who did little but forensic work, feeling that they needed a 
foothold in practice.  What is the right balance?  Are there other ways to acclimatise to the 
expert role? The judges’ suggestion about the possibility of “sitting in” (an opportunity to 
which none of the systemic participants referred) would appear to merit wider publicity for 
non-medical potential experts of the future. 
What the systemic experts showed no understanding of was the effect of their claiming of 
the title of “therapist” or “psychotherapist”, particularly in the judicial assumption that the 
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requirements of confidentiality would exclude psychotherapists automatically from the 
process of assessment.  Although the systemic experts were able to give very clear 
accounts of how they negotiate and manage that issue with the families so that it does not 
become problematic, this possibility was not apparent at all to the judges..  
“Family therapists” continue to debate the usefulness of different titles or descriptions of their 
discipline in maintaining its credibility and status.  “Psychotherapist “might be argued to 
confer a weightier status than mere “therapist” as well as establishing a clearer framework 
(e.g. within UKCP) for regulating standards of practice.  “Systemic” could be argued to give a 
more comprehensive and inclusive idea than “family” of the range of relationships to which 
practice may be applied.  What I have wondered in considering the judicial responses 
outlined above is whether the “psychotherapy” title may also in some contexts exclude the 
discipline from consideration for certain activities because it carries with it a number of 
preconceptions or assumptions which may apply more appropriately to other models of 
psychotherapy.  This may also be the case for the solicitors or guardians who to date have 
been so influential both in recruiting and identifying potential experts and in drawing up the 
letters of instruction.  However, the third “View from the President’s Chambers” (Munby 
2013) emphasised (p820) the responsibility of the case management judge to “adopt a more 
‘hands on’ approach in approving the final form of both the letter of instruction and, in 
particular, the questions the expert is to answer. There must in future be fewer and more 
focused questions”. Judicial training on systemic therapy seems fairly scant; I wonder 
whether more training in drafting letters of instruction and in thinking how they might be  
worded to get the best out of the appointed expert’s skills and knowledge would also be 
helpful. 
Recently a group of systemic experts met to consider responding to the recent consultation 
paper, developed in response to the Ireland report, on creating standards for expert 
witnesses. I was able to attend this meeting and to feed back some of my ideas about the 
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perpetuation of “invisibility”. A response was eventually made on behalf of the systemic 
community as represented by the AFT.  As the co-ordinator of the group commented 
subsequently, “at least it gets our foot in the door”. Another member is drafting a paper on 
what a systemic report can offer that others cannot, and I am hoping to contribute to that 
also. 
Change in the Process of Assessment 
The first significant issue is the variation of judicial understanding of the effect of 
assessment: does it matter that some judges believe that the process inevitably makes a 
difference to families in some way even if that is not the intention of the assessor and some 
do not? Does it matter if judges are not thinking about how the way the assessment is 
conducted (the type of questions asked, the manner of the assessor) will affect the 
outcome? I tried to be neutral about this question: but the weight that is placed on the 
assessment is so great and has such implications for families that I cannot but argue that 
judges should at least be better educated about different theories of the effect of the 
observer on the observed, particularly since they are to be encouraged to be more actively 
involved, for example in drafting questions for  letters of instruction and in the choice of 
experts.  
The second issue is that of some judges attempting to inject some “under the counter” 
change mechanism into families without being able to acknowledge publicly that they are 
doing so because of  the limits on funding . At one level I enjoyed the subversiveness of this 
idea; but on another I am concerned about hidden and unspoken practices that cannot 
therefore be subjected to scrutiny. There might be equal concern in this regard about experts 
who are setting out to pull the wool over the eyes of the Legal Aid Agency. Yet there remains 
the unanswerable question as to how one is to assess the potential for change (a question 
which is usually fundamental to making decisions about families, at least in public law) 
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without trialling it. Is it conceivable that the LAA might be open to some discussion on this 
matter? 
The distinctive features of working in family justice. 
“Attraction” 
I had not anticipated that this would emerge as a significant cluster. Without wanting to  
make too much of individuals’ comments, systemic experts appeared to be attracted to the 
work, in addition to a more general and (for therapists) common desire to contribute to 
helpful change, by the possibility of acting as advocate for the marginalised and by 
intellectual challenge. The judges were drawn by the possibility of acting and thinking 
outside the box and engaging in more “therapeutic” activity, or making a difference. I wonder 
if the therapists had ever considered becoming lawyers, or the judges therapists or social 
workers? If so, what part did their gender, class, education, family background and financial 
circumstances play in the decision? I have also wondered what determines whether or not a 
systemic therapist takes on work as an expert witness: for my participants opportunity and 
invitation appear to have been more significant factors than inclination.  
Family-mindedness                                                                                                                                     
Lord Justice Wilson (2003) attacked what he saw as the “misnomer” of calling family law a 
“backwater”  (Dunn, 1997) and  the fact that the private perception of most lawyers in other 
branches of the law is that family law is the “Third Division., the Leyton Orient of the High 
Court”. He proceeded to argue that family law is more difficult, and unique in focussing not 
only on the future, but on the “psychosocial future”  of children as well as the practical and 
economic, pointing out that “we now realise(my emphasis) that the continuation of a fruitful 
network of relationships...is deeply valuable for the child’s sense of identity and of self-
esteem...” Wilson goes on to talk about the importance of engaging all the relevant adults in  
the forensic enquiry and having an opportunity to “assess the personalities (my emphasis 
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again) of the relevant adults”., as well as having a function to educate parents (for example, 
about the effects of domestic violence),  and  to allow parties to “feel heard” .    He also  
describes using court process to create a dialogue between alienated family members: “I 
watched them converse civilly ..and was determined not to interrupt, whether for irrelevance 
or otherwise.  Indeed it hardly mattered what they spoke about” (p3).   
I quote this article at length not only because it echoes so strongly the ideas about family-
mindedness” which emerged from the judicial interviews; but also because it illustrates a 
judicial claim to some level of psychological expertise or  knowledge (compare for example 
what Dale said about paying attention to the way all the parties presented in court). It also 
illustrates a judicial inclination to act therapeutically which is supported by recent research. 
Eekelaar and Maclean’s 2013 review of judicial working practice in the family courts, based 
on observation and analysis of written judgments, identified (p79-80) three main roles 
undertaken: legal activity, management, and “help”, which was further defined as providing 
information and facilitating an agreed outcome. “Helping” was estimated to constitute 20% of 
observed activity, and the adjudicating role 47%. Helping functions – showing respect for the 
parties, empathy and encouragement - were also seen in the written judgments. 
Some commentators are critical of judges’ psychological interventions:  Reece (2009) 
quoted  a case where the judge talked about the allocation of parental responsibility as 
significant for the self-esteem of the parent and child, seeing this as potentially over-
pathologising of emotion, introducing a “ turn towards the therapeutic” and  a culture of 
vulnerability and victimhood.  Cantwell on the other hand (2007) argues that traditionally the 
law does not deal in emotion , and that (p744) “in part this difficulty is one of culture and 
training, with legal proceedings being governed by precedent and the concept of justice – 
both admirable notions, but not necessarily the ideal touchstones when dealing with the 
emotional ‘messiness’ of many private law disputes”.  Hendrick (2011) discussing when a 
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judge should meet a child, says that the primary purpose is to assist the child in the court 
process; any information gathered is (p1149) “the icing on the cake”. 
It is useful  to distinguish between what might be more precisely called “active case 
management” as suggested by Ryder, and what might be thought of as more creative “out of 
the tramlines” interventions such as those described by Bryn and Kim, where the judge took 
an unexpected and possibly legally more challengeable stand such as refusing to allow 
cross-examination. The participants in my research mostly  seemed to lie on the 
“interventive” side of this debate; but it does highlight the issue as to how judges arrive at the 
positions and beliefs they do in relation to psychological wellbeing. Ryder (2012) 
recommends (p20) that “messages from research and child development” are provided to 
judges but there are potential problems with this. For example, Brown and Ward’s (2013) 
research on time frames which was recently presented to judges has been critiqued (p9) by 
Wastell and White (2013) as a “simplistic guide to a complex field of work where knowledge 
is far from settled”  which ignored negative evidence, thus supporting  (perhaps unwittingly) 
what Lloyd-Jones (2013) calls (p8)  Norgrove’s “reductive re-balancing (some would say 
hazardous unbalancing) of The Children Act”.  
Judges obviously rely hugely on expert advice, but they also rely on what Gerry called 
“homespun wisdom” (Dale talked about learning by how you were brought up as a child and 
Evelyn about how helpful it was to have one’s own problems). In Re CtL and CmL (2013) the 
judge criticised (para 32) the expert witness for asking “senseless” questions about the 
“physical circumstances surrounding the birth of the children or what her own mother did 
when she was naughty as a child”. Given that the expert had been asked to “assess 
attachments”, these questions might not be regarded as senseless in other contexts.  Lord 
Justice Thorpe has written (1997 p6) about what judges might have to learn from the 
psychodynamic idea of exploring the source of one’s own beliefs and attitudes :”the danger 
is the prejudice of which he (sic) is unaware”.  It is my impression that what research has 
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been done about “what judges know about the world” and “how the things that they know 
translate into their activity as judges” (Greycar 1995 p 267) is based on analysis of formal 
judgments. I do not know if it would be possible to explore this further in more direct ways 
(for example, by interview). 
 
Similarly there does not appear to have been  much research on the ways in which family 
judges exercise what Hilary called their “structured discretion”, for example in relation to the 
welfare checklist, or on the effectiveness of some of the “outside the tramlines” interventions. 
Ryder (2012) recommends both the undertaking of a pilot study on providing feedback on 
outcomes of decisions, and the exploration of more “real case examples” in judicial training, 
but perhaps what is also needed is more in-depth analysis of the relationship between the 
two: that is, what assumptions inform judicial decision-making, what impact do those 
assumptions have on the decision, and what is the effect of the decision in the longer term? 
Wilson  himself acknowledges that ”it is not good enough for me to argue that, as a husband 
and a parent and after a lifetime career in the family courts, I have developed insights into 
human behaviour which are sufficient to carry me through”,  and suggests a solution might 
be either for the judge to have an expert  “top psychiatrist or psychologist (!)” to sit alongside 
as assessor, or for judges to have more intensive training such as a three month summer 
course.  The whole question of what training and support should be available to judges in 
managing the emotional complexities of family law obviously merits further consideration. 
Ryder (2012) also recommends that senior judges offer “supervision and advice” to judges 
but there is no guidance as to the frequency or nature. If judges are to become more “psy” 
minded should consideration be given to adopting a more rigorous and “therapeutic” 
approach to “supervision” for all family judges? This suggestion is supported by Eekelaar 
and Maclean (2013 p 79). 
A groundbreaking project in London called the Family Drug and Alcohol Court was evaluated 
in 2011 by Harmin et al.  The project is aimed at families where children are at risk of coming 
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into care because of parental drug or alcohol misuse. Unlike normal care proceedings, cases 
are dealt with by the same judge throughout and there is a specialist assessment team 
attached to the court.  Legal representatives attend the first two court hearings, but 
thereafter there are regular, fortnightly, court reviews which legal representatives do not 
attend, unless there is a particular issue requiring their input. The court reviews are the 
problem-solving, therapeutic aspect of the court process. They provide opportunities for 
regular monitoring of parents’ progress and for judges to engage and motivate parents, to 
speak directly to parents and social workers, and to find ways of resolving problems that 
may have arisen.  
One of the judges involved in the project has been called a “therapeutic judge”  and  it has 
been described (by Joshua Rozenburg in ‘Law In Action’ March  2012) as blurring the 
boundary between law and social work. The conclusion of the evaluation was that the project 
was more successful in keeping children in families and saved money in expert fees. It has 
been recommended that the project be tried in other courts. Again, this project encapsulates 
many of the principles of “family-mindedness” or judicial “therapy”. Further experimentation 
with this model is advocated by Ryder (2012) and I would hope that, if this proceeds, more 
systemic practitioners might become involved. 
It also resonates with the Australian based therapeutic justice movement which has 
produced a bench book for judges (King 2009) which advocates  a move away from 
paternalism and coercion, and promotes judicial involvement with participants through the 
exercise of an “ethic of care” described by Cannon (2007) as “a respectful and proactive 
engagement with people involved in the court process, to pay attention to their needs, rather 
than a neutral but mechanical and unsatisfying closing of files. It is a more exposed judicial 
role compared to the relatively mute and remote figure who only pronounces at the end and 
then in detached language”. 
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It would be useful to consider the origin of the concept of the “ethic of care” and how it is 
compared and contrasted with the “ethic of rights”. The phrase was first used by Gilligan 
(1982), responding to research which purported to show that women are less morally 
“mature” than men because they tend to operate morally at the level of convention 
(conforming to the rules and standards of a group or community) rather than by evaluating 
those rules and standards by reference to universal principles. Gilligan argued that because 
in our culture all children are more likely to have a woman as primary carer, for boys gender 
identification lies in individuation and separation, whilst for girls it lies in attachment and 
empathy. Rather than being inferior women’s approach to morality is “different” and 
characterised by being contextual in approach, having as its aim the preservation of 
relationships by adopting caring practices in concrete situations. She used (p62) the 
metaphors of the ladder of hierarchy and the web of connection to contrast these positions. 
Karst (1984) called (American) law “a system of the ladder, by the ladder and for the ladder” 
(p462). Writing twenty years later, Gilligan (2003) claimed (p156) that “the voice that set the 
dominant key in psychology, in political theory, in law and in ethics, was keyed to separation: 
the separate self, the individual acting alone, the possessor of natural rights, the 
autonomous moral agent” and argued (p160) that “when a relational voice sets the key...it 
frees the voices of women and men and also the voices of the disciplines from patriarchal 
strictures”. 
I have explained earlier why I took a deliberate decision not to use discourse analysis as a 
research method, but it has become impossible to ignore it altogether. Gilligan helped me to 
understand more clearly how relevant to the subject matter of this research are the 
distinctions which are made in this debate between individual and relational, universal and 
contextual, masculine and feminine, rights and obligations. The concept of the idea of rights 
as “personal zones of non-interference” (Karst p471) resonates with Bainham’s description 
(p49) of the use of the terms “privatisation” and “deregulation” in relation to the Children Act 
1989.  It touches on the distinctions made between “hard” and “soft” experts (whether 
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“hardness” and “softness” reside in gender or theoretical orientation), and the fact that 
psychotherapists are more likely to be female. It relates to the distinctions between family 
law and other areas of law, and the fact that female judges are so far outnumbered by male 
judges. It sheds light on the differences and connections between adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems of justice: as Cockburn (2005) puts it (p77): “The rights approach is 
adversarial. To have a right is to have a claim to something against someone”. It draws 
attention to the rights-based legislation within which family justice in this country is framed, 
challenging us to consider particularly how we can make it possible for children to have a 
meaningful input into decisions that are made about their lives and avoid their “rights” being 
exercised or appropriated by adults so that “adult agendas take over and ch ildren become 
symbols rather than real persons” (Smart et al 2001, p22). This seems especially relevant to 
the plight of children involved in private law cases which so distressed many of the 
participants in this research.  
I have been particularly struck by how well the systemic approach to expert witness work as 
evidenced in my findings, with its emphasis on context and relationships, and judicial “family-
mindedness”, fit with the concept of “ethic of care”. The systemic experts also appear to 
have offered examples of ways to address the “difficult” question posed by Kelly (2005, 
p392) as to “how we might incorporate children’s voices into legal decision making”. 
However, I have also begun to wonder whether the “invisibility” of systemic psychotherapy 
as an “expert” discipline stems at least partly from some incompatibility with a dominant 
(patriarchal?) “rights” discourse. Karst (1984), however, warns (p471) against abandoning 
the “rhetoric of rights” while the courts are still using the “language of the ladder”, arguing 
(p480) that the “perspective of the web of connection can itself aid us in breaking out of the 
confines of the traditional dual construct of woman and man” (and presumably the other dual 
constructs I identified in the previous paragraph). Systemic psychotherapists are well placed 
to connect with members of the judiciary who are faced with situations of complexity, tension 
and contradiction.   
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Beastliness/Blood on the Carpet 
There was a marked theme  which emerged in these interviews on the distress of children 
involved in conflicted separation.  My sensitivity to the issue is connected to some personal 
frustration in practice over the years at the number of children who are referred into mental 
health services because they are exhibiting signs of such distress, as if the solution is to 
“cure” the children rather than address the adult behaviours which are the context of their 
“pathology”.   Smith and Trinder (2012) summarised the evidence for the effects of parental 
divorce on children’s wellbeing, identifying the quality of the relationships surrounding the 
child as one of two major factors (the other being poverty): “conflict between parents that is 
frequent, intense and poorly resolved is particularly damaging, especially where children 
are..drawn into the conflict” (p432).  There have been a number of initiatives to try to change 
the behaviour of conflicted parents such as in court conciliation, mediation and parenting 
programmes like the one delivered by the Institute of Family Therapy (IFT) described by 
Chimera (2010), and since 2009 the first nationally available programme for litigating parents 
in England and Wales, the Separated Parents’ Information Programme (SPIP). This is a 
compulsory intervention targeted at parents whose disputes end in litigation. In addition 
bodies like Resolution and the Association of Family Conciliation Courts have encouraged 
the practice of “collaborative law”, by training lawyers to work towards resolution of family 
difficulties rather than adopting an adversarial position. Research conducted by Eekelaar, 
Mclean and Beinart (2000) found that contrary to popular belief that a lawyer-based system 
produces acrimony and conflict, family solicitors actively promoted negotiation. 
However, there are two difficulties with this type of solution. The first is the ideological 
objection to “informal justice” approaches as summarised by Roche and Bottomley (1988): 
that they hide the extension of state control to other “disciplining agencies” (p88) which are 
harder to challenge, and that they marginalise less powerful groups by diverting them from 
the legal system. The comment (p87-8)  that “many of those involved in championing the 
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alternatives were offering their own languages....(especially those with a background in 
family therapy my emphasis)” was especially thought-provoking. 
 
Secondly, the availability of such services is variable and subject to resourcing problems: the 
IFT programme is no longer running.  In addition research for the MoJ  on the efficacy of in-
court conciliation (Trinder and Kellett 2007) found that even where superficially agreement 
was reached between couples, animosity and conflict often continued  to the detriment of 
children. It further identified  (p51) “compelling reasons for focusing interventions on trying to 
shift parental attitudes and behaviour in conflicted cases” and claimed (p52) “the 
development of more relationship-based or therapeutically orientated interventions is long 
overdue”.  Smith and Trinder’s (2012) analysis of the effectiveness of the PIP identifies that 
its “one size fits all” approach has contributed towards addressing legal and contact conflict 
but not (p437)  “the underlying relationship conflict” which they describe (p432) in terms of 
“interparental distrust, anger and hurt.. that ....functions as the source of negative indirect 
and direct impacts on children”. They argue (p445) for interventions which are 
“therapeutically oriented ...which focus on emotions and feelings and the origins of each 
individual’s conflict”. 
The situation is likely to become even more problematic with the cuts in funding which came 
into effect in April 2013 and have removed almost all private law cases from eligibility for 
legal aid.  The significance of this for the welfare of children is that any potential for lawyers 
to be helpfully involved in conflicted disputes will be dramatically reduced and the number of 
unrepresented parties (also known as litigants in person) is likely to rise.  This trend had 
been noticed by Chris and  Pat: and some negative consequences experienced: Pat had felt 
threatened and harassed by a father representing himself and had also been the subject of a 
complaint .  This likely effect has also been acknowledged by  Ryder when speaking to a 
public child care law conference in 2012:” What is clear is that the courts will have to deal 
with a volume of previously represented parents. .. Many will have no idea what a 
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conventional court process entails and some will have no desire or ability to take it on 
board”.  It has even been suggested that the resulting need for extra court time may cost 
more than the savings in legal aid.  This scenario does not bode well for children involved in 
the process and will create extra challenges for any experts that it is considered “necessary” 
to instruct. 
I have heard some very shocking accounts of children’s experiences in conflicted private law 
cases which appear to be on the verge of emotional abuse if not actually so. Judges do have 
the power under S37 of the Children Act to direct a local authority to report on any case 
where the judge considers it might be appropriate to make a care or supervision order. It has 
been used in intractable contact disputes (for example Re M 2003) and it would be 
interesting to know how often it has been used in this way and to what effect.  Smith and 
Trinder (2012) argue that there is a very pro-contact stance within the family justice system 
which disregards some of the research evidence about situations where contact may not be 
beneficial. I wonder if this is an area which would benefit from wider debate about research 
findings as well as exploration of other, more therapeutic,  models of intervention such as 
those used in other countries, for example the US and Australia. At the same time Kaganas 
(2011) cautions us against seeing conflict as invariably damaging rather than part of the 
process of separation and thereby pathologising “dysfunctional” parents, particularly 
mothers.  
 Learning on the Job 
 If one were to accept the premise that a systemic approach has underused potential to be 
helpful to the family courts, there is probably therefore some scope for improving the 
availability and content of formal training on the interface in both disciplines.  Given that the 
possibility of involving systemic expertise may also be “unseen” by other professions who 
are influential in the process of instructing experts (such as solicitors or guardians) it may be 
that this idea might also apply to their training.  This might go some way to addressing the 
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issue of systemic “invisibility” within the family justice system and expanding the small pool 
of established experts. I hope that offering the results of this research both to the original 
participants, to the FJC and to the Judicial College might contribute to this process. 
There is also the potential for increasing the visibility of the systemic experts within their own 
discipline, to which this research will hopefully make a small contribution. This might include 
articles in professional journals and workshops as well as publicising opportunities such as 
“sitting in”. It is also possible that the recent “regrouping” of a number of systemic experts in 
response to the FJC’s consultation will result in more peer support such as specialist 
supervision groups 
What have  become more intriguing to me are the implications of what seems to have 
emerged as a shared commitment to the significance of continuing practice and observation 
of others in the development of professional competence and confidence, and particularly in 
beliefs about the recursive relationship between the two.  Kim, for example, stressed the 
importance for a judge of full-time sitting in order to develop the confidence to act “outside 
the tramlines” (to use Evelyn’s phrase) in the best interests of children.  Alex, Chris and Nick 
were keen to receive positive confirmation of their competence in order to have the 
confidence to continue acting as experts.  There seems to be a good fit between the claim of 
the systemic experts  that so many of their “expert” skills are rooted in other types of 
systemic practice such as teaching and therapy and  Ireland’s (2011 p31) recommendation 
to  the FJC that an expert should be: 
“a senior professional engaged in current practice, ....(and) continue to hold contracts 
with relevant health, government or educational bodies...or demonstrate continued 
practice within the areas that they are assessing (e.g. treatment provision). This is a 
means of ensuring they remain up to date in their practice, are engaging in work 
other than assessment, and are receiving supervision for their wider work ..”  (Ireland 
only researched experts who were psychologists, but the remarks seem transferable)  
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However, there may be a fine balance to be struck between “expert” and “general” practice 
in terms of optimal skill development and maintenance, given the special skills required by 
experts (see the “elements of a good report” section”) and the limited opportunities for 
developing them outside practice. Specialist supervision for expert witness work is obviously 
important.  
It does seem clear that some family judges rely quite considerably on what Dale called 
“wisdom and experience” and will sometimes override professional recommendations on the 
basis of their own beliefs and ideas (as in Re CtL and CmL to which I referred earlier)  Some 
of the systemic participants were quite critical of stances taken or ideas expressed by 
judges, for example in relation to adoption. There is a strong emphasis in systemic practice 
(see for example Cecchin et al 1994) on paying attention to the source and impact of one’s 
own beliefs and prejudices.  Although several of the judges said that they recognised the 
need to be aware of their “prejudices”, they seemed to lack  some of the resources that are 
available to therapists, such as supervision, to explore and identify the source of these more 
fully, and to compare them with “evidence” from other sources such as research. It is 
interesting that the issue of lack of feedback to judges on outcomes was picked up by Gerry, 
one of the systemic participants, who described a child protection case where expert  
evidence about alleged abuse had been rejected by the judge and the child had remained 
with the parents. Gerry, who became aware of further abuse within the same family in 
another country took the initiative to ring the judge who had made the original decision to 
convey this information, thinking that he needed to know that he had made a “bad 
judgment”.  (As I mentioned earlier Ryder (2012) does advocate giving increased feedback 
to judges on outcomes). 
Similarly I am not aware of any support being routinely available to judges to manage the 
emotional toll of the task they are required to undertake, both in exposure to horrific material 
and in the responsibility of the decision process, whereas systemic practitioners are required 
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to undergo regular “supervision” both to support them and to expose their practice to 
external rigour.  Sachs (2009) describes the “tock-tick” of the judicial mind where (p48) “the 
actual journey of a judgment starts with the most tentative exploratory ideas and passes 
through large swathes of doubt ..before finally ending up as a confident exposition 
purportedly excluding any possibility of doubt”.  This account resonates with Hilary’s account 
of the toll that is taken (dreaming about cases) in arriving at decisions in complex cases, and 
of the need to “disguise the teetering”. Again one of the systemic experts expressed concern 
for the wellbeing of the judges in  this regard; 
“but I sort of feel that, that everybody involved in those sorts of cases is impacted 
upon (SH um)and um ..(2).. er I don’t know how much support um...like for instance, 
you know, judges who hear stuff coming through the whole time about cases, you 
know, I sort of just wonder what is that like, you know? How do you, how do you deal 
with all that level of stuff and decision making? um and they’re big, ... (1)...unpleasant 
decisions for anybody to have to make” 
 
I have been unable to find any UK research on secondary or vicarious trauma in judges, 
although I found some examples from the United States (Chamberlain and Miller 2009) and 
Canada (Jaffe et al 2003). Both identified that judges are vulnerable to experiencing 
secondary trauma symptoms, with women and the more experienced judges seeming to be 
at greater risk. In 2007 a 24 hour counselling helpline for judges was set up in this country in 
response to concerns about the isolating and stressful nature of the work. More regular and 
formal supervision of the type I discussed earlier might also offer some emotional protection 
to the judges who are continually exposed not only to the raw emotion and occasional 
physical violence of the parties in court but also to the details of extremes of emotional, 
physical and sexual abuse. 
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Working with finite resources 
Some difficult issues were raised by Les’ comment on the potential conflict of interest for 
experts in making recommendations for future therapeutic work, and by the ethical question 
which divided Chris and Gerry (whether it is useful to identify needs if they are unmeetable). 
Any resources which are made available to children and families will have to be funded by 
local authorities or the NHS.  At the time of writing there are fairly dire prognostications about 
further reductions in resources: the Local Government Association has estimated that while 
total council income in England will have fallen by £7.4bn between 2010-11 and 2019-20 (a 
real terms reduction of 27%), demand for expenditure, driven largely by an ageing 
population, will rise by £7bn (14%) (Butler 2013); the Nuffield Trust (2013) is predicting 
another “decade of austerity” for the NHS. It is hard to be hopeful that more resources will be 
available or that these challenges can be easily addressed. 
Featherstone et al (2013) argue that the present Government’s emphasis on the term “child 
protection” to the exclusion of any discourse about support for already disadvantaged and 
marginalised families is resulting in increased inequalities and intensifying distances 
between groups – including, for example, social workers and their service  users. The effect 
of the current changes in relation to experts could be seen as another aspect of that 
“distancing”: and one about which, as practitioners committed to opposing discriminating 
practices, we ought to be concerned. 
A Commission under the auspices of the Kings Fund (2013) is currently seeking views on 
whether the “post-war settlement”, which established separate systems for health and social 
care, remains fit for purpose. So the future may offer a scenario where there are different or 
fewer boundaries between safeguarding social workers and therapists in child and 
adolescent mental health teams, and where the idea of making more use of the “treating 
professional” in the family courts - advocated by several participants as well as by Ryder 
(2012) and Munby (2013) - may be more easily achieved.  
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Desired changes 
I wonder if there might also be scope for the dissolution of other boundaries: for example, in 
the idea of having teams of experts working alongside judges (something like the FDAC 
model). Several of the systemic experts were keen that judges should speak more to 
children and this is certainly something that Ryder (2013) is also advocating, both in relation 
to finding out their wishes and feelings and also in explaining decisions where appropriate. 
Again this is an area where establishing mechanisms whereby judges could access 
specialist support and advice might be useful (though careful attention would need to be paid 
to the quality of that input: see for example Bryn’s account of seeking guidance on allowing a 
child to give evidence).  
So What? 
What does any of this plethora of ideas and thoughts mean for me or for anybody else? In 
terms of my current systemic practice, working in a CAMHS team, often with children and 
young people who are involved in the family justice system, I have learned a huge amount 
about the processes and practices of the care system as well as about the emotional toll 
taken on the individuals (including professionals) and families involved. I am much more 
sensitive to the needs of children in conflicted private law cases. I think this has helped me 
to be more confident and therefore more containing, particularly in supervision of other 
clinicians. I am also less anxious about the possibility of somehow becoming involved with a 
case in the courts. The process has invited me to deconstruct my beliefs about what it 
means to be systemic. It has shown me that I can see through a major project which 
involves a huge amount of self-motivation and engaging with some quite intimidating people, 
including senior professionals in both disciplines who challenged me intellectually and 
organisationally: for example, to justify my position and to ask questions concisely. This gave 
me some sense of what a court-room experience might involve for the parties, witnesses 
and expert witnesses.  
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At a much more significant level, I  believe it has highlighted some important issues for the 
systemic community (those interested in beginning or continuing to act as experts in 
particular), for expert witnesses of other disciplines, for family judges and for anyone 
involved in planning or overseeing the interface between “psy” expertise and the judiciary. I 
view it as an essential part of this project, and an ethical responsibility, to attempt to share 
some of the ideas which have emerged from it more widely by writing up aspects of it for 
publication, not only in systemic and therapy journals, but also in legal journals. I have 
already undertaken to summarise it for the ad-hoc group of systemic experts who are 
meeting to respond to the consultation on standards, and I will also offer it to the FJC and 
Judicial College, as well of course to all the participants.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Three major themes have emerged from this research, one connected to its original rationale 
and two which were unanticipated but have significant implications not only for the systemic 
community but for expert witnesses, judges and the family justice system in general. 
 
The possibility and desirability of systemic therapists involving themselves usefully 
in the family justice system  
The original rationale for this research project was to explore this issue. During the five years 
since, my views about this have changed. Initially I was not sure that certain epistemological 
incompatibilities could be overcome. However, in talking to people who had found a way to 
reconcile these I became convinced that, although significant (and more problematic to 
some than others), they were of less importance than the benefit that could be brought to 
families by the introduction of a wider relational perspective to a narrow individualistic 
discourse. This would imply that I should be aiming to encourage the recruitment of more 
systemic experts. Latterly the changes to legal aid, and the family justice review’s purpose of 
reducing both the use of expert witnesses and the time available for assessment, have made 
me wonder how practical or useful this would be. 
My research has confirmed that there are very significant and well-founded concerns about 
the difficulty of getting recognised as an expert or being funded by the Legal Aid Agency; 
there may be reservations following Ireland (2012), such as those expressed recently on a 
systemic therapy forum, about whether systemic therapists have the appropriate skills or 
training in risk assessment to undertake the work. Many may feel that there is too little space 
(both practically and philosophically) for the creation of a useful relationship with a family, for 
the possibility of change, or for cherished systemic ideas about multiple realities and the 
shedding of expertise. Some may feel that they do not have the personal resources to 
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manage being subject to cross-examination, or of working in isolation. The lack of 
understanding at all levels within the family justice system of the complexities of the 
assessment relationship, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of assessing for change 
without trialling it, remain problematic. It could be argued that the systemic discipline as a 
whole has some ethical responsibility to attempt to promote a wider debate on this point.  
However, there are very strong arguments for the benefits and relevance of a systemic way 
of thinking about families in the justice system in terms of its focus on relationship rather 
than individuals, its ability to bridge the dichotomy between expertise in adults or children, 
and the attention it pays to issues of marginalisation and disempowerment 
So I offer two conclusions which might be drawn from this research on this issue (these 
“alternative endings” might be seen in the systemic tradition of  containing complexity and 
multiplicity – or, as Alex put it “hedging and fudging”!).  
Firstly, that working as an expert witness is either not practical for systemic practitioners or 
not compatible with fundamental systemic principles, but systemic practice has much to offer 
in the wider family justice system. There may be other roles beside that of the traditional lone 
expert in the forensic arena. Time will tell whether the recommendation for further research 
into the effectiveness of family assessment teams will be followed; but in the meantime the 
Family Drug and Alcohol Court model is being rolled out in Milton Keynes (so far without a 
designated systemic post). One would hope that the value of a systemic input to the team, at 
least in terms of supervision, would be evident. If there is to be further future development of 
parenting programmes such as previously offered by IFT, I would argue that there should be 
a stronger and more obvious systemic presence in them. As Chimera (2010)  points out, the 
advantage of having a systemic practitioner involved in such work is that the sessions 
followed a format rather than a manual and interventions could be tailored to the needs of 
the particular group. 
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Another possible avenue for the effective involvement of systemic practitioners in the lives of 
families who are in, or at risk of entering, the family justice system is the Reclaiming Social 
Work initiative. This was recommended as a model of good practice in the Munro report 
(2011) on improving safeguarding practices in children’s services and has a strong emphasis 
on systemic models of thinking about families and their relationship with services, and the 
inclusion of a qualified or shortly to be qualified systemic therapist in the social work team 
(Goodman and Trowler 2012). The model is already being rolled out in local authorities (for 
example Hackney and Cambridgeshire) with training for social work staff being delivered by 
the Institute for Family Therapy. There is therefore scope not only for becoming involved 
directly but for contributing to  the training and supervision of those doing the direct work. 
Secondly, one might conclude that systemic practitioners have skills and knowledge which is 
well-suited to the expert role and that more should be done to promote their involvement. 
Current systemic experts are already working on promoting their visibility and collaborating 
more as a specialist group within systemic practice. This could also involve a more focussed 
systemic input to judicial training.  
Lack of feedback and research 
I had not anticipated finding a connection between the systemic experts and the judges in 
terms of the lack of feedback available to them on the effectiveness of their individual 
interventions, which have major implications for the long-term wellbeing of children and 
families. Given the “therapeutic” or “helping” focus of many judicial interventions (Eekelaar 
and Maclean’s 2013 research supports my own findings on this),  more research would 
seem timely on the interface between judges and “psy” knowledges, and on how judges 
make decisions. We also need to know  whether they would benefit from more professional 
support of the type enjoyed by professionals facing similar emotional demands such as 
therapists and social workers.  
  192  
 
Managing distress in the family justice system 
The third thread is the distress experienced by children in the family justice system, 
especially those involved in private law cases, and the lack of appropriate resources to 
address it. Connected to that is a concern that there are insufficient resources both to 
prevent families entering the public law system and to support them once they are in it. 
Wider and deeper exploration of these issues is also indicated.  
Recommendations 
I therefore offer the following suggestions for ways of continuing to explore these issues: 
 Those responsible for establishing quality standards for experts be invited to consider 
including experience of (and qualification in?) working with children and families. 
 The FJC and the Judicial College be offered the findings from this research with 
regard to future judicial training 
 Systemic practitioners who are interested in becoming or continuing as systemic 
experts should: 
o become familiar with current research on court assessment processes  
o promote their practice, and the particular relevance of a relational approach in 
family court work as widely as possible within the systemic community by: 
 offering more “introductory” training for systemic colleagues as well as 
judicial training  
 writing articles 
 publicising  the possibility of “sitting in” 
o establish quality measures for a systemic expert report 
o develop a resource pack of information leaflets 
 
 Further research should be undertaken on 
  193  
 
o ways of giving more effective feedback to experts and judges 
o the assumptions which inform judicial decisions in family cases 
o whether there is a need for more formal or informal (peer) support for family 
judges  
The whole question as to whether there is potential to improve the experiences of children 
and families in the justice system, whether in public or private legal proceedings, would also 
merit much deeper exploration. 
I commented in the methodology section on the impossibility of being satisfied that one had 
ever “finished” an endeavour such as this.  I was tempted to quote Ovid “iamque opus exegi” 
but the work is not completed; it is, however,  time to launch it into the world. So here is  ... 
the beginning. 
“To make an end is to make a beginning. 
The end is where we start from” 
(TS Eliot Four Quartets “Little Gidding” pt 5) 
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Appendix 1 
 
Questionnaire used by Doctors.net.uk to collect data to inform “Bearing 
Good Witness” 
 
PROVIDING MEDICAL EVIDENCE TO THE COURTS 
1. What is your specialty?  Paediatrician   □ 
Child psychiatrist  □ 
with psychology? □ 
Adult psychiatrist  □ 
with psychology? □ 
 
2. What is your grade?   Consultant   □ 
Associate specialist  □ 
Senior registrar   □ 
Specialist registrar  □ 
Staff Grade   □ 
Senior House Officer  □ 
 
3. Please tell us where you are based: 
London □  Midlands □  Northeast □  Northwest □ 
South-east □  Wales and Cheshire □  Southwest □  Scotland □ 
 
4. Do you currently act as a witness for the courts?  No  □ 
(please answer questions 5A - 7A) 
Yes  □ 
(please answer questions 5B - 8B ) 
I used to, but I've stopped  □ 
(please answer questions 5C-10C ) 
 
FOR THOSE WHO ANSWER “NO” 
5A. Why are you not willing to act as a witness? (tick all answers which apply) 
• Never been asked       □ 
• I don't feel qualified       □ 
• I don't get involved in child protection work    □ 
• No time to do it       □ 
• Too stressful        □ 
• I'll get insufficient remuneration for it to be worthwhile  □ 
• Worried about adverse publicity     □ 
• Fear of referral to the GMC      □ 
• I don't know how the courts operate     □ 
• I'm unsure about the evidence base     □ 
• Adversarial process in court is intimidating/off-putting  □ 
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• There are always cancellations/delays in the courts   □ 
• I don't know how to write a report     □ 
• My employer is negative about giving me time off 
from my clinical work to appear in court    □ 
• Other (please specify) ……………………………………  □ 
 
6A. Please rank these reasons in order of importance to you (starting with "1" against 
the most important factor) 
(answers will be pulled through from the answers selected for the previous question) 
 
7A. What, if anything, would make you willing to act as a witness? 
…………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
FOR THOSE WHO ARE CURRENTLY ACTING AS AN EXPERT WITNESS: 
5B. Please indicate, in the last five years, approximately how many times you have 
acted as an expert 
witness in court proceedings (even if you did not actually appear in court on all 
occasions): 
1-5 times       □ 
6-10 times       □ 
11-15 times       □ 
16-20 times       □ 
more than 20 times      □ 
 
6B. If you have acted as a witness in the last 5 years, please could you tell us: 
• How many times you gave evidence as the doctor who treated 
the person concerned?      □ 
• How many times you acted as an expert witness to the court? 
(ie were asked to provide an opinion)    □ 
• How many of each type of cases you did? (please give number in each 
category) 
Family        □ 
Criminal       □ 
Civil        □ 
• Whether you did this work within your NHS contract? (estimated percentage of 
cases done within NHS contract or outside it) 
Within NHS contract  □  Outside NHS contract  □  
(tick if applicable)   I'm not in the NHS  □ 
• What is the most you were paid? (approximate figures) 
£ □ per hour 
and/ or £ □ per case 
• What is the least you were paid? (approximate figures) 
£ □ per hour 
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and/ or £ □ per case 
• Roughly how many cases would you expect to undertake in a year?  □ 
• Approximately how many cases a year do you turn down?   □ 
• How long does it take you, on average, to produce a report for the court: 
-Number of hours’ work preparing/writing it? (ie chargeable hours)  □ 
-Total number of weeks needed to produce it?     □ 
 
7B. Have you received any special training to be an expert witness?  Yes  □ 
No  □ 
If yes, please tell us what……………………………………………………… 
 
8B.What, if anything, would make you more positive about being an expert witness? 
……………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
FOR THOSE WHO USED TO BE AN EXPERT WITNESS, BUT HAVE STOPPED: 
5C. Please indicate, in the last five years, approximately how many times you acted as 
an expert 
witness in court proceedings (even if you did not actually appear in court on all 
occasions): 
1-5 times       □ 
6-10 times       □ 
11-15 times       □ 
16-20 times       □ 
more than 20 times      □ 
 
6C. Within the last 5 years, please could you tell us: 
• How many times you gave evidence as the doctor who treated 
the person concerned?       □ 
• How many times you acted as an expert witness to the court? 
(ie were asked to provide an opinion)     □ 
• How many of each type of cases you did? (please give number in each category) 
Family         □ 
Criminal        □ 
Civil         □ 
• Whether you did this work within your NHS contract? (estimated percentage of cases 
done within NHS contract or outside it) 
Within NHS contract    □  Outside NHS contract  □ 
(tick if applicable)   I'm not in the NHS  □ 
• What is the most you were paid? (approximate figures) 
£ □ per hour 
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and/ or £ □ per case 
• What is the least you were paid? (approximate figures) 
£ □ per hour 
and/ or £ □ per case 
7C. Did you receive any special training to be an expert witness?  Yes  □ 
No  □ 
If yes, please tell us what……………………………………………………… 
 
8C. Why are you no longer willing to act as a witness? (tick all answers which apply) 
• No time to do it       □ 
• Too stressful        □ 
• I get insufficient remuneration for it to be worthwhile   □ 
• Worried about adverse publicity     □ 
• Fear of referral to the GMC      □ 
• Adversarial process in court is intimidating/off-putting  □ 
• There are always cancellations/delays in the courts   □ 
• My employer is negative about giving me time off 
from my clinical work to appear in court    □ 
• Other (please specify) ……………………………………  □ 
 
9C. Please rank these reasons in order of importance to you (starting with "1" against 
the most important factor) 
(answers will be pulled through from the answers selected for the previous question) 
 
10C. What, if anything, would make you willing to act as a witness again? 
…………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Medical Expert Witness 
© Crown copyright 2006 
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Appendix 2  
 
Questionnaire for systemic psychotherapists [adapted from that used by Doctors.net.uk to collect data 
to inform “Bearing Good Witness” (Donaldson, 2007)].  
 
PROVIDING EXPERT  EVIDENCE TO THE FAMILY COURTS 
 
 
 
1. Do you have dual qualification?     Psychiatrist              □ 
                                                                 Psychologist                   □ 
                Social Worker         □ 
                                                                 Nurse                             □ 
                                                                 Other                             □ 
                                                                 None                           □ 
 
 
2. What is your grade?     Specialist  □ 
Highly Specialist  □ 
Consultant   □ 
 
 
 
3. Please tell me where you are based: 
London □  Midlands □  Northeast □  Northwest □ 
South-east □  Wales and Cheshire □  Southwest □  Scotland □ 
 
4. Do you currently act as an expert witness for the family courts?  No  □      (please 
answer                                questions 5A and 6A overleaf) 
 
 
 
             Yes  □        (please answer 
questions 5B - 8B page 3) 
                                          
 
            I used to, but I've stopped  □(please answer 
questions 5C-10C  page4-5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR THOSE WHO ANSWER “NO” 
5A. Why are you not willing to act as a witness? (please mark all that apply with a number to 
indicate the order of importance, 1 being the most important) 
• Never been asked       □ 
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• I don't feel qualified       □ 
• I don't get involved in child protection work    □ 
• No time to do it       □ 
• Too stressful        □ 
• I'll get insufficient remuneration for it to be worthwhile  □ 
• Worried about adverse publicity     □ 
• Fear of referral to professional body    □ 
• I don't know how the courts operate     □ 
• I'm unsure about the evidence base     □ 
• Adversarial process in court is intimidating/off-putting  □ 
• There are always cancellations/delays in the courts   □ 
• I don't know how to write a report     □ 
• My employer is negative about giving me time off 
from my clinical work to appear in court    □ 
• Other (please specify): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6A. What, if anything, would make you willing to act as a witness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR THOSE WHO ARE CURRENTLY ACTING AS AN EXPERT WITNESS: 
5B. Please indicate, in the last five years, approximately how many times you have 
acted as an expert witness in court proceedings (even if you did not actually appear in 
court on all occasions): 
1-5 times       □ 
6-10 times       □ 
11-15 times       □ 
16-20 times       □ 
more than 20 times      □ 
 
6B. If you have acted as a witness in the last 5 years, please could you tell us: 
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• How many times you gave evidence as the psychotherapist involved in the 
treatment of the family concerned?     □ 
• How many times you acted as an expert witness to the court? 
(ie were asked to provide an opinion)    □ 
• How many of each type of cases you did? (please give number in each 
category) 
Public Family Proceedings                                                   □ 
Private Family Proceedings                                                 □ 
• Whether you did this work within your NHS contract? (estimated percentage of 
cases done within NHS contract or outside it) 
Within NHS contract  □  Outside NHS contract  □  
(tick if applicable)   I'm not in the NHS  □ 
• Roughly how many cases would you expect to undertake in a year?  □ 
• Approximately how many cases a year do you turn down?                 □ 
• How long does it take you, on average, to produce a report for the court: 
-Number of hours’ work preparing/writing it? (ie chargeable hours)  □ 
-Total number of weeks needed to produce it?    □ 
 
7B. Have you received any special training to be an expert witness?  Yes    □ 
No   □ 
If yes, please tell me what: 
 
 
 
 
 
8B.What, if anything, would make you more positive about being an expert witness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR THOSE WHO USED TO BE AN EXPERT WITNESS, BUT HAVE STOPPED: 
5C. Please indicate, in the last five years, approximately how many times you acted as 
an expert 
witness in court proceedings (even if you did not actually appear in court on all 
occasions): 
1-5 times       □ 
6-10 times       □ 
11-15 times       □ 
16-20 times       □ 
more than 20 times      □ 
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6C. Within the last 5 years, please could you tell us: 
• How many times you gave evidence as the psychotherapist involved in the treatment 
of the family concerned?                                 □ 
• How many times you acted as an expert witness to the court? 
(ie were asked to provide an opinion)     □ 
• How many of each type of cases you did? (please give number in each category) 
Public Family Proceedings                                                            □ 
Private Family Proceedings                                                               □ 
 
• Whether you did this work within your NHS contract? (estimated percentage of cases 
done within NHS contract or outside it) 
Within NHS contract    □  Outside NHS contract  □ 
(tick if applicable)   I'm not in the NHS  □ 
7C. Did you receive any special training to be an expert witness?  Yes  □ 
No  □ 
If yes, please tell me what: 
 
 
 
 
8C. Why are you no longer willing to act as a witness? (please mark all answers which 
apply with a number to indicate order of importance, 1 being the most important) 
• No time to do it       □ 
• Too stressful        □ 
• I get insufficient remuneration for it to be worthwhile   □ 
• Worried about adverse publicity     □ 
• Fear of referral to the professional body   □ 
• Adversarial process in court is intimidating/off-putting  □ 
• There are always cancellations/delays in the courts   □ 
• My employer is negative about giving me time off 
   from my clinical work to appear in court    □ 
• Other (please specify) ……………………………………  □ 
 
10C. What, if anything, would make you willing to act as a witness again? 
 
 
Medical Expert Witness 
© Crown copyright 2006 
Adapted for doctoral research in systemic psychotherapy by Sue Hickman 2009 
PSI licence C2009001050  
  202  
 
Appendix 3 
Application to the Ministry of Justice for Research Approval 
Details of proposed research  
 
The interface between  systemic/family psychotherapy and the family courts: 
with a particular focus on expert reports 
Sue Hickman, MA, CQSW, DST 
 
Potential benefits to the judiciary and to the family justice system: 
 
 The proposed research would contribute to the objectives of the Family Justice 
Council specifically in relation to Strategic Objective 3 of the FJC’s 2008/9 
Business Plan “to examine the use and role of experts in the Family Justice 
System”, and more broadly within the framework of inter-disciplinary 
collaboration.  
 
 The research would provide data with potential for enriching the discussion of 
this topic in the training and continuing professional development of 
systemic/family psychotherapists and of the judiciary, and thus in Sir Liam 
Donaldson’s (2006) words “find new ways of working with each other” 
(“Bearing Good Witness” p2) and determining more common ground about 
what constitutes a “good report”.  
 
 This in turn could result in better outcomes for children and young people who 
are the subject of family court proceedings. 
 
 The research would make a contribution to the development of multi-
disciplinary teams of “experts” within the NHS and the recruitment of more 
systemic psychotherapists to this role, as envisaged by “Bearing Good 
Witness”. 
 
Although this research is connected with a course of post-graduate study, it would 
have these clear benefits for the family justice system and is thus in the public 
interest.  As such it has the personal support of Lord Justice Thorpe, chair of the 
experts’ committee of the Family Justice Council, who has indicated that he would 
imagine I might also rely on the support of the committee. 
I will need to submit a final research proposal to the university in June 2009, and it 
would be helpful to know before then whether I am going to be able to include 
members of the judiciary.  Judges are the most influential and significant “users” of 
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reports and previous research (Tufnell et al 1996) suggests that the views of judges 
differ significantly from those of advocates (the other potential source of the “legal” 
position) in determining what constitutes a good report. In order for the potential 
benefits to be maximised judicial participation is therefore necessary.   
 
Details of Proposal 
 
The provisional research question is: "Judges in the family courts and the family 
psychotherapists who make reports to them: how far is understanding shared about 
the nature of this process?” There are many words and phrases used in this context, 
such as “fact”, “opinion”, “truth”, “observation”, “knowledge”, “expertise”, “reality” and 
”objectivity”, which may have subtle differences of meaning for the participants 
involved depending on their beliefs about the nature of the world and our relationship 
with it.  I am interested in exploring what differences and what similarities there may 
be between the judiciary and the systemic practitioners in approaching some of 
these ideas, and the implications for their successful joint working in the interests of 
children.  
 
I do not envisage that judicial discretion or independence would be impaired by 
participation in this research or that it is in any way politically controversial. 
 
 The research would be qualitative, with a detailed analysis of data 
gathered from semi-structured interviews.  However, I also want to explore 
whether it would be possible to reproduce to some extent within the 
systemic psychotherapy field the quantitative survey conducted for 
“Bearing Good Witness” (2006), which was restricted to doctors. 
 
 I would like to interview family court judges about their ideas about the 
concepts above, the source of these ideas (for example, professional 
training), how they influence their professional actions, especially in 
relation to expert reports, and whether they would expect systemic 
psychotherapists to have similar or different ideas.  It might be helpful to 
explore instances where reports written from a systemic perspective have 
been particularly helpful or problematic, but without going into the details of 
the case. 
 
 I will also be interviewing systemic psychotherapists who are experienced 
in writing expert reports in relation to their involvement with the family 
justice system.  The focus of the interviews will be similar. 
 
 I do not have any specific interviewees in mind among the judiciary.  
However, they would obviously need to be experienced in family work and 
if it were possible I would like the participants to come from different levels 
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of the judiciary and to reflect diversity in gender and ethnicity. I am based 
in Bedford and from a practical point of view it would be helpful to identify 
participants within reasonable geographical reach.  I am married to a 
district judge based in Milton Keynes and I would need to think carefully 
about the implications of interviewing anyone with whom he is closely 
connected. If this research is approved it would be helpful to have 
guidance on recruitment. 
 
 The research would entail my carrying out a semi-structured interview of 
up to 90 minutes, with five to seven judicial participants.  I would be happy 
to meet any requirements of the Ministry of Justice in relation to making 
my thesis, or any subsequent publication, available for comment, and 
intend to prepare a shorter version or my findings for circulation or 
presentation to the judiciary as required. 
 
 Interviews would be recorded by audio-tape for the purposes of 
transcription and analysis. All material in the thesis and in any publications 
will be anonymised, and will therefore not be attributable to any individual. 
 
 I do not imagine that there will be any need for reference to details of 
individual cases.  If a particular report were discussed this would be in 
terms of the features which made it helpful or unhelpful rather than in 
terms of the specific content of the case. If there were any material relating 
to this topic published by the Judicial Studies Board it would be useful to 
have access to it, but I understand that there is none.  
 
 I am proposing to fund this research myself and I will be the only 
researcher involved.  The only other parties to the research will be the 
academic bodies who are supervising and assessing it. They will need to 
approve the research proposal which I have to submit this summer. 
 
 I imagine the research will be taking place over the academic years 
2009/11. 
 
 I am not aware of any other research on this topic specifically.  I note that 
there was no professional body representing solely the systemic field (for 
example, The Association for Family Therapy and Systemic Practice) 
involved either in the consultations for “Bearing Good Witness” or the 
working party on FJC’s inter-disciplinary curriculum.   
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Appendix 4 
Letter for participants 
Dear  
Thank you again for agreeing to participate in research I am undertaking in connection with my 
professional doctorate in systemic psychotherapy.  I am writing to confirm the date, time and venue 
that we have agreed as follows for a semi-structured interview lasting approximately one and a half 
hours: 
As I have explained before, the proposed focus of my research is the interface between 
systemic/family psychotherapists and judges in family courts, with particular reference to expert 
reports.  I am particularly interested in what  similarities and differences of understanding there may 
be between systemic “experts” and the judges who will be the recipients of their reports about the 
meaning of words commonly used in this context, such as “fact”, “opinion”, “truth”, “observation”, 
“knowledge”, “expertise”, “reality” and ”objectivity”.   I am also curious about the process by which 
systemic psychotherapists are invited to write reports as experts, the way they approach this 
process, and how their reports are received and perceived by the judiciary.   This will be explored by 
interviewing a number of systemic psychotherapists who are experienced in writing reports for court 
as well as a number of family court judges who are experienced in receiving them, and by analysing 
the transcripts of these interviews.  My hope is that findings might enhance professional  training in 
this interface and encourage more clinicians to consider participating in the medical expert witness 
service as envisaged by “Bearing Good Witness” (Donaldson 2007).  This research project has been 
approved academically and ethically by the University of East London. 
 
The interviews will be audio-recorded digitally for the purposes of transcription and analysis. All 
recorded material will be anonymised at all stages of the research process, and will therefore not be 
attributable to any individual participant.  I would like to be able to retain interview data beyond the 
writing up of the research project so that it can be remain a resource on the topic for the future, but 
if individual participants wish it to be destroyed as soon as the thesis is submitted, or within a 
specific timeframe, please let me know and I will ensure that this is done.  Should you wish to 
receive a copy of the transcript of your interview once it is available please let me know and I will be 
happy to supply one.  I do not imagine that there will be any need for reference to details of 
individual cases.  If a particular report were discussed this would be in terms of the features which 
made it helpful or unhelpful rather than in terms of the specific content of the case.  However, it  is 
possible that sensitive clinical or judicial material might be inadvertently discussed.  In that 
circumstance I would not use such data in any way which might make it possible to identify 
individuals, and I will ensure security of the information.  
It is also possible that the interview might touch on emotionally distressing topics.  Obviously I 
assume that you may terminate the interview or withdraw from the study at any point for whatever 
reason and without giving an explanation, or refuse to answer any particular question.  Finally I have 
to address the possibility, however remote, that some question of professional misconduct might 
arise which would need to be resolved through the appropriate channels.    
I would be very happy to make the final thesis available to all participants, to prepare a shortened 
version of the findings for presentation in any relevant training contexts, and to meet the 
requirements of the Ministry of Justice in relation to publication. 
Yours etc 
Sue Hickman, MA, CWSW, DST 
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Appendix 5 
Development of Judicial questions 
How long have you been sitting in the family courts? Included throughout inc pilot 
 
What experience did you have of family work prior to your appointment to the bench? 
Included throughout exc pilot 
 
I wonder if you can tell me how you think the role of a judge in family courts differs from that 
of a judge in other areas of law? (?Follow up on “family minded”, blood on the carpet” 
quotes) 
Added in response to J1’s comments about the difference between family and any other sort 
of work 9(542-605). Order changed after ?J2 to follow the completion of the 
“factual/proportional”  questions. Prompts added after J4 and 5 contributed their soundbites  
 
Roughly what proportion of the cases you hear are public and what private law?  Included 
throughout inc pilot 
 
Is it possible to give an approximate idea of the proportion of cases you hear which involves 
an expert report? (clarify at this point that for the purposes of this interview only 
psychological/psychiatric reports are meant). Included throughout inc pilot (clarification 
added after J2) Does the proportion vary between public and private law cases? Added 
after? SP2. 
Of that number, roughly what proportion give oral evidence? Included throughout 
 
What do you personally expect of an expert report?  (prompt on length, objectivity, clarity of 
and rationale for recommendation). Included throughout 
 
Some judges have talked about the assessment process and the writing of the report as 
creating an opportunity to bring about some change for the family: what would your view be 
on this? 
Added for J5 in response to J4’s comments 
 
Could you think about reports you remember as being particularly helpful or unhelpful and 
identify what factors made them so? Included throughout 
 
What differences and what similarities do you see between the way the judiciary think about 
(and approach?)  cases in the family courts and the way the psychiatrists, psychologists and 
psychotherapists do? 
Added after J1 esp 274 “the lawyer wants precision and the doctor tries things out”.  Order 
varies, sometimes before Q abt expectations of expert report 
 
Are you aware of having received reports from systemic family psychotherapists? If so, 
would you be able to identify and features which distinguish them from reports from other 
disciplines or professions?  Where would you expect their expertise to lie? (probe on extent 
of knowledge about sfp) Included throughout 
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In what circumstances if any would you order or request a specific therapeutic intervention? 
Discarded after J1 made it clear (350) that judges don’t have power to order interventions) 
Reworded as: What factors would you take into account in thinking what type of expert 
(psychiatrist, psychologist or psychotherapist) is best suited to a particular case? Included 
from J1 onwards 
 
What experiences have informed your thinking about this? (prompt on training)Included 
throughout 
 
What training would you recommend or what advice would you give to any therapist 
considering taking on the role of expert witness? Included throughout 
 
What skills and qualities does an expert need in addition to their “regular” professional skills? 
Added as a supplementary in J2 when issue of training for experts is being discussed and 
retained. 
 
What do you think an expert witness expects of you in the court process? (prompt on cross-
examination) (possible follow up: What kind of occasions might provoke judicial engagement 
with an expert witness?) Included throughout 
 
How much do you take into account the effects of the court process on the present and 
future emotional well-being and relationships of the participants? Included throughout exc 
pilot 
 
I believe family judges are being encouraged to be more “interventionist”: what does this 
mean to you and what are your views about it? Added in response to J1’s comments about 
judges becoming more interventionist, and also Sir Nicholas Wall’s “Law in Action” 
comments in October 2010 
Included early on in J3’s interview as it fitted with what was said about the role of the family 
judge 
 
What if any aspects of what you do as a judge or the court process in general would you 
consider to be “therapeutic “  in a broad sense? Added after SP2 interview, also connected 
to J1’s comments about change occurring in the court process (88-9), and J2’s comments 
about trying to “mediate, conciliate, achieve a better outcome” (375) 
 
Is there any question that you expected me to ask you that I haven’t and that it would have 
been helpful if I had asked it? Included for J1, order between this and subsequent question 
varies, omitted in error from J4 who was in rather a hurry to finish 
 
Is there anything you would like to add, or any comments you would like to make about the 
process of the interview?  
 
 If time, give gist of Kaplan article and ask for comment. 
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Appendix 6 
Development of Systemic questions 
1 How long have you been involved in writing reports for the family courts?  
Included throughout 
 
2 What proportion are public law cases and what private? Has the proportion changed 
over time: if so, how? In what proportion of cases are you called to give oral 
evidence? 
Not in pilot; included as result of distinctions made in judicial pilot 
 
3 How did you get involved in the first place? If you have continued to do this kind of 
work what has kept you drawn you to it? If not, what has deterred you? 
First part of question not asked in pilot because information emerged, but seemed 
essential to include; idea of “attraction”/”being drawn to”’”enjoying” informed by J1and 
J2’s comments.  Various words tried out after SP2 questioned “enjoying” 
 
4 What ideas did you have about what was expected of you?  How were those ideas 
informed? How have they changed over time in undertaking the role?  
Included throughout  
 
5 What skills and qualities does an expert need in addition to their “regular” 
professional skills as a therapist? 
Included throughout  
 
6 What feedback have you had about your reports?   
Included throughout  
 
7 What’s your current view of what constitutes a good report? 
Included throughout  
8 How would you position yourself theoretically within the broad systemic “church”?  
How well does this position fit with the role of expert witness? (prompt on objectivity, 
meaning of expertise etc) 
 First part included only for SP7 as result of discussion with peers on range of 
theoretical positions amongst previous participants 
 
9 What do you think are the particular strengths of a report written from a systemic 
perspective? (prompt on power issues, marginalising, wider systems) 
Included throughout 
 
10 What differences and what similarities do you see between the way the judiciary think 
about cases  in the family courts and the way systemic experts do? (Prompt on how 
“systemic” are judges)  
Included for all but pilot after J1’s comment on lawyers wanting precision and doctors 
wanting to try things out.  Prompt added after SP4 commented on how systemic 
judges could be 
 
11 What if any differences are there between public and private law cases in terms of 
the experts’ role? Added in response to distinctions drawn in feedback (Q 17) by SP3 
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12 What differences if any do you think there are between acting as an expert in a 
“private” capacity and in the course of employment  in the public services? 
(supplementary on “the whole system is corrupt” comment) informed by SP5’s 
comments about the potential for corruption and SP6’s reflections on working in the 
public sector 
 
13 What is the potential for therapeutic change in the process of making an assessment 
for court? (prompt on impact on relationship, do you think change is expected by the 
commissioners?) What do you think is the impact of the interaction with families that 
it will be the subject of a court report and how do you manage this? Informed by 
SP2’s comments and included thereafter. Second part of question got positive 
feedback from pilot but for some reason not always included thereafter  
 
14 What experiences have been the most helpful in preparing for and developing the 
role? (prompt on training opportunities) 
Included throughout  
15 If you had the opportunity to communicate with judges about the process or practice 
of writing a report from a systemic perspective, what ideas would you want to share 
with them? 
Included throughout  
16 What do you expect of the judges? (prompt on protection in the witness box) 
Included throughout 
17 How far do you think judges take into account the impact of the court process on the 
present and future emotional wellbeing and relationships of participants?  
Included in all systemic interviews after positive feedback to parallel question from J1 
 
18 What do you think judges mean when they talk about being more “interventionist” in 
family cases? 
Included in response to comments by J1 and position statement about this time by  
19 Is there anything you would like to add, or any comments you would like to                                                      
make about the process of the interview? Do you mind if I just check to make sure I haven’t 
missed out any questions?   
First part of question elicited some useful ideas eg the public private distinction 
 
1 Are there any questions that you expected me to ask that I haven’t? 
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Appendix 7 
 
  TRANSCRIPTION NOTATIONS 
 
The transcription notations used were as follows.  
 
...  Untimed pause which is noticeable but too short to measure. 
 
..(2)..  Pause timed to nearest second. 
 
word  Underline - emphasis placed  on words by speaker. 
 
(overlap)  Overlapping utterance 
 
.……  Speaker trails off. If followed by (overlap) then indicates 
  that speaker has been interrupted. At the beginning of a  
  sentence it indicates continuance of statement after (overlap) 
 
(indistinct) Inaudible. This will refer to one or two words. It will be  
  indicated if longer section of dialogue. 
 
(?)  Preceding word not 100% clear. 
 
(laughs)  Non-verbal information 
 
SH  Researcher's contributions 
 
^^^            Section of extract left out 
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Appendix 8 
First example of coding 
SP1 I’m talking about the families I’ve seen, yeah...  86 confirming 
SH That they’ve appreciated that... 87 Reflection of confirmation/affirmation? 
SP1 Yeah, very often they have, yeah 88 Dance of confirmation 
SH I’m going to anticipate a question that I thought 
might fit in later on, 
89 Thinking aloud  
but I’m kind of wondering, I guess it might depend 
on the context how soon the families become 
aware or you become aware that you might be 
taking this position in relation to the work you’re 
doing with them 
90 Allowing for context 
but I’m wondering how you think it, the fact that 
you are producing something a report for court, 
how do you think that affects your interaction with 
families and maybe how you talk about it to them? 
91 Asking about impact of court work on interaction 
SP1 Well that’s generally where we start, I start by 
telling them I have to produce a report,  
A92 keeping families informed about need to produce  
report 
that I want to hear it the way they think about it, A93 Families thoughts are wanted 
that at the end of it or when we are coming close to 
the end I will also um arrange a time for me to go 
through what I’ve written with them, 
A94 Families will have chance to go through report 
um that I won’t necessarily ..change the 
recommendations or the conclusions that I might 
have come to, 
A95 expert reserves right to disagree 
but it gives them a chance to ..hear and see what 
I’m thinking 
A96 expert shares thinking 
and if they have a different idea about it I am 
happy to include that also 
A97 expert will include families’ thoughts 
um ...so...that’s generally right from the off, um part 
of setting the context I, I do that, 
98 Stressing importance of beginning from this point 
so that ..I think so that they don’t go into the court 
and are surprised by what they hear me say and 
they know that I am going to say the things I am 
saying 
A99 Shouldn’t be surprises in court 
and they can also ask me why I am saying the 
things that I am saying 
A100 families should have opportunity to challenge 
and usually in the report writing I say their words; A101 Using families own words 
part of the first of it is about describing the 
interview and their words 
A102 Report includes what family have said 
before I go on to make, have a discussion using 
the theory that I’ve been using to help me think and 
give meaning to their words, 
A103 report includes SP1’s explanation of theory 
so that’s there and if they think I haven’t heard their 
words as they intended they can tell me that. 
A104 Chance for family to clarify meaning 
SH Um, er do you think of those kind of 
interactions as having a therapeutic purpose as 
well as a purpose of ..information gathering? 
105 Introducing own hypothesis 
SP1 Yes, I do A106 assessment has therapeutic effect 
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Appendix 9 
Second example of coding 
so you know sometimes in the course of the 
work, I mean one family an incredible painful 
case where the mother really after having a lot of, 
quite a few contact meetings with her children 
with us decided that she wasn’t going to keep 
pushing for contact with them, she would leave it 
to them so that was a change that happened in 
the course of the work  
F129 parents changing their position on contact 
in course of work 
so really our task was not to say that we 
recommended that but that this was a decision 
and then talk about what might be the likely, talk 
about what had led up to that decision and what 
might be the likely consequences and how it 
would affect each of the children (SH um) and the 
father and so on and so forth 
F130 explaining process of change and likely 
consequences to court 
um so I do see the report as trying to create a 
new narrative and therefore it is very much 
looking very hard at what seems to have kept the 
system which is the legal system stuck before 
F131 report trying to create a new and unstuck 
narrative 
um ..(4)..you know one case it all sort of edged 
around whether a father’s new partner had or had 
not hit the child when the child had been visiting 
the parent and we were involved I don’t know 
kind of like three years after this incident and the 
father insisted that this partner had never met the 
child and the mother insisted that she had and 
the mother had assaulted the partner so it was a 
kind of huge battle over the truth 
F132 parents battling over the “truth” of allegation 
of violence 
a with that one we actually managed to find a 
way out of it in the court, it had developed, we did 
manage to get the father seeing the child partly 
by getting the mother’s mother got involved and 
was very helpful to us..(2)..and really just trying to 
find a way of having the father apologise to the 
child but without having to contradict his own 
narrative that the mother, that this woman had 
never met the child because basically nobody 
knew so  that was a kind of complicated one 
where social services were involved and all sorts 
F133 finding way forward that avoids 
contradicting either narrative 
so often I think the conclusions are quite in the 
kind of realm of more the sort of emotional truths 
than the sort of logics, it wouldn’t be very often 
that my conclusions would be that you know that 
the father should have overnight contact on 
alternative weekends because all that’s been 
done (SH um) you know. 
F134 reaching emotional not practical truths 
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Appendix 10 
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Appendix 11 
Codes extracted by participant 
(Bold italics show codes from examples of texts in appendices 8 and 9) 
 
A78 expert’s role is to flesh out and thicken description 
A79 systemic role is to flesh out and thicken description 
A82 client’s appreciation of bigger picture being provided 
A 83 appreciation expressed more than once 
A 84 Creates new ways for people to be portrayed 
A92 keeping families informed about need to produce report 
A93 Families thoughts are wanted 
A94 Families will have chance to go through report 
A95 expert reserves right to disagree 
A96 expert shares her thinking 
A97 expert will include families’ thoughts 
A99 Shouldn’t be surprises in court 
A100 families should have opportunity to challenge 
A101 Using families own words 
A102 Report includes what family have said 
A103 report includes SP1’s explanation of theory 
A104 Chance for family to clarify meaning 
A106 assessment has therapeutic effect 
A108 questions have therapeutic effect 
A109 assessment is in domain of production 
A110 inclusive process of assessment is therapeutic 
A117 client surprised by report 
A118 client expecting to be criticised 
A119 expert focussing on strength and resources as well as deficits 
A122 Effect on story of self can be more important than court outcome 
 
 
F118 systemic strength being able to engage people in possibility of change 
F119 systemic strength engaging with other sources of wisdom 
F120 respecting generational differences 
F120a respecting the logic of the system 
F121 systemic strength holding knowledges contingently 
F122 being irreverent to theory 
F124 holding multiple positions as way of mapping a system 
F125 distinguishing holding multiple positions from not being able to make your mind up 
F126 trying to present a new way of looking at things 
F127 considering what’s already been said 
F128 courts often tending to go for the middle ground/fair division of the child 
F129 parents changing their position on contact in course of work 
F130 explaining process of change and likely consequences to court 
F131 report trying to create a new and unstuck narrative 
F132 parents battling over the “truth” of allegation of violence 
F133 finding way forward that avoids contradicting either narrative 
F134 reaching emotional not practical truths 
F135 sometimes recommending something doesn’t happen 
F136 sometimes recommending separate legal representation 
F137 good report addresses everyone’s logic respecting difference and dilemmas 
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Appendix 12 
 
Codes arranged by “cluster” 
 
Change/ therapeutic effect in assessment (systemic) 
A 84 Creates new ways for people to be portrayed 
A100 using families’ own words  
A103 checking that intended meaning is heard  
A118 focussing on strength and resources as well as deficits  
A106 assessment has therapeutic effect 
A108 questions have therapeutic effect 
A109 assessment is in domain of production 
A110 inclusive process of assessment is therapeutic 
A117 client surprised by report 
A118 client expecting to be criticised 
A119 expert focussing on strength and resources as well as deficits 
A122 Effect on story of self can be more important than court outcome 
A127 positive change in family connected with aspects of her report 
A128 expert likes to believe positive change created by report  
A130 Change in parent’s reputation as result of report 
A135 Enriching but challenging clients’account 
C93 recognising ability to facilitate significant change 
C94 stopping being in court 
C125 difficult distinction between assessment and therapy 
C126 won’t be paid for therapy 
C127 entails working quickly 
C128 working towards change 
C131 nowhere else to do the work 
C133 have identified need for quick change 
 
Truth seeking 
C258 idea of truth seeking doesn’t fit 
C260 hard to be as certain as legal system wants you to be 
C261 legal system wants you to say this is what’s wrong 
C283 stuckness is around looking for a truth 
C290 systemic ew is not thinking about truth 
C291 systemic ew  is sharing “way of thinking” 
F134 reaching emotional not practical truths 
F159 finding of fact as one kind of truth 
F160(i) defining truth through connectedness 
F160(ii) using finding of fact as “truth” in work with parties 
F161 emotional truth vs finding of fact in some cases 
F162 living with the court’s truth 
G47 “finding of fact” is really opinion 
G48  all lawyers know truth is the truth used by one party at one time 
G49 certain problems with reality and objectivity 
G117a never claiming something happened, only that it was reported to have happened 
G118 courts liking these distinctions around “truth”  
G118a some ews haven’t got hang of these distinctions around “truth” 
G120 distinctions around truth informed by “barrister’s logic” 
G202 awkward if you have to assume “if A then B” eg re injuries 
G211 families being muddled by different standards of proof 
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Appendix 13 
Example of “e-memo” 
A128 memo 
 
what stories do therapists need to develop about their reports in order to maintain their belief 
in their competence to do them?  How is this connected to the amount of feedback they get 
about the usefulness of their reports to the court? How far do judges share the experience of 
not getting feedback about outcomes or having their practice observed by their peers? 
Revisited in extracting codes 26/4/12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  218  
 
 
Appendix 14 
Example of memo later incorporated into analysis 
Use and awareness of self 
“and I sometimes think that if I have been a good family judge - as I believe I have for a long time - 
it’s partly because I have so many problems of my own that enable me to understand personal 
problems and enable me to empathise with those that have problems like my own or different from 
my own and so I..I don’t let it all hang out I can assure you” (E) 
 
The idea that personal experience is a useful lens for judges occurred in several interviews.  B cannot 
understand how people can tolerate being torn to pieces for five days in court; D is a human being 
first, then partner, then judge, and also comments that although it is harder for money specialists to 
“steer” cases in the interests of children, most are parents or grandparents with a broad experience 
of life and so will be able to manage. K connected a sense of the importance of developing trust 
between the judge and the parties with having a family member who was a GP; trust might be 
promoted by showing empathy, getting involved, and “letting people know I bleed”. K also 
wondered how families coped with the experience of appearing in court. 
D and K describe a passion or drive to do the work they do which is not intellectual, but about 
gaining good outcomes for children  
Family law is described by H and K to be subjective: what H calls “structured discretion”, that is 
applying subjective judgments to established “objective” guidelines such as the welfare checklist.  H 
comments that the subjectivity of the expert interviewer can affect the assessment and goes on to 
say that no-one can shed subjectivity completely, although judges should make efforts to avoid 
stereotyping and compartmentalising their emotions: “getting real but not cynical”. J also 
emphasised the importance of being aware of one’s own preconceptions and making sure that one 
is not driven by them. 
E gave an account of feedback received from an expert who had felt unfairly treated and described 
the steps taken to explore this issue further and to make some changes in practice as a result. 
H talked about the toll that is taken (dreaming about cases) in arriving at decisions in complex cases, 
and of the need to “disguise the teetering”.  B commented that judges rely on the expert for help in 
making complex decisions: “maybe too much”. 
 
It does seem clear that some family judges rely quite considerably on what D calls “wisdom and 
experience” and will sometimes override professional recommendations on the basis of their own 
beliefs and ideas.  For example, D describes rejecting a care package prepared by a local authority 
because no provision had been made for the siblings to have contact with each other. Some of the 
systemic participants were quite critical of stances taken or ideas expressed.  Although several of the 
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judges said that they recognised the need to be aware of their “prejudices”, they might benefit from 
some of the resources that are available to therapists, such as supervision, to explore and identify 
these further.  The isolation of decision making was mentioned by H (check others). Herlihy et al 
(2010) undertook an analysis of the assumptions made by judges in asylum cases and compared 
them with psychiatric and psychological research findings.  They recommended further research in 
the area.  I am not aware of any similar research in the field of family law (tho I’m still waiting for an 
answer from Phil on this point!) and it might be extremely useful. 
Similarly I am not aware of any support being available to judges to manage the emotional toll 
(secondary trauma?) of the task they are required to undertake both in exposure to horrific material 
and the responsibility of the decision process.  Sachs (2009) describes the “tock-tick” of the judicial 
mind where (p48) “the actual journey of a judgment starts with the most tentative exploratory ideas 
and passes through large swathes of doubt ..before finally ending up as a confident exposition 
purportedly excluding any possibility of doubt”.  This account resonates with H’s “teetering” 
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Appendix 17 
Draft outline for data analysis 
systemic clusters 
 
judicial clusters 
what constitutes a good 
report/expert witness 
 
Elements of good report (systemic) 
Practical issues re presentation/court process: 
Showing your workings 
Taking a position 
Introducing new ideas 
Understanding the family/formulation 
Respecting difference 
Self-reflexivity 
Ethical dilemma 
Acting into context 
 
Skills/abilities required by ew 
Transferability from therapy 
Helpful theory 
Helpful technique 
 
a good report 
answering the question or making a judgment 
expert witness skills  
can systemic reports be helpful?  
W hat a systemic report has to offer 
General suitability 
Finding a fit with court’s story/repecting the 
logic of the system 
Useful techniques/ways of working/theory 
Considering wider network 
Challenging assumptions 
Keeping open mind/holding multiple positions 
Offering alternative explanations/options and tolerating 
uncertainty  
Thickening description 
Humanising the image 
Relational model 
Enabling change 
Social justice, marginalised voices 
Complexity 
 
Skills/abilities required by ew 
Transferability from therapy 
Helpful theory 
Helpful technique 
Lack of recognition and respect 
Lack of systemic tradition 
 
what expert for what question 
h/o expert witnesses 
ews used too much 
lack of experienced ews 
unreliability of ews 
visibility of sfp 
expectations of sfp 
BGW 
making sense of apparent conflicts,  
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inconsistencies, and constraints 
court appearance 
frequency/length 
Unpleasant experience 
Adversarial v inquisitorial 
Wariness re court process 
 
Discussing report with family 
Fit/lack of fit ew/systemic 
General ideas about fit 
Truth seeking 
Thinking about context 
Short time frame 
Certainty/clarity/complexity/hedging and 
fudging 
Taking a position/punctuating at a point in time  
Objectivity 
Systemic blinkers 
 
ew process - practical and ethical issues 
Finance/resources (further breakdown needed) 
Relationship with other agencies 
LIPs 
Corruption of ew system? 
Letters of instruction 
Public private distinctions 
Respecting the position of the lawyers 
 
facts/truth 
objectivity/ taking a particular line 
defensive law 
in court experience 
time issues 
finance and resource issues(further breakdown 
needed) 
letters of instruction 
 
emergence and maintenance of 
professional identity and expertise 
("learning on the job") 
 
court appearance 
frequency/length 
Unpleasant experience 
Adversarial v inquisitorial 
Wariness re court process 
Learning on the job  
Influence of others/careers/professions 
Being sought out, not seeking 
Ew work as thread 
Competence feedback loop 
Lack of systemic input on ew  
 
source of knowledge abt psi issues 
advice to potential ews 
ways to learn 
learning on the job 
shared commitment to the wellbeing of 
children and families  
 
Foregrounding children 
beastliness 
helping the court with difficult questions 
avoiding too much blood on the carpet 
family-mindedness 
paramouncy of child 
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 court as “critical moment” 
reliance on ews 
frustration 
ew/jud relationship 
awareness of the potential for change in 
assessment and the court process in 
general  
 
Change/ therapeutic effect in assessment  
 Doublespeak/LSC 
Judicial emotional literacy  
What the judges/LSC don’t understand 
 
the "therapeutic judge" 
emotional understanding 
court’s therapeutic potential 
intervening 
alternative disposals 
change 
ongoing assessment 
psychotherapy inconsistent with assessment 
impact of assessment on system 
Kaplan question 
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